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A PHILOSOPHIC APPROACH TO COMMUNISM

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A PHILOSOPHIC APPROACH TO COMMUNISM

BY
THEODORE B. H. BRAMELD, PH.D.

WITH A FOREWORD BY
T. V. SMITH, PH.D.

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Foreword

THE READER may easily introduce himself to the problem of this book by reflecting upon the common notion that men will not work if they believe that the rewards of work can be had without exertion. To believe that things will happen just so, regardless of what one does about them, has generally been called fatalism. Suppose one fully believed, as a stage driver in the West once confessed to me, that "what is fated will happen whether it ever comes to pass or not," would he cease from effort? I did not notice that my driver was less careful, more garrulous, or less courteous than other drivers with other overbeliefs. The fact of having beliefs seems at times more important than what the beliefs are, though even the having of beliefs has not been proved indispensable to action. Certainly the Mohammedans and, closer home, the Calvinists have not been sluggards in action, for all their fatalistic convictions. Nor has intellectual skepticism been unambiguously identified as a cause of vital lethargy. David Hume, it will be remembered, welcomed mild functioning as compensation for gravid skepticism. Those who do not think a cause worth dying for, nevertheless sometimes think it worth living for; and life has not infrequently been lived, and lived well, by those who consistently declared it not worth living. Caution will be slow, therefore, to wager wisdom upon any all-inclusive dogma as to the necessary relation between action and ideology. And all the more so since Communism came to Russia.

Rousseau, the democratic thinker closest to Communism, once declared that Russia would never be civilized

because it had been civilized too soon; and not a few Marxists have believed that Russia would be civilized (i.e., communized) last because it was not soon enough on the fated trail of industrialization. And yet Lenin picked Russia—or did Russia pick Lenin?—as the scene of the initial demonstration of human effort against the odds of fate, in a task that fate was vaguely supposed to take care of willy-nilly. How far does such effective history-making as Lenin indulged in depend upon a conviction of the worth-whileness of action? Does Marxism impair the efficacy of action by holding to the inevitability of Communism in the fullness of time? Or is the action in question whereby results *seem* to come about itself necessitated as an incidental part of the indispensable means to an inevitable end? Such are the questions that not only get raised by critics but that raise themselves bodily out of the pages of the great Marxists. Indeed, such questions rise so insistently and lend themselves to such duplex answers that Marxian assurance has served not only as a banner for the march but also as a symbol of dissension among the marchers.

It is such questions that Dr. Brameld has set out to answer in this book. He concerns himself primarily with the answers given by the great Marxists themselves—Marx, Engels, Lenin. Certain concluding hints of his as to ways and means of resolving inconsistencies, apparent or real, are incisive and suggestive; but the body of the book assumes a more modest, though hardly less valuable, rôle than that of corrective criticism—the rôle of exposing the sensitization of Marxian masters to these speculative problems and of presenting the many-sidedness of their re-

sponses thereto. In doing this, Dr. Brameld seems to me to have achieved a model of impartiality, seeking neither to convict nor to eulogize Marxism, though all the while clearly minded to implement the friendly assumption that its ideology has some basic consistency. Impartiality, of course, is itself differentially assessed by scholars in Communist and Capitalist cultures. Lenin has said that "neutrality is a narrow egotism"; and he and Marx are at one in suspecting impartiality as a camouflage for *counter*-propaganda. But to be able to depend upon what purports to be knowledge as being what it purports to be, must remain a comfort to those who are suborned to what we yet regard as truth.

Still that last remark is not fully informed with the foreground of Lenin's quoted dictum. Dr. Brameld has here made very clear that Marx and Lenin had an epistemology which rendered practice not only the confirmation of knowledge but an organic part of the process of knowing. This is, of course, heavily reminiscent of American pragmatism. Lenin took note of this resemblance, in a book that technical philosophers cannot permanently overlook—*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*—in order to distinguish dialectical materialism from the errors of pragmatism. Materialism, thought he, furnishes a metaphysics that can render more objective and therefore more dependable than can pragmatism, the bases of belief.

Our general problem of the relation of the individual and the cosmos is illustrated by this distinction in a very nice form indeed. The revolutionary spirit of Communism indicates clearly enough that things are not as they ought to be. The revolutionary spirit must eventuate as a pro-

gram for the reconstruction of things as they ought to be. But no Communist can give credence to anything so pale as a mere "ought to be." Conscience must be cosmos-grounded before it can be trusted. But can it be trusted then? Materialism has been thought by many to be a hopeless philosophy. And the Marxists have insisted upon materialism not only to the point of deriving all culture from modes of production but also to the point of rendering mind a mirror of objective reality. A thoroughgoing pan-objectivism, such as Communism achieves through its epistemology, would seem to nullify mind even more effectually than behaviorism has been thought to do. And yet mind is retained by Marx and Lenin, as a reflector of the strictly and severely objective. Such a view may perhaps still pass as materialism, even though it sport the luxury of a deckle-edged mentalism. This spiritualistic fringe, however, had even as ornament better be watched. It plays "as if," and then forgets that it was all play. Thus did the disdained "Utopians." Mind must merely reflect. Reflect what—what *is?* Yes, and what *was*. But if it can reflect what *was*, can it be estopped from reflecting what is *going to be?* No; it may also reflect what is going to be, if it *knows* that it *is* going to be.

Here is where the "dialectical" aspect counts. Historic materialism was static. Communist materialism—being, as Marx said, Hegelian idealism turned right side up—is dynamic. Mind in dialectical materialism is still a reflector; but it can now, like a crystal, reflect the truth, future as well as present and past. But it would not help revolutionary morale if it reflected a future just like the slavish present which produces the rebellious spirit. This is to forget that to meliorists—of whom the revolutionist is

normally one—the future is always going to be better. Revolutionary action is intended to make it better; and if to intention can be added insurance of outcome, the action will eventuate as intended. If, now, dialectics flashes from our mirror-minds a picture of the better-yet-to-be, metaphysical materialism, which produced and conditions our minds, is but revealing in that flash a subsequent stage of her inexorable unfolding. Through mind's merely reflecting the truth, the pan-objectivism of historic materialism becomes now a pan-hedonism of dialectical materialism. Since hedonic maxima are held by the Communist to imply equalitarianism, the picture flashed from mind clairvoyant of a future classless society is taken as certain sanction for the activity through which the inevitable outcome comes to be.

Short of that outcome, however, there will not improbably continue to be partisans of this or that class whose minds will reflect a future dominance of it. For I must add to Lenin's remark that "dialectic is the correct mirroring of the eternal development of the world," Plato's insight that "the dialectical method is no respecter of persons." But if Capitalist or Fascist, Nietzschean or Christian, use the Marxian logic for his own ends, his the responsibility. Mind is a remarkable matrix, and fecund. The Communist has received his flashes and is out both to make and to write history. I commend to the reader the material in this book as propaedutic to his own assessment of Communist theory at the ticklish point where human microcosm and material macrocosm meet.

T. V. Smith

Department of Philosophy
University of Chicago

Prefatory Note

THE author gratefully acknowledges valuable criticisms which have contributed to the development of this book—and especially those made by the following: Professors John Dewey, James H. Tufts, T. V. Smith, E. A. Burtt, Gregory D. Walcott, and Sidney Hook. That others have influenced this study through their writings will become sufficiently evident, but one scholar in particular must be mentioned: Mr. A. D. Lindsay. The author appreciates also encouragement from Mr. V. F. Calverton, Professors Frank H. Knight and Frederick L. Schuman, and assistance from Miss Martha Pilger.

T. B. H. B.

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Part One
INTRODUCTION

Chapter One

Demarcation

"There are little side eddies and whirlpools, yes; but the great current flows on as constantly as that of a mighty river."

These words, spoken earnestly by one of America's ablest Communists, state well what may be thought the fundamental problem underlying the society of Soviet Russia. They answer well, too, the question for him whose understanding is that Communism is essentially, and happily, absolutistic. They do not answer it so well for others—neither for those who fear the course the river takes; nor for those who are willing that the course should travel as this Communist insists, but who wonder whether as it goes it is not shaped, reshaped, by the eddies and whirlpools which dig minutely yet resolutely at the river's crumbling bank.

The questions raised by this simile necessitate first, however, a certain demarcation of subject-matter. *Communism* we shall define at once as *a synthesis of the doctrines of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.* That this definition is altogether inclusive could hardly be maintained by anyone familiar either with the variety of creeds descending from the "Communist Manifesto"[1] or with the intricate political concretions of that nation calling Communism its only creed. But there is much in favor of a definition

[1] K. Marx, "Communist Manifesto," *Essentials of Marx* (New York: Vanguard, 1927), pp. 25 ff. An example of the diversity of creeds recognizing this famous document is the Menshevik party of pre-revolutionary Russia, a party against which Lenin, a Bolshevik, fought vigorously.

which goes at once to the theoretical heart of a doctrine. Marx and Engels, as we shall have ample cause to show, were the postulators of virtually every foundation stone of that doctrine. Lenin is as yet the final spokesman in Soviet Russia itself: his views have come to assume a significance which no other exponent of the movement in this century equally possesses. To this friend and foe agree.[2]

Now it is of course clear that the term, Communism, once we settle our usage, might be held synonymous with either the term *Marxism* or *Leninism*. The difficulty is only that either of them is perhaps even more ambiguous popularly than a loose usage of the term chosen. Marxism, for example, has come to mean through the course of fifty years several different things none of which is too clearly related to the rest.[3] On the other hand, Leninism, while it is often regarded as including more than what Lenin himself wrote, has likewise only too soon acquired several connotations: according to Stalin it is the Marxism of the imperialist epoch and the proletarian revolution;[4] according to Fülöp-Miller it usually means Bolshevism in Russia today;[5] and according to Lenin's widow it is the Marxian methodology applied to new situations.[6] But

[2] Cf. the tribute of Lenin's enemy, Landau-Aldanov, as quoted in R. Fülöp-Miller, *Mind and Face of Bolshevism* (New York: Putnam's, 1927), p. 28.

[3] Cf. *infra,* pp. 200 ff.

[4] J. Stalin, *Theory and Practice of Leninism* (Chicago: Daily Worker Publ., no date), p. 2. Elaborated edition: *Leninism* (New York: International, 1928-33), Vol. I and II. Subsequent references are to former edition.

[5] Fülöp-Miller, *op. cit.,* p. 29.

[6] N. K. Krupskaya, *Memories of Lenin* (London: Lawrence, 1930), p. 189.

though any of these definitions is no doubt legitimate for specific purposes, one may no less arbitrarily regard Marxism or Leninism in its deepest sense as a synthesis of the doctrines of both, and so once more as one fundamentally with Communism as stated. The important point just now is that Marx, Engels, and Lenin are—whatever their doctrines be named—in definite correlation theoretically; or, more exactly, Lenin perpetuates the views of his predecessors in all important particulars.[7] This indeed is a subsidiary hypothesis to the central one we shall be called upon to consider. Meanwhile let Communism remain as our choice of terms.

From what has already been said it will be clear that there are connotations of Communism which though acceptable elsewhere are not included. The first is the extent to which the theory for which it stands is actually being applied in Soviet Russia. Lenin's writings, it is true, deal largely with concrete political situations; but in so far as the latter enter the discussion they do so, not to prove how far Communism in theory agrees with its practice, but rather how far in practice Communism agrees with its theory. That Lenin is greatly concerned with theory is indicated often, but nowhere more emphatically than in his citation with approval of a passage from Engels: "Without a sense for theory, scientific Socialism would have never become blood and tissue of the workers."[8]

[7] But this does not necessarily mean that Lenin is "orthodox" in the usual sense. Lenin is orthodox; but his orthodoxy consists, it will be argued, not as has been the case too often in adhering rigidly to the system of Marxism, but in appreciating *all* the features of Marxism.

[8] F. Engels, *Peasant War in Germany* (Leipzig, 1875), as quoted in V. I.

The second possible meaning of Communism here excluded concerns the overwhelming array of official Soviet and anti-Soviet literature which has grown out of the Bolshevik régime. To determine how far such commentators as Deborin, Bukharin, Timiriazev, Trotsky are consistently Communistic is no doubt a legitimate problem; but aside from incidental references to such writers the objective here is to clarify Communism in the direct sense defined. One reason why this procedure may fairly be justified is that genuinely objective opinions and examinations of Lenin's works are scarce. There are quantities with a bluntly propagandistic purpose, to be sure, for there is in Soviet Russia today a more or less "official" philosophy which is none too hospitable to other sorts. On the other hand, philosophers such as those excommunicated from the country after the Revolution have been inclined to dispose of that philosophy somewhat tersely.[9]

As to the subject-matter of Marx, Engels, and Lenin themselves a certain amount of demarcation is also necessary. It would be impossible to introduce all phases of their doctrine even though their economics and politics do play a part in any significant approach to that doctrine. The Marxian labor theory of value, for example, is integral; but to discuss its details or its possible refutations is a task exceeding the boundaries of this study. Similarly we do not propose to follow the historical or chronological development of the final views held by the three men.

Lenin, *Iskra Period,* collected works, IV (New York: International, 1929), Bk. II, 111.

[9] Cf. S. Frank, "Contemporary Russian Philosophy," *Philosophy Today,* ed. Schaub (Chicago: Open Court, 1928), pp. 553 ff.

As to the sources themselves, all of Marx and Engels with a few exceptions has been translated into English, and such exceptions are available in German. Moreover in the case of these two thinkers the vast amount of interpretation already existent is of course an important aid. In the case of Lenin his collected works in Russian are not available to the writer. But that a study of this nature is nevertheless legitimate—a study not so much concerned with every statement as with those revealing an essential point of view—is maintained for the following reasons: first, about half of Lenin's writings are already in English, and these happily contain his most significant views; they range from his earliest writings in 1893 to his latest in 1924; and in those years when his influence was greatest, events most significant, there is an especially abundant supply. In all, then, there are in English two volumes of selections, a large number of pamphlets, smaller volumes and articles, and finally his official collected works which fill eight substantial books. Second, there are several volumes by Lenin in the German. Third, this study has found valuable several commentaries containing passages of Lenin, such as Stalin's *Leninism,* and particularly a volume in German, *Lenin und die Philosophie* by Luppol, translated from the Russian.[10] While the interpretation therein may not be especially significant the volume contains a multitude of long passages from Lenin's writings which have not otherwise been translated from the Russian, and which bear on our particular approach. Indeed it is safe to assert that Luppol has omitted

[10] I. Luppol, *Lenin und die Philosophie* (Wien-Berlin: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1929).

very few statements of Lenin pertaining to any kind of philosophic interpretation.

As to the treatment of this material, two points: first, Marx and Engels, as more directly theorists, stated their views at least somewhat more systematically than did Lenin. Consequently in our chapters dealing with them we have been able to present more correlated statements often, than in the chapters on Lenin where his views are given by piecing together many brief comments. It is believed, however, that this latter procedure is legitimate; for Lenin would be the first to insist that his writings presuppose a systematic theory.

Second, the chapters on Lenin, despite the procedure necessary, attempt at times a more thorough exposition of his views than do the chapters on Marx and Engels of theirs. This does not imply, of course, that Lenin is more important. What it does imply is that his views, especially as systematic, are less familiar.

But when Communism thus has been expounded the remaining—and here the fundamental—necessity is that of treating it from a philosophic perspective. Now Communism is primarily a political doctrine; yet seldom in the history of great movements has there been one where philosophy is admitted to play such an important rôle. Marx as a young man was trained in philosophy. In his early days he cried that "Philosophy can not realize itself without the abolition of the proletariat, the proletariat can not abolish itself without realizing philosophy."[11] A good

[11] K. Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt-Berlin: V.M.B.H., 1927-30), I, Abt. I, as

portion of the writings of Marx and Engels as will be shown amply enough in the pages beyond are devoted to philosophy.

As to Lenin, however, we so often associate him with the hard-headed practical revolutionary that we are likely to overlook how deeply the philosophic spirit actually permeates his own work. Luppol has said, "Lenin is regarded as by no means a negligible factor in philosophic perspective . . . , he has posited a series of problems which one cannot ignore haughtily."[12] According to Lenin himself, philosophy is foundational to dialectical materialism: "We must understand," he says, "that without a solid philosophic foundation no natural science . . . and no materialism . . . can stand in the battle against the storm of bourgeois ideas";[13] he likewise insists that German philosophy is one of the chief ideological currents leading to Communism.[14] Lenin even wrote a lengthy book on epistemology;[15] and a number of philosophic articles to be mentioned later. That he was a conscientious and thorough student of the subject has been mentioned by his widow[16] and other biographers.[17] One of the most curious documents in Communist literature, *Aus dem*

quoted in S. Hook, "Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism," *Journal of Philosophy,* XXV (1928), 113.

[12] Luppol, *op. cit.,* p. 6.

[13] N. Lenin, "Ueber die Bedeutung des streitbaren Materialismus," as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.,* pp. 76 f.

[14] V. I. Lenin, *Imperialist War,* collected works, XVIII (New York: International, 1930), 20.

[15] V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,* collected works, Vol. XIII (New York: International, 1927).

[16] Cf. Krupskaya, *op. cit.,* p. 33.

[17] Cf. J. Maxton, *Lenin* (London: Davies, 1932), p. 43.

Philosophischen Nachlass,[18] contains the study made by Lenin of several philosophers, ancient and modern, with all his marginal notes meticulously reproduced. This point is stressed because we approach the following chapters on Lenin with the conviction that every paragraph contains, either explicitly or implicitly, a philosophic significance. Luppol has a passage with which this study thoroughly concurs: "Lenin's philosophy must be sought not only in his special philosophic writings but in all the works which he wrote in the course of his life."[19]

While philosophy is then essential to Communism, what shall be the way of dealing with it? We propose to examine Communism chiefly by means of one concept, *acquiescence,* and the next chapter is devoted to clarification of that concept itself. Acquiescence, it will be seen, leads us to central issues, is related to non-philosophic but pertinent aspects like the economic, and suggests an alternative concept, *activity,* which plays a parallel though negative rôle.

Following this clarification, in Part Two we shall designate Communism as acquiescent positively. This will necessitate dissection of the views of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in so far as they seem to accept as absolute the individual, the world,[20] and again the two as automatic criteria of one another. In Part Three we shall attempt to designate Communism as acquiescent negatively, that is, as active. This again will necessitate analysis of our exponents'

[18] W. I. Lenin, *Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass* (Wien-Berlin: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1932).

[19] Luppol, *op. cit.,* p. 6.

[20] Used synonymously with "world" are sometimes such terms as "nature," "social," "dialectical process," "objective," etc.; with "individual" such terms as "subjective."

views; but this time as they do not accept the individual and world as absolute. And in Part Four we shall suggest how Communism is both acquiescent and active simultaneously. Such procedure necessitates obviously a classification of evidence into several distinct divisions; and *the reader cannot be too strongly advised against judging the whole by any one of those divisions.* This study follows the Hegelian sympathies of Marx, Engels, and Lenin to the extent at least of a method which insists upon the organic relatedness of the chapters constituting, in a way, separate terms.[21]

The importance of the question to be examined is, stated shortly, this: is Communism a doctrine which requires its exponent to acquiesce in his own nature or in the course of history; is it a doctrine which permits him to take a primary, active part in shaping that course; or is it somehow both? To answer this question is to answer, obviously, the question put by the flowing stream. It is to answer the question of the futility or utility of the eddies and whirlpools which make up human effort.

[21] For a diagrammatic suggestion of how this study is planned, cf. "Appendix," *infra,* p. 223.

Chapter Two

The Concept, Acquiescence

EXEMPLIFIED IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

SINCE acquiescence has little explicit philosophic history the precise meaning given to it in this study cannot arbitrarily be stated. What seems necessary rather is to review perhaps three important philosophies—an ancient, an early modern, and a contemporary—and from these to draw up a definition with which to approach Communism.

Before this is done we shall make but one assumption—that acquiescence be regarded primarily as connotative of attitude and therefore of a concept probably closer to the ethical than to other branches of philosophy. It is true, however, that philosophy cannot always keep attitude and fact apart; and in the case of acquiescence, too, there will no doubt be occasions when it seems to describe not only some such ethical mood as indifference, but also some such metaphysical actuality as cosmic reason. But to choose an emphasis on attitude is at least no more arbitrary than another, and it is not out of keeping with the everyday meaning of the term.

a) *Stoicism.*—By devious routes, and impelled by the need for new security to replace that lost with a crumbling civilization, Stoicism was led toward an egoistic retreat. As it was for Epicureanism such was a logical conclusion from the premises of Plato and Aristotle that, despite their interest in the community, the ethical norm is ultimately to be found in a disregard of the exigencies of an empirical world. With such elements for its foundation Stoi-

cism is not inconsistent, then, in crying with Aurelius, "Look inwards, for you have a lasting fountain of happiness at home that will always bubble up if you will but dig for it."[1]

But though such a philosophy might itself indicate passivity Stoicism is not subjectivism. The universe is real, indeed material; and co-ordination of the individual with it lies in the discovery that the material world is at heart a rationality. The ruling faculty is for the Stoic a reason which is the god within; and through it one lives in conformity with nature and the course of the universe.[2] Carried to its extreme this doctrine becomes a virtual fatalism; and explains why the Stoic is not hostile to society: it like all else is subject to general laws of reason.

Thus the question arises whether Stoicism is on its objective side merely submissive to the *status quo*. The answer is that on the contrary it is both self-assertive and militant. If it appears that this aggressiveness is a paradox in the Stoic creed it is a paradox not insoluble.[3] When the Stoic cheerfully conforms to the world-course he does so only because he has achieved unity of will and reason. After he has found that the world to which he belongs moves with definite purpose it is his destiny not merely to let things take their course in the happy realization that everything will turn out all right in the end, but to assume a vigorous rôle through understanding of that purpose itself. In this union of action with tranquillity is the Stoic temper focused. And his aggressiveness lies not so much in

[1] M. Aurelius, *Meditations* (London: Scott, no date), p. 116.

[2] W. L. Davidson, *Stoic Creed* (Edinburgh: Clark, 1907), p. 142.

[3] A. K. Rogers, *Morals in Review* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), pp. 105 ff. This exposition of Stoicism is especially indebted to Professor Rogers.

opposing institutions—though he may on occasion even do this—as in protecting his selfhood by refusing to be affected emotionally by them while devoting his reason wilfully to the reasonable, teleological universe of which society and humanity are but manifestations.

And so it cannot fairly be said that the Stoic humbly acquiesces in the order of the universe.[4] When the core of the doctrine is seen to be one of resolution, then although this may indeed involve acquiescence of some kind, it clearly is not a passive self-effacement in an overwhelming infinitude.[5]

b) *Spinozism.*—Although about fifteen centuries elapsed between the height of Stoicism and the exposition of his system by Spinoza there are certain respects in which the two are related with equal importance to the concept here considered.

Spinoza has sometimes been called a founder, along with Hobbes, of modern naturalism; and if this is so it is doubtless explicable on the ground that both attempted to understand the individual in terms of what he really seems to be. But as contrasted with the cruelly selfish man of Hobbes, Spinoza holds that the fundamental quality of human nature is not mere selfishness but rather vigorous self-realization of one's own being. "The effort by which each thing endeavors to persevere in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself."[6]

Such an emphasis does not lead to a retreat inward. The universe assumes for Spinoza, as it did for the Stoics, a

[4] Davidson, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
[5] Rogers, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[6] B. Spinoza, *Ethic* (London: Trübner, 1883), p. 114.

deep significance because man is a part of the power of nature, and nature is God,[7] a source of constant good to which the rational individual subscribes. There is an eternal operation of the whole according to a strict determination of consequences from antecedent grounds so that finally you see pictured a world which, instead of making room for self-realization, seems to chain the individual by an inescapable logic to an unnaturalistic Absolute. In his political philosophy he seems to affirm the submissiveness of the individual.[8]

Yet it is important to note that political power is only a way of constraining the irrational individual; and this power is itself made possible by the consent originally of rational men. Individual right is never wholly abandoned because "subjects still resolve of their own proper motion to obey".[9] The state, humanity, and even the universe rest in other words upon the autonomy of the self-realizing individual, although the individual realizes that autonomy in the divine substance whose mode he is.[10]

The antithesis between freedom and necessity is thus resolved, and with it either a completely irresponsible freedom or a complete human bondage. The freedom of man is the freedom of God; and so human bondage vanishes into a divine freedom.

c) *Instrumentalism.*—Like both philosophies already touched there is in this contemporary position an early

[7] *Philosophy of Spinoza* (New York: Modern Library, 1927), pp. 72, 253.

[8] B. Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (London: Trübner, 1868), pp. 276 f.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 288.

[10] Cf. J. Ratner, *Spinoza on God* (New York. Holt, 1930), pp. 83 ff.

emphasis upon the individual. An experience where there is realization that one is at odds with one's surroundings, where there is accordingly an adventurous effort to remake conditions according to desire[11]—this in the philosophy of instrumentalism is at once the focus of reality and the hope of mankind. It is the focus because only here occurs what rightfully can be called individual mind,[12] or arises whatever becomes capable of description either in subjective or objective terms; and it is the hope because only in this center of activity does intelligent effort lift the individual above the slothfulness of habit, reverie, or anesthetized immediacy toward intelligent environmental gains.

But always implied is also the importance of the objective world. Unless the individual had a problem to act upon, whose source lay in an environment, there would be no cause for intelligence to arise. Separated from the perspective of the person is what is called "immediacy of existence" in all its heterogeneity and fullness.[13] Indeed to the extent that intelligence draws its material from this immediacy and refers it back again for test we seem to have a shift now from an emphasis upon the priority of the individual to that of a completely "unindividualized" world—a world which temporally might be said to be past and future since it always lies, on the one hand, beyond the beginnings out of which present ideas are formed, and, on the other, beyond the endings toward which those ideas move as they become solutions—endings which now

[11] J. Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Norton, 1929), p. 245.

[12] J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Modern Library, 1930), p. 87.

[13] *Experience and Nature, op. cit.*, pp. 85, 87.

seem to be characterized by a contemplative, emotional consummatory quality providing escape from a difficult world by absorption in it.[14]

If however this statement were to terminate with a dualism of self and nature it would be false to instrumentalism. When the individual and his world are surveyed co-ordinately we have what is sometimes called interactionism,[15] an historical continuity between objects to which mind and its ideas are themselves related as objects. The focus of consciousness is, to be exact, a relative focus—fading off from the center of reflection to the periphery of daydreaming and merely sensuous experience. Indeed the individual is characterized in perspective as much by immediacy, habit, feeling, as the outer world is by such immediacies as law and custom. But also modified is an overemphasis upon the priority of this outer world, for this is seen to acquire meaning and value only in so far as it is brought within the moulding forces of instrumental techniques.

This continuity again is manifested by the circumstance that there is no dichotomy between knowing and doing. Concepts are tools by which obstacles may be removed so that experience can be satisfying once more; and this involves manipulation of environmental objects themselves. Thus too the endings toward which activity moves are not final endings; but as they are reached through intelligent activity they become imbued with meaning, become means of readjustment toward still further ends.

[14] J. Dewey, *Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton, Balch, 1929), pp. 236 f. Cf. *Experience and Nature, op. cit.*, pp. 90, 79 ff.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 106; cf. *Human Nature and Conduct, op. cit.*, p. 10.

Instrumentalism stresses the tentativeness of all experience.

In short the synthesis of the individual with his world is made possible not alone through withdrawal from it, nor a domination by it, but rather by a co-operation with it. Whatever there is of acquiescence here must fit into these circumstances.

A DEFINITION

In considering the relation of certain concepts to a philosophy as important as any of the three outlined above, it is necessary to appreciate how those concepts do not apply, as well as how they do. The expositions of Stoicism, Spinozism, and instrumentalism were devoted therefore mainly to a negative clarification of the relation of acquiescence to them, the results of which may be summarized as two: first, that although emphasis in all three is placed upon the reality and autonomy of rational selfhood, this does not lead to a mere ascetic withdrawal from the world and consequently to a complete indifference to that world in favor of a devotion wholly to oneself. Second, that although the world—typified as society, laws of nature, undissected whole experience—is real, this does not result in a mere compliance of the individual with it, a submission ending in virtual negation of identity. Acquiescence involves the drastic consequences neither of complete egoism nor of complete altruism.

Turning now to positive aspects of the concept it is possible these will be found in the reconciliation of individuality and nature which proved the crowning truth of each of these three philosophies.

In the case of the Stoic, for instance, his temper was

described as a union of tranquillity and action—tranquillity because of a refusal to be disturbed by the apparent demands of the world; action because response to those demands nevertheless is made, made however by exultation in one's own power and self-sufficiency and by means of which alone the goodness and truth of the world are reached. For these reasons, then, we are perhaps justified in defining Stoicism in some such terms as a philosophy of volitional acquiescence.[16]

Logically the conclusions from Spinoza's doctrine are not wholly different from these, but his repeated insistence upon exact knowledge of an exact world has led, at least in his interpreters, to a concentration upon that world. He places at the heart of his philosophy the doctrine of necessity—a knowledge that the world is not one of accident but of scientifically determinable regularity, and wherein accordingly metaphysical freewill is replaced by personal responsibility realizable through acquiescence in that regularity itself.

Finally, the instrumentalist too is acquiescent in certain ways: in depending upon habit, revery, or even in contemplative regard for his intellectual processes he finds himself for the moment independent of external demands and, like the Stoic, self-sufficient. Yet, in co-operating with nature he complies often like Spinoza with its laws, immediacies. Frequently, inner satisfactions, and unions with nature where consciousness yields wholly to an undifferentiated

[16] Cf. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 107 ff. This phrase suggests a shade of meaning always implied in our use of the term, acquiescence, throughout this study. It means, not a lethargic or reluctant submission to something one does not cordially approve, but rather a willing, often joyful, acceptance.

continuity not unlike the traditional Absolute,[17] are two ways of taking the same experience. Stated in terms of religious pragmatism, acquiescence may reflect what has been called "the practical absolute"—the finality and validity which are attached to an action following deliberation and choice.[18] Yet it is not only this kind of pragmatic action that precipitates the attitude with which we are concerned: Lewis Mumford has said that when William James builds a philosophy rationalizing the spirit of modern, busy, dynamic America he is resorting to a "pragmatic acquiescence," a submission to—indeed a glorification of—the ultimacy of action as such.[19] It is conceivable that not only do the poles of, for example, individual habit and worldly law contribute to the dynamic immediacy of existence, but that so also do the active relations of adjustment between them; for if these relations are integral to their terms, then even the analyzing processes of science are not excluded ultimately from the reality of Becoming, which is the accepted presupposition of instrumentalism's point of view.

At any rate, taking as a whole the positive aspects of acquiescence in the three philosophies, it will be seen that the meanings which that concept can be shown *not* to have must be stated cautiously. While it does not from the standpoint of individuality imply *mere* indifference to the world resulting from realization of one's autonomy it does nevertheless depict a capacity to withdraw from the world

[17] Cf. T. V. Smith, "Dewey's Theory of Value," *Monist,* XXXII (1922), 339 ff.

[18] Cf. E. S. Ames, *Religion* (New York: Holt, 1929), pp. 159 ff.

[19] L. Mumford, *Golden Day* (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1926), pp. 157 ff.

into oneself sufficiently to be impervious to some of its demands. And again while acquiescence means no *mere* compliance of personality within the almost overwhelming demands of a dynamic world it also requires full recognition and often acceptance of them. Indifference toward the world is modified by the degree of vigorous compliance with it; compliance with the world is modified by the degree of resolute indifference toward it; but there is obviously in all three philosophies a large element of each of these moods which together constitute an acquiescence.

Yet in elucidating the parallels between the three types of philosophy in their relation to our central concept it is also important to indicate certain differences. Professor Dewey has been a severe critic of philosophic tradition because, he says, it has invariably sought security through dependence on something superior which is generalized intellectually into logical patterns to which real things must conform. In Spinoza, for example, "there are exhibited complete loyalty to . . . ultimate and self-sufficing Being as the standard of all human thought and action—with perpetuation of the Greek theory of knowledge and its exaltation of reason over experience".[20] With Spinoza's incorporation of the new discoveries of physical science he strengthened this conception by showing the interdependence of all things according to universal law.[21]

The general effect of this procedure has seemed to be that in man's approach to his world, security has been achieved not through careful analysis of difficulties leading to their removal by doing something about them, but

[20] *Quest for Certainty, op. cit.*, p. 54.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

through an act which achieves security automatically: reference to an antecedently posited criterion of truth and reality which has usually been a self-sufficient whole. Personal activity is involved in these systems, as instrumentalism is the first to admit;[22] but whether it be exultation in one's own power or participation in the affairs of the world, this activity identifies itself with the activity of that world; just as personal freedom is the freedom of the whole whether viewed now from the perspective of the microcosm or again from that of the macrocosm. In contrast with this method of reference to a given criterion instrumentalism would reach security—as we have seen—in quite a different way, the way of thoughtful consideration of the most efficient means thereto, the way of analysis, operations, experimentation.

To put it differently the earlier positions, anxious to achieve security, *incline toward* hypostatization of their desire. Individual initiative and freedom spend themselves either on an insistence upon the relative autonomy of personal being in the face of an exigent world, or on the relative necessity of that world in the face of egoistic temptations. Often it is impossible to gauge the precise extent to which individual or world predominates; and probably both are always compresent to a greater or lesser extent, just as are—to borrow the terms once more—microcosm and macrocosm. The most that can be said accurately is that Stoicism suggests on the whole more of a compliance with the former, the microcosmic, not only because its representatives have at least articulately seemed to be more indifferent toward laws of nature than personality,

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 93.

but also because in the course of ages the term *stoical* has come to imply a certain inner composure. Spinozism, however, probably suggests more a compliance with the latter, the macrocosmic, and hence something of an indifference toward oneself in contrast, at least, with its great concern with exactitudes of physical nature. But however the two sides are adjusted toward one another, there is in attitude a definitely emphasized tendency to look away from concrete methods of action toward criteria of personal or worldly security in which it is desirable, as directly as possible, to acquiesce.

Instrumentalism, however, would reach security through minimizing the tendency to hypostatize desire. It would reach its objective by a method which so far as possible denies that objective: for while habit, law, and other immediacies are admitted to the realm of discourse and are frequently relied upon, they are strictly speaking never altogether accepted but subordinate always to action, change, and above all to tentativeness. Professor Dewey himself makes the distinction in terms of the concept here used. The "world or any part of it," he declares, "as it presents itself at a given time is accepted or *acquiesced in* only as *material* for change."[23] Again, "Conditions and events are neither to be fled from nor passively *acquiesced in*; they are to be utilized and directed."[24] The result for the instrumentalist is, with either of the entities—individual and world—to which the Stoic or Spinozist looks for security, accordingly different from what it is for the lat-

[23] J. Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York: Holt, 1920), p. 114.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 116; in this and preceding quotation, italics of "acquiesced in" mine.

ter: that is, since there can be no criterion to which we completely agree therefore we accept the absolute validity, so long as we are consistent, neither of ego nor of universe. We concede the possibility of them both, and there are times when we seem to concede much more, but in their certainty to anywhere near the degree conceded by traditional philosophy we must and do refuse to acquiesce.

But then does this differentation of traditional and contemporary philosophy dispel altogether the similarities earlier pointed out? Hardly so: the similarities are so clear that some critics see Spinoza's system, for example, as containing the core of modern scientific method,[25] and thus reflecting a thoroughly active attitude. Others find that instrumentalism, despite its professed eagerness to avoid the drastic consequences of antecedent criteria, has had to imply at the expense of consistency the status of truth in past experience[26]—and thus to imply something of a submission, not only to the immediacies of existence, but also to the facts of man and world which it supposedly is in the process of discovering. Through the philosophies of all three runs, moreover, the thread of an assumption that the world is more or less dynamic, and so too the individuals belonging to it. Perhaps we can put the interrelationship of the three sharpest by declaring that while traditional philosophy is active for the sake of acquiescing, this contemporary philosophy is acquiescent for the sake of activating; yet within the acquiescent spirit of Stoicism and Spinozism there beats strongly a personal and cosmic action, as surely as within

[25] Cf. *Philosophy of Spinoza, op. cit.*, introduction by Ratner, p. xliii.

[26] Cf. C. I. Lewis, review of *Quest for Certainty, Journal of Philosophy,* XXVII (1930), 18 f.

the active spirit of instrumentalism is there a longing for and frequent yielding to a personal and cosmic acquiescence.

These conclusions lead us back to the question of acquiescence as fact and attitude. While we assumed at the outset the latter standpoint it was pointed out that there is an interrelationship throughout of the individual, in whom attitudes are found, and of the world of which he is part but with which we associate facts. The connection of fact and attitude would seem evident, moreover, from the truistic observation that the difference of emphasis discovered in our three philosophies is due at least as much to the dependence of their method and content upon the historical attitude generating them as is their attitude dependent upon method and content. Yet we cannot, although deliberately choosing the perspective of attitude, fail to realize how inextricably joined is that attitude with the substance of philosophy itself.

It follows that acquiescence has doubtless played a part of importance for other than the three philosophies examined. They are regarded as pertinent examples; but even so, there remains the probability that our concept would take on further complications as other theories were reviewed. The procedure here used, then, admittedly may involve the arbitrary, just as does the relationship of attitude and fact. But this much can be stated confidently: certain basic implications of our concept have been discovered and stipulated, and with these, at least, we are justified in approaching Communism. This is not to say however that the problem following will be that of demonstrating the precise extent to which Communism is itself Stoical, Spinozistic, and instrumentalistic. Naturally a

definite similarity is to be expected if acquiescence characterizes them mutually; but though this be true, and though too our survey may thus serve to establish the organic relationship between the history of philosophy and Communism, nevertheless in the structure of this latter position there may be found not only aspects upon which acquiescence throws some light (and this is, of course, the direct problem) but also aspects which may enrich further the meaning of acquiescence itself.

Let us summarize, as a definition, the principal features of acquiescence developed explicitly and implicitly in the course of the preceding analysis:

Acquiescence:

a) Is a positive attitude which both reflects and is reflected in certain philosophic positions.

b) Connotes—to the *degree* that activity (an attitude suggested to some extent by instrumentalism) is minimized:

(1) An *indifference* to the world through compliance with oneself (an attitude suggested to some extent by Stoicism);

(2) A *compliance* with the world through indifference to oneself (an attitude suggested to some extent by Spinozism);

(3) *Both* indifference (following from an emphasis on subjective autonomy) and compliance (following from an emphasis on objective regularity) in reciprocal, varying degree.

c) Is never present without aspects of activity negatively compresent.

Part Two
ACQUIESCENCE

Chapter Three

The Individual of Marx and Engels

In the preceding chapter the nature of acquiescence was developed in each of three schools by a series of three steps—first from the standpoint of individuality, then from that of the world, and finally from that of the two together. What is proposed, then, is to follow as far as possible a similar procedure hereafter—to treat Marx, Engels, and Lenin according to the three elements, which will be shown to be involved in them, of individual, world, and individual-world. It should be emphasized again that this procedure involves a segregation of evidence which may have, however, an eventual relatedness.

The question in this Part is to what extent these elements may be regarded as absolute criteria to which are attached an acquiescent attitude. This and the next chapter present the element of individuality in Communism.

The works of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) are often treated together, not only because the two men sometimes wrote in collaboration,[1] but also because whatever statements the one made were almost unreservedly approved by the other.[2] From the standpoint of Communism as we have defined it, more-

[1] Cf. *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels* (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1902), Bd. I, II, und III.

[2] One of the few instances where Engels criticized Marx was in a letter about "die Heilige Familie" (published in *Nachlass, op. cit.,* I, 103 ff.), in which the book was described as "too big" and "incomprehensible." Cf. O. Rühle, *Karl Marx* (New York: Viking, 1929), p. 80.

over, both men were certainly regarded as equally authoritative by Lenin. As Engels was himself eager to declare, however, Marx was the postulator and pace-setter, Engels the defender and popularizer.[3] In this study we may proceed with an acceptance of the statements of both men, although recognizing Marx as leader, and although aware that attempts have been made to prove serious differences between the two.[4]

Offhand the question might well be asked, how can there be a place in Marx and Engels for genuinely autonomous selfhood when the very terms, Communism and Socialism, suggest its absence from a properly ordered world?

But as has been pointed out often,[5] the founders of Communism were—as all theorists are—products of their time; and despite their denunciation of the laissez faire individualists they too include in their premises a distinct element of classical individualism.

Thomas Hobbes is often credited as the founder of modern individualism. His premises may be traced to a materialistic philosophy in which the prius of knowledge and of reality is the individual thing, thoughts being nothing but words representing a group of those individual things. Ethically, Hobbes was the forerunner of a hedonism with the premise that since the greatest good

[3] Cf. Engels' introduction to the "Manifesto," *Essentials of Marx, op. cit.*, p. 28: "I consider myself bound to state that the fundamental proposition which forms its nucleus belongs to Marx."

[4] Cf. K. Kautsky, *Frederick Engels* (Chicago: Kerr, 1899), p. 17, and S. Hook, "Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx," *Symposium,* II (1931), 332 ff.

[5] Cf. A. D. Lindsay, *Karl Marx's Capital* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1925), p. 11.

lies in the greatest individual pleasure, therefore it is natural for one to do everything he needs to do in order to promote his own interests and happiness. The only right, naturally, is power: no act is wrong so long as it gains that power which makes possible a victory over others.[6]

Now although Hobbes cannot himself be called a laissez faire individualist it is probably accurate historically to say that out of this general position—by diverse and sometimes indirect routes which included the Lockian and pre-Utilitarian schools—there eventually developed the economics of laissez faire. Adam Smith was its greatest representative. His position is peculiar in that he also developed an ethics which was to a great extent social; yet even this with its touchstone of sympathy failed to avoid an individualistic aspect. In his political philosophy, however, he places himself, according to Ingram,

"habitually at the point of view of the individual, whom he treats as a purely egoistic force, working uniformly in the direction of private gain, without regard to the good of others or of the community at large. . . . He justifies this personal attitude by its consequences . . . that the good of the community is best attained through the free play of individual cupidities. . . ."[7]

Marx and Engels never tire of condemning the principles of Smith and other classical economists. Yet that their indebtedness was great[8] is established in no more definite

[6] Cf. F. Thilly, *History of Philosophy* (New York: Holt, 1914), pp. 265 ff. Cf. also T. Hobbes, "Leviathan," *Selections* (New York: Scribner's, 1930), pp. 249 ff.

[7] J. K. Ingram, *History of Political Economy* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), p. 108.

[8] Among the great number who have noted this, none has more elo-

way than in their acceptance of the position that man is fundamentally interested in promoting his own welfare and therefore his own profit. Each man follows his own desired ends, Engels declares.[9] Indeed almost the whole of *Capital*[10] is an analysis of that level of human evolution where man's activities are devoted to the accumulation of private property or to suffering because some other man is accumulating it.[11] When we speak of the "individual" we often mean, in fact, just such a man as this,[12] although there is also the "isolated independent laboring individual" of the pre-capitalist era.[13] The bourgeoisie "has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment' " and "egotistical calculation," they cry in the "Communist Manifesto."[14]

Now the Hobbesian man, originally more or less free and equal, is also cruel, greedy: lustful competition for power and riches is perfectly natural to him. When Marx and Engels describe the economic man they seem often to be adopting or at least duplicating this conception of Hobbes. Marx, for instance, quotes Luther as saying "very aptly" that love of power is an element in the desire for riches;[15] and he does not hesitate to describe the capitalist as one filled with "sordid avarice"[16] whose cruel treatment

quently than Max Beer; cf. "Revival of Anti-Marxism," *Labour Monthly*, I (1921), 417 ff.

[9] F. Engels, *Feuerbach* (Chicago: Kerr, 1903), p. 105.

[10] K. Marx, *Capital* (Chicago: Kerr, 1906-9), Vol. I, II, and III.

[11] Cf. *Essentials of Marx, op. cit.*, p. 179.

[12] "Communist Manifesto," *op. cit.*, p. 47.

[13] *Essentials of Marx, op. cit.*, p. 180.

[14] "Communist Manifesto," *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[15] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 649, footnote.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 651.

of those in his power is hateful and nakedly brutal.[17] The warlike spirit of the Hobbesian man is also carried over to a hostile antagonism between classes,[18] between those in power—today, capitalists—and those not, workers. That this is an example of the same point, despite the use of the term "class" and not individual, is clarified by recalling that so long as their premise is economic selfishness Marx and Engels are entitled to use "class," not as an indication of organic relationship between individuals, but as a name for certain similar ways in which men act *as* individuals. Yet, although accumulation of capital is made possible through the employer usurping profit created by exploitation of workers, this no more justifies condemnation by moralists than does the right of power by Hobbes: it is rather a natural effect of the same self-interest motivating class oppositions. This circumstance is doubtless "a rare stroke of good luck for the purchaser, but it does not infringe the *rights* of the vendor" of labor.[19] In fact, rights of both capitalists and workers are equal.[20] Finally, an implied substantiation of the Hobbesian picture of individuality is seen when Engels endorses Darwinism with this description: There is a

"struggle for existence, which not only shows itself directly in the wear and tear of the body, but also as a struggle for space and light. . . . And it is evident that in this fight those individuals have the best

[17] "Communist Manifesto," *op. cit.*, p. 33; *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 708 f.

[18] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 65, and F. Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* (Chicago: Kerr, 1918), p. 105. It should be recalled for purposes of historical accuracy that Hobbes never asserted the actual existence of a purely "natural" individual; cf. Hobbes, *op. cit.*, pp. 255 f.

[19] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 216, translation adapted from G. Deville, *People's Marx* (New York: International Library, 1900), p. 79, italics mine.

[20] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 259.

prospect of coming to maturity . . . which possess certain qualities, perhaps insignificant, but advantageous in their fight for existence."[21]

But self-interest which characterizes the individualistic element in Marx and Engels is complicated by the fact that they also recognize to some extent the natural rights doctrine of Rousseau. At the beginning of *Capital* Marx establishes his labor theory of value[22] which thereafter serves as the gauge by which to measure such deviations from it as occur in capitalist exploitation. The theory is that justly everyone who exchanges one commodity for another receives back in the second the equivalent of value found in the first. In such situations there is in other words a real economic equality in which producers and buyers are on even terms since the labor-power put into a commodity is paid for in full, through a freely entered agreement, by the commodity received in return. In fact this kind of equality almost invariably is meant in Communism, not equalities of intellectual or physical endowment; nor were such equalities of endowment what Rousseau usually meant: he speaks of *rights*, grounded in a state of nature, and it is these which Marx refines in economic terms:

"This sphere . . . within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by their own free will. . . . Equality, because each enters into relation with the other . . . and exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks

[21] F. Engels, *Landmarks of Scientific Socialism* (*Anti-Duehring*), (Chicago: Kerr, 1907), p. 97.

[22] *Capital, op. cit.*, Vol. I, especially the first six chapters.

only to himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. Each looks to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just because they do so, do they all, in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things . . . work together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the interests of all."[23]

It is obvious that Marx is not speaking in this memorable passage of the same historical level as the capitalistic, but he is speaking still of the individual, indeed self-interested, man. The individual depicted is quite as extreme as from the Hobbesian point of view. Yet human nature is here somewhat different in its attributes: man although freely and equally selfish is not embroiled in unbearable unceasing quarrel, for he is happy, peaceful. This is more like the state of nature—to which Engels also refers approvingly[24]—depicted by Rousseau. His view was, of course, a development through Locke of Hobbes' principles; but the individualism common to both assumed for Rousseau a condition not to be avoided if possible but to be sought after.[25]

This natural man of Rousseau was in certain respects that with which the Utopians were also concerned. Like the Frenchman, these idealists devised grand ideas for liberating humanity from the evils of the day—in their

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

[24] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, pp. 171 f. It should be noted that Engels here states Marx was directly influenced by Rousseau.

[25] Cf. J. J. Rousseau, "Social Contract," *Social Contract and Other Discourses* (New York: Everyman's Library, 1932), pp. 10 f., 14. The same qualification noted in footnote 18, *supra*, applies to Rousseau; cf. "On the Origin of Inequality," *Social Contract and Other Discourses, op. cit.*, p. 175.

case mainly industrial evils—in order that peaceful equality and freedom might be made possible for every man. Their object was to restore the natural rights of individuals, not by scientific consideration of the complexities of society, but simply by concentrating on the profound reasonableness of those rights.[26] Become conscious of your rightful autonomy, they urged in substance, and Utopia automatically follows. Now while Engels criticizes Fourier, Saint-Simon, and Owen for their lack of practicality,[27] just as he does Rousseau also,[28] he at the same time acknowledges their superior understanding of the problems of their day,[29] and in fact he calls them "the founders of socialism."[30] While the mere recognition of their part in founding socialism is no proof in itself that he accepts also the individualistic premises of the Utopians, yet the conclusion does remain that if Marx and Engels concede certain individualistic aspects of Rousseau which declare the natural rights of man, it is quite possible they mean to accept the same aspects presupposed by the Utopians.

Now although the natural man of Hobbes and the natural man of Rousseau are not in characteristics identical Marx seems to regard both types as in certain ways real. On the one hand he speaks of man's greed, his normal desire for profit even through robbery;[31] on the other he speaks with Engels of the primitive goodness of men[32]

[26] Cf. J. O. Hertzler, *History of Utopian Thought* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 221 f.

[27] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, pp. 52 ff.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 63 f., 67.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

[31] Cf. *supra*, pp. 32 f.

[32] "Heilige Familie," *op. cit.*, quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

who, while still self-interested, show genuine feelings of affection between themselves.[33] As historians and scientists Marx and Engels must mean to imply in their labor theory of value that men (while perhaps never as literally as the "Eden of the innate rights" depicts) are actually willing to live and sometimes have lived in a fairly peaceful condition of free and justly equal exchange, so that this theory suggests no merely fictitious standard. The principle of equality is as old as mankind.[34] Nor does Marx suggest, so long as these human characteristics are truly fundamental, the easy solution that men can be exclusively gentle, contented, at one time, and exclusively greedy, warlike, at another. In brief what there seems to be here is a conception of human nature which when analyzed solely by itself is not altogether harmonious. At the same time, however, it would be factitious to belabor the point too much, for the influence of Hobbes and Rousseau on Communism was perhaps more indirect than direct. Their systematic doctrines were probably of less importance for it, too, than were their general points of view; and even the latter are often as much alike as they are different. And so, although the extent to which there may be differences between the two social philosophers remains a problem in Communism for later consideration,[35] what we are concerned with at the moment is this, that Marx and Engels accept the premise of *both* Hobbes and Rousseau: men are endowed with the equal privilege to promote their free interests and autonomous rights as individuals.

[33] *Feuerbach, op. cit.,* p. 77. Cf. J. J. Rousseau, "On the Origin of Inequality," *op. cit.,* pp. 199, 214.

[34] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.,* p. 139, cf. p. 171.

[35] *Infra,* pp. 118 f., 122, 128 f., 180 ff.

There should be indicated briefly several other ways—connected more or less with those already mentioned—in which Marx and Engels suggest an individualistic side.

The first is their recognition of basic human characteristics. They speak of men who become capitalists as possessing "energy, solidity, ability, and business sense";[36] they make much of the natural human tendency toward conservatism;[37] they speak of men as "agents imbued with deliberation or passion";[38] of conflicts of individual wills;[39] and of man's intellectual endowments.[40]

The second is their appreciation of the part played by great leaders. They speak of Owen, Fourier (his "mighty intellect"[41]), Feuerbach, Hegel, and Darwin as geniuses and epoch-makers.[42] Engels at one point speaks of great men and leaders,[43] and again there are mentioned Bonaparte and Bismarck as leaders to be admired by the bourgeoisie.[44]

The third is more strictly philosophic. In Marx's famous "Theses on Feuerbach" he criticizes that thinker for his neglect of "human sensory activity," of the subjective.[45] In "die Deutsche Ideologie" there is discussed the devel-

[36] *Capital, op. cit.,* III, 705.

[37] K. Marx, *Eighteenth Brumaire* (Chicago: Kerr, 1913), pp. 9 f.

[38] *Feuerbach, op. cit.,* p. 104.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] "Heilige Familie," *op. cit.,* quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.,* p. 85.

[41] F. Engels, "Progress of Social Reform on the Continent," *Gesamtausgabe, op. cit.,* II, Abt. I, 437.

[42] Cf. M. M. Bober, *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1927), pp. 81 f.

[43] *Feuerbach, op. cit.,* p. 108.

[44] "Engels an Marx," *Gesamtausgabe, op. cit.,* III, Abt. III, 387.

[45] K. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," as quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.,* p. 90.

opment of mind from a simple sensuous state, of man's early development as differing from the sheep in that his instinct has become conscious;[46] and then of man's rise to the point of truly emancipated consciousness.[47] Engels speaks of the active value of ideas, using them for our own purposes;[48] and of the motives of individual will.[49] Marx goes so far as to assert that "the method of advancing from the abstract to the concrete is but a *way of thinking* by which the concrete is grasped . . . in our minds as a concrete."[50] There is mention too of the need of fulfilling the powers of one's "own true individuality";[51] of "the genuine spiritual riches of the individual";[52] of "healthy human understanding";[53] and of "active historical agents."[54] The social world may be real but there is no mistaking the fact of individuality, in statements like this, as real *also:* "the split exists between the individual and the common interest."[55]

[46] K. Marx, "Marx und Engels über Feuerbach, der Erste Teil der 'Deutschen Ideologie,'" *Marx-Engels-Archiv* (Frankfurt: V.M.B.H., no date), I, 247. Since this work was published in 1925, *die Deutsche Ideologie* has appeared in a new, complete edition (Wien-Berlin: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1932). Subsequent references are to former, under title "Deutsche Ideologie."

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 248.

[48] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, pp. 60 f.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

[50] K. Marx, *Critique of Political Economy* (Chicago: Kerr, 1904), pp. 293 f., italics mine. Partly in *Essentials of Marx, op. cit.*, but other edition used unless specified.

[51] "Heilige Familie," *op. cit.*, as quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[52] K. Marx, "German Ideology," *Capital* (New York: Modern Library, 1932), p. 2.

[53] "Heilige Familie," *op. cit.*, as quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[54] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, p. 90.

[55] "German Ideology," *op. cit.*, p. 1.

The fourth and last indication of the individualism in Marx and Engels is more indirect but as will be shown later[56] nevertheless suggestive. We refer to the individualistic element present in their two main philosophic predecessors—Hegel and Feuerbach—who, although of primary importance in Communism because of their contributions to the objective perspective, deserve mention here. That Hegel ultimately defines individuality in terms of the Absolute is a conclusion soon to be observed; but we cannot ignore statements like these: "Passions, private aims, and the satisfaction of selfish desires, are . . . most effective springs of action." We "may affirm absolutely that *nothing great in the World* has been accomplished without . . . self-seeking designs".[57] As for Feuerbach, though his principal influence was materialistic, nevertheless his fundamental premise was an emphasis on self-consciousness and feeling.[58] The willing and sensuous personality of man is the greatest of truths.[59]

But let us have a final word from Marx and Engels themselves. "The first premise of all human history," they declare, "is of course the existence of living human individuals."[60]

[56] Cf. *infra,* pp. 127, 191.

[57] G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History* (New York: Colonial, 1899), pp. 20, 23.

[58] J. E. Erdman, *History of Philosophy* (London: Sonnenschein, 1892), III, 74 f.

[59] W. Windelband, *History of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 670 f.

[60] "German Ideology," *op. cit.,* p. 8.

Chapter Four

The Individual of Lenin

Nikolai Lenin (1870-1924) places importance upon man, conceived as autonomous, in quite as many ways as do his predecessors.

It was noticed in the preceding chapter that man is depicted sometimes as like, in certain respects, the natural man of Thomas Hobbes. The argument has been not so much whether Hobbes was the direct source of this characterization as whether the characterization is present. Considering the proximity of Adam Smith to Hobbes in certain though not all ways of defining the individual, and considering again the proximity of Smith to Marx in their economics, it is not unlikely that an historical connection between the individual man of Lenin's conception and the individual man of Hobbes could be established. The primary fact here, however, is that man is viewed in one light by this Russian as cruel, greedy, and selfish. In one of the earliest of his enterprises, the *Iskra,* (Spark), a revolutionary periodical, Lenin talks of rich men interested only in profits,[1] and of Russian capitalists as greediest of all,[2] as monsters, tyrants, and murderers.[3] He cries that the "masters of the capitalist state are no

[1] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* I, 172. It should be noted here that some of the passages quoted from Lenin are stenographic reports, etc., of his speeches; and therefore may not always be exactly verbatim.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 168.

[3] V. I. Lenin, *Revolution of 1905* (New York: International, 1931), p. 11.

more concerned about the vastness of the numbers of the victims of famine and crises than a locomotive is concerned about those whom it crushes in its path."[4] *Hatred*—this is the first fact to be admitted freely. The bourgeoisie hate us madly, Lenin insists in one of his latest writings,[5] but they are not alone: "hate is comprehensible and dear, not only to the proletariat, but to all toilers. . . . This hatred . . . is, indeed, 'the beginning of all wisdom' ",[6] a noble and sublime feeling of the finest spirits among the exploited.[7]

From the present point of view, however, we cannot, nor could Hobbes, condemn this spirit as morally wrong: it is natural, to be expected; stated in terms of surplus value the capitalist is "entitled" to exploit the laborer for profit.[8] So too when this bitter hatred results in wars: "war is not an accident, not a 'sin,' " it is as natural as peace.[9] All it does is to illustrate on a wider scale the same tendencies in men taken separately. War "is waged by two opposing groups of looters and oppressors merely for the robbers' booty, merely to decide as to who shall have a better chance to stifle more peoples, to grab more".[10] This same position is implied, of course, in Lenin's recog-

[4] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* II, 36. Cf. also N. Lenin, *Revolutionary Lessons* (London: Modern Books, 1929), p. 82, where it is argued that equality is realizable as property interest declines.

[5] N. Lenin, *Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power* (London: Labour Publ., 1922), p. 22.

[6] N. Lenin, *"Left" Communism, An Infantile Disorder* (published by the Toiler, no date), p. 61.

[7] N. Lenin, "German Socialist Outlook," *Labour Monthly,* I (1921), 349.

[8] *Imperialist War, op. cit.,* p. 31.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 88.

[10] V. I. Lenin, *Revolution of 1917,* collected works, XX (New York: International, 1929), Bk. I, 177.

nition of the struggle between classes: the whole world belongs to two camps, " 'We,' the labouring, and 'They,' the exploiters" in continuous battles of labor and capital.[11] That even this is essentially an individualistic conception of man rests upon the realization again that when Lenin talks of classes in this way alone he is stressing the economic self-interest of their members. It is out of protection of this interest that battles between them occur; and he is explicit on the point that capitalist economy and individualism go together.[12]

But opposite this gloomy picture of human nature we find in Lenin—though perhaps, as in Marx, more implicitly than otherwise—something of a Rousseauian concern with natural rights and their more optimistic attributes. He talks of the "urgency of immediate, elementary, essential rights";[13] and demands for the peasants peace,[14] absolute equality and complete liberty.[15] He goes even so far as to argue for religious freedom.[16] But all these ideals of freedom, equality, peace, are not ideals alone. They are, in certain ways, facts; and they show themselves as real whenever opportunity is given them. He speaks, for example, of the discipline of the Red Army as due not to the club but to a society of equals.[17] He feels that men

[11] *Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power, op. cit.,* p. 85.

[12] *Speeches of V. I. Lenin* (New York: International, 1928), p. 75.

[13] N. Lenin, "Party and Non-Party," *Selections* (New York: International, no date), II, 145. Abbreviated titles of selections sometimes used.

[14] *Imperialist War, op. cit.,* p. 266.

[15] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* I, 106.

[16] Cf. V. I. Lenin, *Religion* (New York: International, no date), p. 12. Cf. also "Workers' Party and Religion," *Selections, op. cit.,* II, 279 f.

[17] N. Lenin, *Proletarian Revolution in Russia* (New York: Communist Press, 1918), p. 452.

have empirically a sense of justice,[18] and insists that women can have freedom and equal rights under Communism.[19] These statements are enough to indicate that there is in Lenin a belief in human nature not altogether agreeable with the earlier one; but he goes even farther when he talks of true comradeship,[20] the sympathy of workers for one another,[21] their spirit of sacrifice,[22] their eagerness to "wipe all brutality from the face of Russia".[23] And once he even attributes to individuals among the mild socialists the virtue of complete sincerity.[24]

Common to Lenin's varying characterizations of human nature is, however, just as in Marx and Engels, the fact of human nature as fundamentally interested in itself. In an article on the New Economic Policy (the NEP of early post-revolutionary Russia) Lenin admits, for example, the error of attempting to socialize Russia too fast. He speaks therefore of building "every branch of national industry on personal interest."[25] Responsibility he feels should be made personal for each peasant, and every specialist should take his own private interest in production. Elsewhere he

[18] N. Lenin, *Proletarian Revolution* (London: Modern Books, 1929), p. 79.

[19] K. Zetkin, *Reminiscences of Lenin* (London: Modern Books, 1929), pp. 62 f.

[20] N. Lenin, *Great Initiative* (Detroit: Marxian Educational Society, no date), p. 30.

[21] N. Lenin, *Letter to American Workingmen* (New York: Socialist Publication Society, 1918), p. 5.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, I, 89.

[24] V. I. Lenin, *Toward the Seizure of Power,* collected works, XXI (New York: International, 1932), Bk. I, 167.

[25] N. Lenin, "New Economic Policy and the Tasks of Political Enlightenment," *Labour Monthly,* I (1921), 513 f.

admits the need, at least at a certain level of development, of liberty for the private trader, saying that "a little encouraging impulse" in the way of individual economy will stimulate activity.[26] It becomes indeed apparent that the economic, self-interested man of Adam Smith is here to some extent the economic man also of Lenin. And we may expect selfish excesses by individuals even under Communism itself.[27]

Quite a different indication of Lenin's regard for individuality is his insistence upon the need of leadership in political activity. If it were not for the dozen or so experienced and able leaders, "and talented men are not born by hundreds", no class today could conduct a real struggle, he says.[28] He praises such men as Liebknecht, Adler, and MacLean as "individual heroes," forerunners of the revolution.[29] Scathingly Lenin pictures Kerensky, leader of the Provisional Government of 1917 in Russia, as intoxicated by his new power.[30] At times he opposes broad democracy politically, calling it "a *useless and harmful toy.*"[31] Even in 1905 he spoke of the need of a "Tsar" to head the revolutionary class.[32] So strong indeed is

[26] *Speeches, op. cit.*, pp. 68 ff.

[27] N. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (London: British Socialist Party, 1919), p. 93. This important work is also published in *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, Bk. II, and in a volume including *Imperialism* (New York: Vanguard, 1927). Unless otherwise specified, London edition is used.

[28] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 196.

[29] V. I. Lenin, *On the Eve of October* (New York: International, 1932), p. 11.

[30] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 89.

[31] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 212.

[32] *Revolution of 1905, op. cit.*, p. 17.

Lenin's feeling on this score that he has been accused of "Bonapartism",[33] of excessive egoism,[34] accusations easily understandable from statements like this: "the Communist Party can only accomplish its task if it is organized on a basis of centralism, ruled by an iron, almost military discipline, directed by a central organism possessing strong authority, commanding extensive powers".[35] Perhaps the sharpest words from Lenin as to the need of individual leadership are the following: "But how can we secure a strict unity of will? By subjecting the will of thousands to the will of one. . . . The revolution . . . demands the *absolute submission* of the masses to the *single will* of those who direct the labor process."[36]

A final suggestion of individualism in Lenin is more directly philosophic. In somewhat ethical language he speaks now and then of desires, dreams, and interests.[37] He quotes approvingly a fellow revolutionary who says that "if man were completely deprived of the ability to dream . . . then I cannot imagine what stimulus there would be to induce man to undertake . . . work in the sphere of art, science, and practical" achievement.[38] He himself praises visionaries, insisting they are indispensable to revolutions.[39] Speaking of consciousness, to say that

[33] Cf. *Selections, op. cit.,* I, 168.

[34] Cf. T. G. Masaryk, *Spirit of Russia* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1919), II, 353, footnote.

[35] As quoted in Stalin, *op. cit.,* p. 74.

[36] N. Lenin, *Soviets at Work* (New York: Rand School of Social Science, 1918), pp. 35 f. Cf. also V. I. Lenin, "Party and Party Discipline," *Communist,* VIII (1929), 138.

[37] N. Lenin, "Democratic Revolution," *Selections, op. cit.,* II, 100.

[38] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* II, 241.

[39] *Speeches, op. cit.,* p. 67.

"ideologists (i.e., conscious leaders) cannot divert the movement . . . is to ignore the elementary truth that consciousness *participates* in . . . creation."[40] In his article, "Konzept der 'Wissenschaft der Logik' von Hegel," Lenin tells of conscious activity, determined by the intellect; and he distinguishes subject from object.[41] Suggesting an anthropological explanation of consciousness he shows that although the man of instinct, the savage, does not realize himself to be distinct from nature the consciously thinking man does so.[42] In one of his early writings, "Was sind die 'Freunde des Volkes,' " Lenin goes so far as to say that while determinism seems to him true this in no way denies the fact of reason, of conscience, and especially of "the rôle of personality in history."[43] Again, throughout his whole *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin talks of the human mind,[44] of consciousness, spirit, and sensation.[45] His widow, too, quotes him as saying that the worker would be helpless without knowledge.[46]

But all these points are also exemplified and perhaps most significantly by Lenin's repetition of the need for theory. The light of theory needs to be used in each concrete situation.[47] A revolutionary theory is fundamental

[40] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* II, 67.

[41] N. Lenin, "Konzept der 'Wissenschaft der Logik' von Hegel," quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.,* p. 86.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] N. Lenin, "Was sind die 'Freunde des Volkes,' " as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.,* p. 146.

[44] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.,* p. 300.

[45] *Ibid.,* p. 290.

[46] Krupskaya, *op. cit.,* p. 192.

[47] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* I, 18.

to the revolutionary movement.[48] His most extraordinary words on this point are, however, that "the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose quite independently of the spontaneous growth of the labor movement" in Russia.[49] It arose, he goes on, as a development of ideas among the intelligentsia. The import of this viewpoint needs no explanation. Theories presuppose a theorizing agency, a human mind. They presuppose what the evidence of this chapter establishes in several other ways—that the individual is for Lenin important and real.

[48] Cf. Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
[49] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 115.

Chapter Five

The World of Marx and Engels

Marxism, philosophically, is traditionally expressed by the theory of dialectical or historical materialism,[1] which will be regarded here as the literally objective, world-sided perspective of Communism. The consideration of its connection with the individualism above described, if such connection exists, must be postponed.

The outstanding influences shaping dialectical materialism as a philosophy were two: Hegelianism, and materialism as formulated principally by Feuerbach. Practically there were fundamental influences other than these—the rise of the bourgeois class, the coincidental rise of a proletariat, and the decline of feudalism. But Marx, especially, was less a practical man than a scholar; and while he was sensitive also to social conditions his theoretical impetus came largely from the two sources mentioned. Accordingly it may be profitable to review the outstanding features of Hegel's system, and to indicate also the materialistic philosophy of Marx's time. Having done this we shall then observe how dialectical materialism is itself formulated out of them, and expanded.

a) *Hegel.*—When Marx was a young man he was caught by the tide of popularity accorded Hegelianism. What that philosophy seemed to accomplish beyond previous systems was, first, a transcendence of the dualism of ideal and material which many thought Kant's first *Critique* had left as an inheritance; and, second, an accounting

[1] Cf. *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, p. 23; cf. *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 26.

for the moving, historical, social aspects of reality while yet providing a criterion of certainty and object of knowledge which would bring the apparent fluctuations of experience into some kind of order.

The key to Hegel lies of course in the *Logic,*[2] although from the standpoint of Hegel's entire system it is but a third—the "thesis" of a supreme cosmic triad of which *Nature* is the "antithesis" and *Spirit* the "synthesis."[3] Let us notice one of the three divisions which in turn characterizes the Logic: the thesis, *Being*. From this analysis we shall be able to judge how Hegel's doctrine is developed.

Being is the first sphere because it is the most universal and therefore prior logically to all other concepts—that is, while all objects are not material or white they invariably *are*. The first deduction under this sphere is that of the thesis, Quality. Here we find that mere Being, because it is utterly abstract, is empty and therefore equivalent to Nothing. Thus Nothing passes into Being, and vice versa, so that from these polarities we get Becoming—their concrete unity. Then through a series of sub-triads, in which Hegel tries to show how each term dissolves by the forces of logic into further terms, we come finally to another triad still subordinate to the great sphere of Quality: Being-for-Self. In this category we begin to see signs of Quantity emerging, a typically Hegelian procedure, for as a synthesis is reached there are already evident in it the marks of disintegration. In Being-for-Self the familiar idea "negation of negation" appears—that is, the other-

[2] *Logic of Hegel* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1892).

[3] For one of the best treatments of Hegel's system as a whole, cf. W. Stace, *Philosophy of Hegel* (London: Macmillan, 1924).

ness of a negative category itself becomes negated and merged into a positive One. But this in turn involves the Many, since the One could not be recognized as such unless it had a negative relation also, that is a relation to an other.

Thus through a labyrinth of disintegrating triads we arrive finally at *Quantity,* a many-in-one, the antithesis of the entire sphere of Being; and then, through still more stages, we reach the last great step in Being, the synthesis, *Measure.* This introduces again the thesis, Quality, supposedly left far behind. But here is no mere lapse into the former status: the logical process is never backward. Hence Quantity is likewise still retained, but in unity with Quality. Measure indicates a balance or proportion between them, just as a quality of water may turn into another quality of steam because of an excess heat quantity. It lies in the very nature of each category to exceed itself only to be caught again within a more inclusive category.[4]

This is the end of Hegel's deduction of the thesis, Being. From it he goes to the antithesis of the entire Logic, *Essence,* and then to the synthesis, *Notion.* This final sphere introduces the concrete universal where universal, particular, and singular are all ultimately alike because each mediates the other. Under Notion, too, he deduces the Idea, the most concrete of all universals because containing all previous premises within it. Here "the subject has taken the object up into itself".[5]

When Hegel is done with the Logic he turns to a second great division of his entire system, that of *Nature.* But

[4] For the whole treatment, cf. *Logic of Hegel, op. cit.,* pp. 156 ff.

[5] Stace, *op. cit.,* p. 280.

even this is fundamentally *"thought* of nature."[6] Possibly the difficulty Hegel faced, in accounting for the particularities and contingencies of nature by a logic of universals, may have affected Marx's materialistic opposition to him.[7] What we are concerned with now, however, is the last division of the Hegelian system—*Spirit,* wherein are found institutions and history. One of these, likewise reached only through several painful stages, is Civil Society, characterized by independent persons. Here is to be found the kind of society described as basic by Hobbes and Rousseau.[8]

Beyond this in the world-dialectic of Spirit lies the State: just as in logic there is a union of universal and particular so here there is a union of subjective and objective freedom.[9] Everything depends, Hegel insists, on the law of reason and the particular freedom of individuals interpenetrating so that my particular end is identical with the universal end, otherwise the State is but a castle of air.[10] The last phase of the State is World-History. It will be noted how in the statements below Hegel attempts to show the logico-spiritual nature of history, the co-ordination of individual and world, the integration of objectivity and subjectivity, and reality as teleological: The "history of the world . . . presents us with a rational process. . . . Reason is Substance. . . . It supplies its own nourishment, and is the object of its own operations . . . the History of the world."[11]

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 298.

[7] Cf. *infra,* p. 57.

[8] Cf. *Ethics of Hegel* (Boston: Ginn, 1893), pp. 159 ff. Cf. *supra,* pp. 30 ff.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 190.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 199 f.

[11] G. W. F. Hegel, "Introduction to the Philosophy of History," *Selections* (New York: Scribner's, 1929), pp. 348 f.

Spirit . . . is always one and the same, but . . . unfolds this its one nature in the phenomena of the World's existence.[12] [The] State is then well constituted and internally powerful, when the private interest of its citizens is one with the common interest of the State. . . .[13] [In the case of great leaders they as] individuals had no consciousness of the general Idea they were unfolding . . . [but they] had an insight into the requirements of the time—*what was ripe for development.* . . . [It] is the moral Whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which the individual has and enjoys his freedom; but on the condition of his . . . willing that which is common to the Whole. . . . Law, Morality, Government, and they alone . . . [are] the positive reality and completion of Freedom.[14] The objective and the subjective . . . are then reconciled, and present one identical homogeneous whole.[15] The logical, and . . . the *dialectical* nature of the Idea in general . . . [is] that it is self-determined—that it assumes successive forms which it successively transcends; and by this very process . . . gains . . . a richer and more concrete shape. . . .[16] This . . . accomplishment is at the same time . . . dissolution, and the rise of another spirit, another world-historical people, another epoch of Universal History.[17] The life of the ever present Spirit is a circle of progressive embodiments. . . . The grades which Spirit seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths of its present.[18] The State is the march of God through the world. . . . We must therefore worship the State as the manifestation of the divine on earth. . . ."[19]

And that State is reached, Hegel says, in the "German nations".[20]

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 350.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 369.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 377, 387.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 389.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 421 f.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 432.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 442.
[19] G. W. F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Law," *Selections, op. cit.*, pp. 443, 447.
[20] "Introduction to the Philosophy of History," *op. cit.*, p. 361.

b) *The Materialists.*—"One must have experienced the delivering power of this book"—*Essence of Christianity*[21] —"to get a clear idea of it," Engels writes in his *Feuerbach.* "The enthusiasm was universal, we were all for the moment followers of Feuerbach."[22] And Marx: "Who has annihilated the dialectic of concepts, the war of the gods which the philosophers alone knew? Feuerbach."[23]

Even a cursory examination of the theory which Feuerbach actually set forth indicates however that the aspects which Marx and Engels find to be materialistic are partial. It was shown above that there is an individualistic element in Feuerbach, as is seen at once from his recognition of self-consciousness and feeling.[24] His materialism is derived from this premise in somewhat the fashion of Hobbes,[25] in that because the individual thing (of which the person is an example) is the prius of reality, therefore all metaphysical schemes for generalizing are fallacious; they cannot understand the real nature of sensuous particulars, and so they are illusory. Mind is simply "Nature in its otherness."[26] The source of conceptions can therefore be found in man only in that he is the highest object of sense, and has the ability to converse.[27]

Marx himself recognizes Hobbes as an early materialist;[28] and Engels asserts that the latter, together with

[21] L. Feuerbach, *Essence of Christianity* (New York: Blanchard, 1855).
[22] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, p. 53.
[23] "Heilige Familie," *op. cit.*, pp. 194 f.
[24] *Supra*, p. 40.
[25] *Supra*, p. 30.
[26] Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 641.
[27] Erdman, *op. cit.*, III, 95.
[28] K. Marx, *Selected Essays* (New York: International, 1926), pp. 188 f.

Bacon and Locke, are the fathers of French materialism.[29] What particularly strikes Marx and Engels about the philosophy of Frenchmen like Condillac and Helvetius is that it tends away from theological settings toward practical, matter-of-fact explanations of society and politics.[30] And in the case of Feuerbach, too, his materialism is not confined merely to a private sensualism; he believes that religion can be made anthropological by recognizing its supernatural paraphernalia as projections of human wishes, and by encouraging love between men by means of feeling. One of his major concerns is with the corporeally defined group.[31]

c) Dialectical Materialism.

"I use . . . the term, 'historical [dialectical] materialism' to designate that view of the course of history, which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one another."[32]

It has been shown plausibly[33] that Marx's intellectual evolution began with his doctoral dissertation[34] which interprets Stoicism and Epicureanism as a doctrine of self-consciousness. Thereby he was led to sympathize with

[29] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, p. 17.

[30] *Selected Essays, op. cit.*, pp. 190 ff.; cf. also *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, p. 31.

[31] Erdman, *op. cit.*, III, 74 f., 95 f.

[32] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, p. 23.

[33] M. S. Handman, *Beginnings of the Social Philosophy of Karl Marx* (doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1916), p. 54.

[34] K. Marx, "Differenz der demokritschen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie," *Nachlass, op. cit.*, I, 71 ff.

that modification of Hegelianism by which the outer world was posited as the creation of self-consciousness.[35] From this stage, Handman shows, all that Marx needed was to heed the realistic tendency of the post-Hegelian period (a tendency indicated by the increase in technological research and science, Feuerbachian materialism, and by a philosophic desire on Marx's part to identify subject with object), and reverse the process: self-consciousness is the creation of the outer world.[36] In other words, what Marx did was, first, to interpret Hegel, via Feuerbach, as a subjectivist: "To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking . . . is the demiurgos of the real world".[37] And second, to assert that "With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind".[38] Ideas are phantasmagorias in the brains of men.[39] Engels speaks of the reversal which Feuerbach instigated:

"With irresistible force he brings himself to the view that the Hegelian idea of the existence of the absolute idea before the world . . . is nothing else than the fantastical survival of the belief in the existence of an extra-mundane creator; that the material, sensible, actual world, to which we ourselves belong, is the only reality, and that our consciousness and thought . . . are only evidences of a material bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is only the highest product of matter."[40]

An epiphenomenalism is suggested when he says further,

[35] Handman, *op. cit.*, p. 129. Bruno Bauer, one of Marx's early rivals, is cited as such a modifier.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 25.

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] "German Ideology," *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[40] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, pp. 63 f.

"We conceived of ideas as materialistic, as pictures of real things".[41]

Now it is no doubt possible to show that Hegel, though technically an objective idealist, is a subjectivist to the extent that he seems to explain the world in terms of logical processes which minds supposedly go through. But there is also every evidence in our brief exposition of his system that he did not himself mean to articulate any such superficiality as this. Rather the logical process he describes is the process of reality itself, and there is from the standpoint of consistency little more reason for supposing him to mean that the world corresponds to mind than that mind corresponds to world. It is true that some interpreters have felt he never fully accounts for the non-conceptual particularities, the accidents of Nature;[42] and perhaps Marx sensed in this the difficulty which encouraged him to insist on the priority of the outer world. Aside from this possibility, however, the fact remains that when Marx develops an objective philosophy he is not thereby departing from what Hegelianism could itself very well mean. His criticism when it is founded upon "the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking" is, as Croce has pointed out,[43] over-simplified.

That Marx also recognized an objective element in Hegel will be suggested later; but, though this recognition as well as his recognition of the subjective element are significant for the rôle of acquiescence,[44] it is the conse-

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[42] Cf. *supra*, p. 52.

[43] B. Croce, *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx* (New York: Macmillan, 1914), p. 82.

[44] Cf. *infra*, pp. 113 ff., 135, 144 f., 176 ff., 197 ff.

quences of his subjective interpretation for dialectical materialism with which we are concerned at the moment. Marx felt the tendency in the post-Hegelians, at least, to disregard the realities of life; to retire within their own "phantoms, ideas, dogmas, imagined illusions";[45] to supernaturalize Hegel's philosophy;[46] and above all to give too little attention to legal and political forms as rooted in the material conditions of life.[47] In short, Marx turns away from what seems to him the "mystifying side"[48] and toward the side which is still an adequate process, he feels, in philosophy—the dialectic.

"I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, . . . [for the] mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again. . . ."[49]

But before indicating how Marx and Engels apply the dialectical process of history to their theory let us note further how, upon the basis of that materialism which they derived from Feuerbach and from their reaction to the mystical and religious features of Hegelianism, they conceived of human experience as rooted in the economic and political. In his *Poverty of Philosophy* Marx first clearly says that social relations are attached to productive forces. "In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production, and in changing their mode of produc-

[45] "Deutsche Ideologie," *op. cit.*, p. 230.

[46] K. Marx, "Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right," *Selected Essays, op. cit.*, p. 12.

[47] *Critique of Political Economy, op. cit.*, p. 11.

[48] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 25.

[49] *Ibid.*

tion, their manner of gaining a living, they change all their social relations."[50] In the "Communist Manifesto" Engels asserts that its fundamental proposition is this, that in each epoch the existing economic mode and resultant social organization "form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch".[51] In condemning the bourgeois state of the time he and his collaborator go on to assert that its very ideas are simply the outgrowth of the conditions of bourgeois production, just as its legal system is determined by the economics of the bourgeois class.[52] Again, "What else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual production changes in character in proportion as material production is changed?"[53]

In "Wage-Labor and Capital," the social is defined sharply for the first time: "The relations of production collectively form those social relations which we call a society, and a society with a definite degree of historical development, a society with an appropriate and distinctive character."[54] But probably the finest statement on the important premise that society is a reflection of materio-economic nature, a statement often quoted but worth quoting again, is this:

"In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these

[50] K. Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy* (Chicago: Kerr, no date), p. 119.

[51] "Communist Manifesto," *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[54] K. Marx, "Wage-Labor and Capital," *Essentials of Marx, op. cit.*, p. 94.

relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness."[55]

The final causes of every social change are to be sought, not in the brains of man nor in his insight. They are to be found in changes in modes of production and exchange.[56]

From these words we may conclude that dialectical materialism, so far as its materialism alone is concerned, means that ideas and institutions both are determined by economic functions.

But, now, where does dialectic enter this conception? It was noted above that logic for Hegel is a process by which out of the internal relations of certain categories there are necessarily deduced other categories which stand opposed to the first; and then that these categories blend again with their theses to form a higher and richer category. We traced a few of the steps in the sphere of Being to indicate how Hegel regards each subtle phase as essential and inevitable. The deductions by which levels of society are made possible were not analyzed: sufficient it is to note that for him they too are inevitable and necessary according to the same internalities of logic.[57]

[55] *Critique of Political Economy, op. cit.*, pp. 11 f.
[56] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, p. 94.
[57] *Supra*, pp. 50 ff.

Marx and Engels accept this system, within limits, in their conception of history. They regard themselves as "probably the first to impart the well known dialectic of the German idealistic philosophy into the materialistic view of nature and history."[58] In his famed *Anti-Duehring,* in which Marx collaborated, Engels goes into detail to prove how dialectic is the very core of reality: for example, a grain of barley is negated by becoming a plant; the plant is negated by death; and then there is grain again, only in new form and abundance. It is important to assure oneself that dialectic for Marx and Engels is a process *in nature* itself.[59] That such a natural process does not itself prove a similar process to exist in men's thinking or in societies is, of course, evident—unless it is recognized that such thinking and such societies are fundamentally united with material nature. This being, however, the position Marx and Engels take in this present view of their doctrine we can understand that they are not separating dialectical thought, individual and social, from dialectical nature when they say again that dialectic is a

"very important law of development of nature, human history and thought, a law which we see realized in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history, and philosophy. . . . [All processes are embraced] under this one law of progress. . . . The dialectic is . . . nothing but the science of the universal laws of motion, and evolution in nature, human society, and thought. . . . The law of the negation of the negation which operates in history and which until it is once learned goes on in our brains unconsciously . . . was first clearly formulated by Hegel. . . ."[60]

[58] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.,* p. 30.

[59] Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 166 ff.; cf. for an elaborate treatment, F. Engels, "Dialektik und Natur," *Marx-Engels-Archiv, op. cit.,* II (1927), 151 ff.

[60] *Ibid.,* pp. 173 ff.

Dialectic has already been used in Aristotle, in Descartes, and Spinoza, and indeed before these in Heraclitus.[61] But only in the philosophy of Hegel

"the entire natural, historical, and spiritual universe was regarded as a process, that is, as in constant progress, change, transformation, and development. . . . From this historical point of view the history of mankind no longer appeared as a barren confusion of mindless forces, . . . but as the development-process of humanity itself, to follow the process of which, little by little . . . and to establish the essential laws of which, in spite of all apparent accidents, is now the task of philosophic thought."[62]

Dialectic in short is a knowledge of the universal laws of motion of both world and man, and in which, up to now at least, matter is the unity where both are identified.[63]

Engels believed that Darwin furnished genuine proof of this dialectic in natural science: contradictions between creatures in their struggle for existence result in new species through survival of variations aiding that struggle.[64] This led Engels to say, "Just as Darwin discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of evolution in human history"[65]—an evolution in which each order not only is surpassed by new orders according to universal law, but in which each order determines human will and consciousness.[66]

If the law of evolution in human history is fundamentally expressed in dialectical terms, in its commonest form

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 f.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[63] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, pp. 95 f.

[64] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, p. 83; cf. *supra*, pp. 33 f.

[65] Cf. Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 366.

[66] Cf. *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, pp. 103 f., and review of *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 23, which Marx quotes in his preface approvingly.

it is known as the class struggle. Interpreters have even maintained that the dialectic applied to that struggle is virtually the heart of Marxism.[67] Man's whole history, since the dissolution of primitive tribal society with its common ownership, has been a history of class struggles between exploited and exploiting, ruling and oppressed, the "Manifesto" declares.[68] It establishes this by an examination of history which leads to the observation that now society as a whole is ever more completely splitting "into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat."[69] The Hegelian way of expressing it is put thus by Marx:

"The possessing class and the class of the proletariat represent an identical human self-alienation. But the former class feels itself comfortable and assured in this self-alienation, recognizes the alienation as its own power, and possesses in it the semblance of human existence; the latter feels itself annihilated in the alienation, regards in it its own impotence, and perceives in it the reality of an unhuman existence."[70]

How this contradiction has come about is shown through an examination of history: first, the primitive communal tribes, next the slave epoch, then feudalism where production was one of hand-labor controlled by gilds, then the bourgeois era, and now the proletarian era.[71] Each one of these stages follows, develops out of, its preceding one. The era of feudalism, for example, was eliminated grad-

[67] Cf. M. Beer, *Life and Teaching of Karl Marx* (New York: International, 1929), p. 18.

[68] "Communist Manifesto," *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[70] "Heilige Familie," *op. cit.*, as quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

[71] Cf. *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, p. 110 f.; cf. also F. Engels, *Origin of the Family* (Chicago: Kerr, 1902).

ually as the manufacturing middle class dominated the lords of the earlier time.[72] And throughout all these periods an inner contradiction has been at work because there has been always the materialistic and dialectical basis already defined—a basis which is fundamentally one of economic relations, and therefore one of opposition between that class which controls those relations, and that class which does not. In the bourgeois era this contradiction then is between wage-labor and capital, which Marx and Engels regard as respectively the exploited and the exploiting.[73]

The task of proving this process of exploitation is completely presented only in Marx's *Capital*. To follow it in detail lies, of course, beyond the scope of this exposition, but its essential features should be stated. Following his treatment of the labor theory of value in which commodities ideally are exchanged at their just value[74] Marx proceeds to his famous theory of surplus value. Since it is clear that somewhere in the economic scheme profit accrues, it is necessary to find a commodity the consumption of which somehow produces more value than it originally had. Such a commodity is labor-power: originally its own value is determined, as are all other commodities, by the labor-time necessary for the production of it—in its case, of course, physical maintenance and reproduction.[75] Now it may be, however, that when the employer consumes the labor-power of the workman he is able to extract a surplus beyond the minimum necessary to keep

[72] "Communist Manifesto," *op. cit.*, pp. 32 f.
[73] *Poverty of Philosophy, op. cit.*, p. 224.
[74] *Supra*, pp. 34 f.
[75] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 186 ff.

that workman going. In other words, let us suppose it takes half a day of labor to produce the clothing, food, and the other necessities of the workman's life; the employer gives him as wages, then, the equivalent in money of that which has cost this half day.

"But the past labour that is embodied in the labour-power [purchased], and the living labour that it can call into action; the daily cost of maintaining it, and its daily expenditure in work, are two totally different things. . . . The fact that half a day's labour is necessary to keep the labourer alive during 24 hours, does not in any way prevent him from working a whole day. Therefore, the value of labour-power, and the value which that labour-power creates in the labour process, are two entirely different magnitudes; and this difference of the two values was what the capitalist had in view, when he was purchasing the labour-power."[76]

In other words the capitalist retains as his share the value which the laborer produces during the half-day for which that laborer is not paid.

Now the conditions under which the laborer sells his own commodity are supposedly those of a free contract. But unless he does sell his labor-power he must starve, since he has no other property. As he does so, however, he automatically increases the capital of his employer, and thus the latter's power over him.[77] This is indicated by the tendency of capital to accumulate. "The circle," Marx says in Hegelian language, ". . . changes into a spiral."[78] In a famous statement he describes this "historical tendency":

[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 215 f.
[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 632 f.
[78] *Ibid.*, pp. 636 f.

"The private property of the labourer . . . [his labor-power] is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow . . . bounds. . . . At a certain stage of development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organization fetters them. . . . It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the transformation of the individualised and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, . . . this fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital. . . . As soon as . . . the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then . . . the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself, but . . . many labourers. *This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself,* by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist always kills many."[79]

But as capital becomes centralized by these immanent laws of dialectical materialism what happens? Competition—prodded by the capitalist's fanatical bent to make value expand itself, and with it his profit[80]—requires greater investments of capital in plants, machinery, in order that the relative cost of producing individual commodities may be reduced.[81] But as this process occurs the laborer in turn is seriously affected—so seriously indeed that the antithesis between him and his employer reaches its maximum. Marx's analysis of the situation is, to say the least, complex. Let it be sufficient here to indicate two major phenomena of the antithesis.

The first is the increasing misery of the workers. Capital must increase the productivity of labor, and hence the

[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 834 ff., italics mine.
[80] *Ibid.*, p. 649.
[81] Cf. *ibid.*, III, 263 ff.

ratio of surplus value. The means employed are centered in extracting greater and greater energy from the workman through systematization, prolonging hours of work, employing women and children. Machinery is the greatest ally of capital in this respect, for it forces a certain amount of work from the laborer. Machinery and increased efficiency also require a smaller number of workmen per given quantity of products and, while this is a contradiction in the capitalist scheme since smaller numbers mean less surplus value, capital attempts to counteract the contradiction by forcing greater energy from workmen. The effect of this decrease in demand for labor is a reserve army of workmen, a continual surplus of unemployed. And the effect of increased accumulation is also periodic crises of industrial stagnation, an effect due to the fall in rate of profit to a level where stagnation occurs.[82] "Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation . . . of the working class";[83] misery due—in summary—to machine slavery, longer hours or greater extraction of energy or both, exploitation of women and children, constant unemployment, recurrent crises with tremendous suffering; miseries all due to the same necessity for profits made possible only by an unequal exchange between the commodity of labor-power and its reward.

The second phenomenon is the socialization of the proletariat. There is evidence that—just as in Hegel's "civil

[82] *Ibid.*, I, 291, 691 ff., 447 ff., 509 ff.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 836.

society" of independent men[84]—the capitalist era has within it dialectical symptoms of a genuine organicism not too different from Hegel's State.[85] One such symptom lies in the labor theory of value the essence of which has been described as determination of value exclusively by the amount of labor in a commodity, whose fair exchange for another commodity is justly evaluated by that labor.[86] But that Marx meant to include more than this in his criterion is indicated by statements like these: "The labour time spent upon commodities counts effectively only in so far as it is spent in a form that is useful to others"; and the "labour of the individual producer must as a definite useful kind of labour satisfy a definite social want."[87] Now whether or not the whole labor theory of value, as Sombart pointed out many years ago,[88] is mainly an ideal standard hardly warranting estimation in terms of social concretions, the fact nevertheless remains that Marx conceives labor in this world-view of his as fundamentally organic rather than atomic, and so too the society which reflects labor relations. Another and more direct symptom of Marx's conception of the social lies, however, in his analysis of the increasing co-operation necessary in capitalism. This indeed is seen even in his reference above[89] to the tendency of capital to accumulate into greater and greater masses with their manufacturing centers. "Cen-

[84] Cf. *supra,* p. 52.

[85] Cf. *supra,* pp. 52 f.

[86] Cf. *supra,* pp. 64 f.

[87] *Capital,* Vol. I, as quoted in Lindsay, *op. cit.,* p. 76; cf. also L. B. Boudin, *Theoretical System of Karl Marx* (Chicago: Kerr, 1907), p. 69.

[88] W. Sombart, "Zur Kritik des ökonomischen Systems von Karl Marx," *Archiv für Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik,* VII (1894), 555 ff.

[89] *Supra,* pp. 65 f.

tralisation supplements the work of accumulation, by enabling the . . . comprehensive organisation of the co-operative labor of many . . . into socially combined . . . processes of production."[90] Now it should be observed that the co-operative and socially managed processes of production are especially typical of modern industry's emphasis upon what Marx calls the "collective labourer" who is organized, disciplined, and controlled by those processes.[91] "When the labourer co-operates systematically with others he . . . develops the capabilities of his species," Marx declares.[92] The genuinely organic nature of this situation is clearly stated here: "Just as the offensive power of a squadron of cavalry . . . is essentially different from the sum of . . . individual cavalry taken separately, so the sum total of the mechanical forces exerted by isolated workmen differs from the social force" of many workmen functioning together.[93] Marx describes the collective laborer in terms of a hierarchy of functions within the workshop—a division of labor which requires much skill from some, very little from others, but in which all tasks are organized together interdependently, and directed by an organizing agency.[94] "The work of directing . . . becomes one of the functions of capital, from the moment that the labour under the control of capital, becomes co-operative."[95] Socialization has become a necessary and genuine feature of the capitalist era.

[90] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 688.
[91] *Ibid.*, p. 384; cf. Lindsay, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
[92] *Ibid.*, p. 361.
[93] *Ibid.*, p. 357.
[94] *Ibid.*, pp. 314, 390.
[95] *Ibid.*, pp. 363 f.

But while capitalists themselves have relied upon it, socialization now turns against them because with its growth has grown also the misery of the working class. There is co-operation, yes; but anarchy also: co-operation in the workshop, but hateful competition among employers with utter disregard for the needs of consumers[96] and the wants of workers. Says the "Manifesto,"

"The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers . . . by their . . . association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave diggers."[97]

The bitter opposition of the working class grows, compromising with liberals only to oppose them more sharply when their usefulness ceases.[98] And finally the opposition between the two classes reaches its breaking-point: united and disciplined by capitalist mechanics the proletariat rebels against the fetter of capitalist monopoly. Centralization and socialization become incompatible. The capitalist "integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated."[99] Here is the Hegelian speaking: "capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation."[100]

The point at which the actual "negation of negation" occurs is the point of revolution. "Force," Marx says,

[96] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, pp. 102 ff.

[97] "Communist Manifesto," *op. cit.*, pp. 43 f.

[98] Cf. K. Marx, "Address of the Central Authority to the Communist League," *Capital* (Modern Library ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 355 ff.

[99] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 836 f.

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 837; cf. *supra*, pp. 50 f.

"is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one."[101] "The clashes that spontaneously arise out of the conditions of bourgeois society . . . cannot be conjured out of existence."[102] And Marx and Engels both feel that the dialectical method supports them in this view: dialectic recognizes "the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up"; for dialectic is essentially critical and revolutionary.[103] In more specific terms the material forces of production in society reach at a certain stage of development a point of conflict with relations of production. From forms of development these relations turn into obstacles soluble only by revolution.[104] Under the leadership of capitalism, Engels cries,

"society runs headlong to ruin like a locomotive. . . . [The] productive forces of the modern capitalistic mode of production as well as the system of distribution based upon it are in glaring contradiction to the mode of production itself and to such a degree that a revolution . . . must take place . . . or the whole of society will fall."[105]

Now it was suggested in a quotation from the "Manifesto" that one fundamental reason for this revolution is the socialization of workers in factories, an organization which undesignedly gives them strength and community of purpose. Revolution achieved let us now see what Marx and Engels regard as the outcome of the contradiction, the synthesis of the thesis and antithesis. Its first characteristic is a still more closely socialized condition, for it does

[101] *Ibid.*, p. 824.

[102] K. Marx, "June Days," *Karl Marx, Man, Thinker, and Revolutionist*, ed. Ryazanoff (London: Lawrence, 1927), p. 68.

[103] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 26.

[104] *Critique of Political Economy, op. cit.*, p. 12.

[105] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 183.

not revert back to the pre-capitalist era of primitive production: rather it is characterized by the fundamental qualities of that era united with the qualities of capitalism also; and these are, as has been shown, strongly socialized. Primitive property relations are re-established, according to Marx, but they are now "based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i.e., on co-operation and possession in common of the land and of the means of production."[106] What we seem to have is the thesis (primitive Communism, where commodities are produced singly and exchanged equally) plus the antithesis (capitalism, where commodities are produced co-operatively and exchanged unequally) united into a common whole (Communism proper, where commodities are produced co-operatively but exchanged equally). Hence there is not a retrogression but a progression.[107] It is, as Engels might point out, the Communist negation of the capitalist negation.[108] Here is the objective of the dialectical process in history.

But this inevitable synthesis is not quite so simple. After the revolution has occurred there are two more phases in the movement toward the ultimate end. The first of these is the dictatorship of the proletariat; the second is the withering away of the state.

The proletariat, upon overthrowing the bourgeoisie, steps into power; but this does not permit immediate application of Utopian principles. The "class dictation of the proletariat" is "the needful transition point toward the abolition of class divisions as such," Marx says in his

[106] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 837.

[107] Cf. *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, pp. 161 f.

[108] *Ibid.;* cf. the Hegelian logic, *supra*, pp. 50 ff.

study of the revolutionary years, 1848-50, in France.[109] It is the stage just *issuing* out of capitalist society.[110] Precisely what this dictatorship involves is never wholly explained, except through references to the Paris Commune, but it can safely be inferred that it means at least the destruction of bourgeois political machinery[111] and the maintenance of a workers' government.[112]

Marx regarded the proposition that the class struggle leads inevitably to the dictatorship of the proletariat as one of three original discoveries concerning classes, the second being that this dictatorship is "but the transition" to a classless society.[113] This transition period marks the withering away of the state. It follows from the Marxian definition of that state. Since political conditions are invariably reflections of the economic, therefore whichever state is in power at a particular period implies that a class whose interests are uppermost will be represented governmentally. The "will of the State . . . is declared through the changing needs of bourgeois society, through the domination of this or that class," Engels says of the capitalist period.[114] Its purpose is to maintain "means of subduing and exploiting the oppressed masses."[115] But when the proletariat has seized the state "it becomes the

[109] K. Marx, *Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich* (Berlin: Glocke, 1895); in English, *Class Struggles in France* (New York: Labor News, 1924), p. 174.

[110] K. Marx, *Criticism of the Gotha Program* (New York: Labor News, 1922), p. 28.

[111] *Eighteenth Brumaire, op. cit.,* pp. 141 f.

[112] K. Marx, *Civil War in France* (Chicago: Kerr, no date), pp. 43 ff.

[113] As quoted in *Capital* (Modern Library ed.), *op. cit.,* introduction by Eastman, pp. xv f.

[114] *Feuerbach, op. cit.,* p. 113.

[115] *Origin of the Family, op. cit.,* p. 208.

real representative of the whole society," and therefore "renders itself unnecessary. . . . State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then [withers away] dies out of itself".[116] This cannot happen until a new generation, developed under new social conditions, will be able to cast away the entire machinery of the state.[117]

And now the genuinely classless society, the third of the three discoveries as to classes which Marx believed himself to have made.[118] Of the features characterizing this ultimate synthesis Marx and Engels mention absence of class distinctions, abolition of distinction between town and country, abundance of wealth, change in human nature making that society durable and endurable.[119] As a result of the proletarian dictatorship the proletariat has not thereby become supreme in society, for its victory lies in negating not only its opposite but itself. The proletariat and the capitalists both disappear.[120] Now,

"for the first time, man, in a certain sense, is finely marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and control of man. . . ."[121]

Here is a universal co-operation of men enjoying the all-sided fruits of the earth, but where men are also free to

[116] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, pp. 128 f.

[117] "Engels' Introduction to the Civil War in France," *Communist*, VI (1927), p. 50.

[118] Cf. *supra*, footnote 113.

[119] Cf. S. H. M. Chang, *Marxian Theory of the State* (Philadelphia: John Spencer, Inc., 1931), pp. 133 f.

[120] "Heilige Familie," *op. cit.*, quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[121] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, p. 134.

train themselves as they choose.[122] "All socialists agree that the State, and together with it, also political authority, will vanish as the result of the future Socialist Revolution."[123]

In surveying this grand panorama let us recognize again the inevitable dialectic which, by a kind of inner purpose inherent in matter itself,[124] moves like a spiral[125] through levels of revolutionary evolutions. Societies appear and disappear again into higher regions[126] by the Hegelian laws of social logic;[127] and, throughout, the minds of men are united with, or at most reflections of, this vast material development. History, society, nature, man—all are subject to the dialectical laws of mobile matter[128] in which economic experience is itself rooted deeply.[129] When the doctrine of Communism is viewed in this way we can appreciate why Marx says there are no ideals to realize in a society whose new elements lie already implicit in the old.[130] We can understand Engels, too, as he pictures Marx pointing a stern finger at the strange necessities by which history draws ever near to the supreme negation of all negations, the classless society.[131]

[122] "German Ideology," *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[123] F. Engels, "Uber das Autoritätsprinzip," as quoted in Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[124] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 95.

[125] Cf. *supra*, p. 65.

[126] Cf. *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 49.

[127] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 45.

[128] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, pp. 99 f.

[129] Cf. *supra*, pp. 58 ff.

[130] *Civil War in France, op. cit.*, p. 50.

[131] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 164.

Chapter Six

The World of Lenin

FOUNDATIONAL to Lenin's view of the social world are, as might be expected, considerations of Hegelianism and materialism.

a) *Hegelianism.*—Lenin made, it has already been mentioned, an intensive study of Hegel. Some of his work was done while in exile as early as 1898;[1] still more while in Switzerland not long before the revolution of 1917.[2] Lenin regards the importance of Hegel for Communism as nothing short of tremendous.[3]

While he is frank to admit that it puzzles him in some ways,[4] there are three essential aspects of the Hegelian dialectic to which Lenin pays especial respect: as a theory of development and evolution; as a process of struggling polarities; and as an organicism.

In an article on Marx he praises Hegel's theory of development as more comprehensive and fruitful than even the current conception of evolution. He feels that it accounts for revolutions as well as for "intervals of gradualness"; and that it explains how interdependent phenomena proceed according to law.[5] It is Lenin's opinion elsewhere that dialectic is the "understanding of evolu-

[1] Krupskaya, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[2] Cf. *Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass, op. cit.*

[3] Cf. *Religion, op. cit.*, p. 41.

[4] N. Lenin, "Bestimmungen der Dialektik," *Unter dem Banner des Marxismus*, V (1931), 283.

[5] In *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 24. It should be noted that this article, while purporting to set forth the views of Marx, also shows both by tone and statement a conviction on the part of Lenin. The statements quoted are his own, not Marx's.

tion in its fullest, deepest, and most universal aspect".[6] This implies, of course, the essentiality of movement.[7]

As a process of contradictions, the Hegelian dialectic is discussed by Lenin in two recently discovered philosophic "fragments." The very kernel of the process, he declares in his "Bestimmungen der Dialektik," is the unity of opposites.[8] Speaking "On Dialectics" he adds that the division of the One into its contradictory parts is the very essence of Hegelianism, a division recognized as long ago as Heraclitus whose philosophy of Becoming involved a principle of struggle.[9] He gives examples of polarity:

"In mathematics: + and — . . .
In mechanics: Action and reaction.
In physics: Positive and negative electricity.
In chemistry: The combination and dissociation of atoms.
In the social sciences: The class struggle.
The identity of opposites . . . is the recognition . . . of the *mutually exclusive* and opposed tendencies in all the phenomena and processes of nature. . . . Development is 'struggle' of opposites. . . . It is *only* this . . . conception which offers the key to understanding the 'self movement' of everything in existence; . . . the destruction of the old and the appearance of the new."[10]

The third feature of the Hegelian dialectic, as Lenin sees it, is its interrelatedness. This is seen in the fact that particulars and generals are really identical, and that everything is bound to every other thing by "thousands

[6] N. Lenin, "Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism," *Capital* (Modern Library ed.), *op. cit.*, p. xxii.

[7] *Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass, op. cit.*, p. 3.

[8] "Bestimmungen der Dialektik," *op. cit.*, p. 284.

[9] V. I. Lenin, "On Dialectics," *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, pp. 321 ff.; also in *Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass, op. cit.*, pp. 285 ff.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 323 f.

of threads".[11] This holds also for knowledge; indeed dialectics is the theory of knowledge both of Hegel and of Marx.[12] It "does not follow a straight line, but a curved line which infinitely approaches a system of circles, the spiral."[13] The danger in epistemology lies in considering one segment as the whole. As Lenin elsewhere points out, dialectic is an understanding of the thoroughgoing *relativity* of knowledge.[14]

In his "Bestimmungen der Dialektik" Lenin summarizes his precise understanding of the whole Hegelian process. It is developmental, oppositional, relational. It is universal, transitional from lower to higher through the negating of oppositions in an endless process.[15]

But, above all, Hegelianism is objective.[16] "Logic is not the teaching of the outward forms of thought, but of the laws of development of all material, natural, and spiritual things, i.e., of the development of the entire concrete contents of the world".[17] This paraphrase by Lenin of the Hegelian dialectic is elucidated in "Konzept der 'Wissenschaft der Logic' von Hegel" to mean two fundamental things: first, the necessary and objective coherence of all appearances; second, the inner logic of objective evolution typified by the battle of polarities.[18] Well understood,

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 327.

[14] "Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism," *op. cit.*, p. xxii.

[15] "Bestimmungen der Dialektik," *op. cit.*, pp. 283 f.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 283.

[17] "Konzept der 'Wissenschaft der Logik' von Hegel," *op. cit.*, as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 90; cf. *ibid.*, p. 110.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

dialectic is applicable to almost every aspect of experience, and it is the duty of the consistent dialectical materialist to work out this process in every direction.[19] In natural science, for example, the Hegelian principle is so fruitful that philosophers would be able by means of it to answer many questions hitherto insoluble.[20] We must remember, above all, that *"dialectic is the correct mirroring of the eternal development of the world."*[21]

b) *Materialism.*—It is curiously suggestive of Lenin's philosophic insight that he seemingly was little perturbed by the idealism of Hegel. We recall that Marx devoted much of his early writings with Engels to a refutation of that philosophy.[22] Lenin once implies, however, that Hegel might very well be interpreted, even in his most idealistic moments, as really more materialistic than idealistic.[23] Apparently, then, Lenin is sensitive to the objectivity in Hegel; and indeed he compares "die Objektivität" of the Hegelian logic to the materialist dialectic.[24] At any rate the dialectic is applied materialistically by Lenin, as we have already seen in his application of it to the real world.

Lenin's most exhaustive study of materialism is, however, to be found in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.*[25] This is an extraordinary work for several reasons—

[19] "Uber die Bedeutung des streitbaren Materialismus," *op. cit.*, quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, pp. 117 f. Cf. *Religion, op. cit.*, p. 41.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

[21] "Konzept der 'Wissenschaft der Logik' von Hegel," *op. cit.*, as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 99, italics mine.

[22] *Supra*, pp. 55 ff.

[23] *Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass, op. cit.*, p. 160.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[25] Cf. *supra*, p. 9.

its polemical, not to say bombastic style (Lenin treats his philosophic opponents as though they were political enemies; appellations like "blockhead" are frequent); its encompassment of a vast amount of philosophic literature in several languages; and the position it defends. The book is basically epistemological and cannot pretend to establish the doctrine of dialectical materialism completely. But where the latter is defined as a strictly non-subjective, totally objective, *Weltanschauung* there may be need for an epistemology foundational to, even though not synonymous with, that philosophy.

Materialism and Empirio-Criticism was inspired by a compromise philosophy which had considerable vogue in Russia beginning in 1905, a philosophy whose chief exponent was Ernst Mach, a German scholar. Sketchily stated, Machism maintains that the world is made up of sensations, and the aim of knowledge is to recognize the connections of irreducible, immediate pure experience, the elements of sensation. All that our concepts amount to is that they are abbreviations, thought-symbols for groups of sensations; self, on the one hand, matter, on the other, these too are sensation complexes. To this theory Mach appends a voluntaristic view of knowledge: the latter arises from practical needs, and comes and goes with those needs; indeed both body and self are, so far as our conceptions of them go, not metaphysically presupposed at all but only makeshifts for purposes of empirical orientation.[26]

Lenin's own reaction to Machism resulted from reading

[26] Cf. Thilly, *op. cit.*, pp. 564 ff.; cf also E. Mach, *Analysis of Sensations* (Chicago: Open Court, 1914).

the Russian philosophy of Bazarov, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, and others In letters to Gorky he felt that these writers were really preaching a philosophy of faith, of mysticism, idealism, and agnosticism:[27] their whole book is absurd, philistine, and clerical, he said.[28] In other words, Machism is "revisionistic" and therefore a party-man, convinced of the deep fallacy and evil of the doctrine, must fight against it.[29] Lenin's book is the result: it was first published in 1909, following a trip by him to London where he perused philosophic literature in the British Museum.[30]

What then is Lenin's specific objection to the empirio-criticism of Mach? Simply this, that Mach's view is just the opposite of that holding sensations to be 'symbols' or images or reflections of things.[31] That is to say, his

"doctrine of things as complexes of sensations, is subjective idealism and a tedious repetition of Berkeleianism. If with Mach, bodies are to be reduced to 'complexes of sensations,' or with Berkeley to 'combinations of sensations,' then from this it inevitably follows that the 'world is my idea.' . . . and this is the purest solipsism."[32]

Or, call these sensations "elements" if you will: even then this philosophy is "idealism which in vain tends to cover

[27] Quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 22; cf. also M. Gorky, *Days with Lenin* (New York: International, 1932), pp. 24 ff.

[28] Cf. *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, introduction by Deborin, p. xviii.

[29] N. Lenin, "Leninskij Sbornik," quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 23. Cf. also N. Lenin, "Memoirs of a Publicist," *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 335, where in 1910 he continues to say that the fight in philosophy is still with the Machists.

[30] Cf. *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, introduction by Deborin, p. xx.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 21 f.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

the nakedness of its solipsism by a garb of 'objective terminology.' "[33] The trouble with the Machians then is that they do not trust what the sense-organs reveal, do not grant that objective reality is the source of our sensations.[34] And what does this type of epistemology lead to? "Our Machians have become enmeshed in idealism,"[35] which "gives nature at least the same status as God".[36]

Machism curiously is regarded by Lenin as a broad tendency in philosophy extending far beyond the borders of that particular school which it is his desire to destroy. Machism is found in at least two other important tendencies. The first is pragmatism as that is represented by William James: Lenin points out that this school rejects both idealism and materialism in favor of experience, and that the difference between Machism and pragmatism is both insignificant and subsidiary according to materialism.[37] The second tendency is idealistic physics: Henry Poincaré is one who is cited as arguing that, with the reduction of electrons to energy, mass disappears, and the tendency therefore is to regard the principles of physics as products of mind.[38] Rey is another mentioned as believing that the "new movement in physics sees in scientific

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 299.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 193; cf. quotation from Lenin in V. Marcu, *Lenin* (London: Gollancz, 1928), p. 180: "If there is no objective truth, if truth . . . is only an organized form of human experience, then the fundamental principle of priesthood is admitted, the door is opened to it, the ground is cleared for the 'organized forms' of religious experience."

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 296; cf. also W. James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1908), p. 58.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 213 f.

theory only symbols, signs, prescriptions for practice".[39] When matter disappears what we have is simply a return to Kant, where reason prescribes laws to nature, and ultimately then a return to Machian idealism.[40]

But what alternatives are there to this type of philosophy? Fundamentally two only, Lenin answers: materialism and various brands of compromise such as agnosticism. But these latter types also tend toward idealism of one sort or another, so that philosophic history reduces ultimately to but two positions[41] arraigned against each other: "Are our relative conceptions . . . approximations to real forms of being? Or are these only products of the developing, organising, and harmonising human mind? This . . . is the fundamental problem of the theory of knowledge on which the fundamental philosophic schools divide."[42] Indeed, just because there are these two tendencies—"that is, whether to take nature, matter, the physical, the outer world as the *prius* or whether to start with consciousness, spirit, sensation"[43]—the efforts of Mach and his ilk are at best weak imitations of Berkeley, Hume, and Kant.[44] And to mention the latter two leads us, incidentally, to a clarification of Lenin's reasons for regarding agnosticism as allied with idealism, for it is his opinion that Kant as well as Hume belong more or less to that category: Kant, because of his unknowable

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 217.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 264.
[41] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 292.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 143 f.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 290.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 8 f., 14 f.

thing-in-itself;[45] Hume, because according to him mind deals only with perceptions and cannot determine whether they are connected with objects.[46] Now the point is that the neutrality of the philosopher as exemplified by agnosticism, skepticism, "*is* already a mark of servility to fideism"[47] (Lenin uses the term, fideism, somewhat peculiarly—a sort of subjective idealism). There is servility precisely because so-called neutrality itself denies "the objective reality of the source of our sensations."[48] This is why Mach, even when he straddles the fence, is still thoroughly an enemy of materialism.

The positive side of Lenin's doctrine is now ready for elucidation. He cites Haeckel approvingly as a consistent epistemological materialist: "Knowledge is a physiological process, with the brain for its anatomical organ."[49] This extreme materialism is also urged by a statement of his own:

"Such is the view of materialism; that matter, acting on our sense-organs, produces sensation. Sensation depends upon the brain, nerves, retina, etc., upon matter organised in a certain way. The existence of matter does not depend upon sensation. Matter is of primary nature. Sensation, thought, consciousness are the highest products of matter organised in a certain way."[50]

But Lenin makes two additions to this statement, additions which he does not always take the pains to indicate

[45] Cf. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), pp. 192 ff.

[46] Cf. D. Hume, "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," *Selections* (New York: Scribner's, 1927). Lenin refers to a specific passage, in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, p. 16.

[47] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, p. 298.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

as related to it. The first of these is that matter is absolutely independent of anything called mind, in the sense that it can exist without intervention of mind: "Materialism generally recognises the objectively real being (matter) as existing independently of mind, sensation, experience, etc. Historical materialism recognises social being as existing independently of the social consciousness of humanity."[51] The other contention is that mind is a reflection of matter: "To regard our sensations as copies of the external world, is to admit an objective truth, that is, to hold a materialistic point of view."[52] Lenin quotes Dietzgen approvingly for saying that our "faculty of cognition . . . is not a supernatural source of truth, but a mirror-like instrument which *reflects* the things of the world, or Nature."[53]

Epistemologically this position of Lenin is more or less adequately defined as epiphenomenalism. It is true that some of the statements above suggest that there is an identity of matter and mind, and it is true also that Lenin seems concerned sometimes only with proving the externality of the world; but considering the frequency with which such terms are used as copy, mirror, image, reflection, and even the terms, consciousness and mind, it is probably legitimate to conclude that though the basis of consciousness still be material, and though matter be inseparable from motion,[54] states of consciousness are describable as effects of that mobile matter, as, in short, after-appearances. In terms of the social, Lenin frankly

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 281; cf. p. 96.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[53] J. Dietzgen, *Philosophical Essays* (Chicago: Kerr, 1906), p. 331.
[54] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, p. 229.

admits this position when he says, "Social consciousness *reflects* social being. . . . The reflection may be a true, though approximate copy of the reflected, but to speak of their identity is absurd."[55] This—though his own terms are realism[56] and materialism—is epiphenomenalism.

There are certain applications of this epistemology which Lenin discusses and which warrant mention. For example, things-in-themselves are somehow knowable; for the materialist they not only exist but can be known.[57] "There is absolutely no difference between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be none. The difference is only between what is already known and what is not yet known."[58] Again, Lenin argues that the so-called idealistic physics does not disprove the essential truth of his position: all materialism contends is that there is an objective reality outside our cognition,[59] and this in no way prevents the principles of physics from changing. Certain recent discoveries, for instance, require merely this revision: "traditional mechanics was a 'copy' of motions of moderate velocity, while recent physics is a 'copy' of motions of enormous velocity. The recognition of the theory as a copy is . . . materialism."[60] In other words, science has merely succeeded in discovering different forms of matter and motion, has reduced the old to new forms;[61] and hence we are, after all, justified in believing —regardless of certain errors—that the physicist is right

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 278.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 82.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 220.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 225.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 268, footnote.

who says that atoms, molecules, electrons, really exist.[62]

Still another application of Lenin's position is to be seen in his insistence upon the objectivity of natural law. "The recognition of the fact of natural *order* and the approximate reflection of that order in the mind of man is materialism."[63] Again, although physical principles may change, and in that sense are relative, this does not mean that they can therefore be called merely working postulates, for to deny "the absolute character of the *most important and basic laws*" is to deny objective law entirely.[64] Lenin even goes so far as to call the objects of reality eternal and absolute truths;[65] to every scientific theory there corresponds objectivity which is absolutely true in nature.[66] In this respect the relativism which some philosophers read into dialectics is superseded. Space and time are examples of this position: our cognition reflects their reality only with greater and greater exactitude.[67]

Thus far in our exposition of Lenin's epistemology we have failed to indicate in what ways, if any, he attempts proof. His frank recognition of the profound significance of Berkeley[68] might indeed suggest that he does not pretend to refute idealism conceived as the direct opposite of his position; and this possibility is enhanced by a re-

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 125, italics mine; cf. also p. 135, and *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 114: "All that happens in history is subject to the law of necessity." Cf. also his references in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, p. 127, to J. Dietzgen, *Positive Outcome of Philosophy* (Chicago: Kerr, 1906), pp. 109 ff.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 221 f., italics mine.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 108, 143, 153.

[68] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 6 ff.

markable admission: "Let us," Lenin says, "imagine a consistent idealist who holds that the world is his sensation, or idea. . . . Outside of me there is nothing. . . . And by no proofs, or syllogisms, or definitions would it be possible to refute the solipsist, if he consistently adhered to this view."[69] But even so, Lenin does feel that there are some grounds for holding the materialistic position: first, of course, the authorities Marx and Engels. Second, common sense: any healthy person believes that reality, environment, and things exist outside his perception. "The 'naïve' belief of mankind is consciously taken by materialism as the basis of its theory of knowledge."[70] One instinctively,[71] even by faith, clings to the objective existence of external reality.[72] The third "proof" Lenin offers is that natural science everywhere takes materialism for granted: "The scientists . . . recognise without hesitation the existence of nature prior to man and organic matter"[73] and "the *inseparable* connection between the instinctive materialism of naturalists and *philosophical materialism* as a tendency".[74] This foundation of Lenin's view of the world, then, may be summarized:

Any philosophy which refuses to recognize the priority, independence, and order of the outer world is an idealism or agnosticism which leads invariably to solipsism and fideism. Machism is such a philosophy because its elements are sensations; Humeism, Kantianism, pragmatism,

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 226.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 47.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 223.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 249.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 300; cf. also pp. 52, 63.

and idealistic physics (with its emphasis on symbols) are other examples. Mind and its knowledge are a reflection of the outer world and somehow grounded in matter; a proof of this position being especially the naïve epistemology of ordinary men and that of natural science.

c) *Dialectical Materialism.*—The title of this section is used again as implying the strictly objective side of the position under inspection, a term encompassing not only dialectic and materialism taken as philosophically foundational, but especially the political, economic, sociological. The connection between the two preceding sections of the present chapter and this section is suggested by Lenin when he says that his epistemology is indispensable to the objective logic of social development.[75] As for the justification of attributing to him a monistic view no better reason is to be found perhaps than when Lenin asserts: "The application of materialist dialectic to the development of the entire political economy, history, science, philosophy, politics, and tactics of the working class" is most important.[76] Indeed Hegel's philosophy offers the only scientific way of explaining history;[77] the Hegelian dialectic is applicable in countless ways to war, revolution, economic and political relations;[78] and out of the chaos which formerly characterized historical views we find historical materialism "strikingly whole and symmetrical".[79]

[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 280 f.; cf. also p. 290.

[76] N. Lenin, "Briefwechsel zwischen Marx und Engels," as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

[77] "Was sind die 'Freunde des Volkes,'" *op. cit.*, quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

[78] *Religion, op. cit.*, p. 41.

[79] "Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism," *op. cit.*, p. xxiii; cf. *supra*, pp. 77 ff.

The precise way in which materialism serves as a basis for this wide assertion is to be found in the fact that ideologies and governments of all kinds are determined by that materialism, conceived economically: "all . . . ideas . . . without exception, have their roots in the condition of the material forces of production. . . . [The] production of the material means of life" forms "the basis of all the historical activity of man".[80] This is why political institutions are superstructures and economic events the foundation;[81] why crises occur independently of will;[82] why neither impatience nor wishes but objective conditions bring about historical occurrences;[83] why wars cannot possibly be brought on by the crimes of individual persons;[84] why the national culture of the bourgeois period is only the culture of the property-owner and the priest (who reflects and protects it);[85] why it is fantastic to suppose people can remain independent of the march of events;[86] why the literature and art of the bourgeois period is dependent on the purses of the dominating class,[87] and finally why the state is itself merely a tool in the hands of the economic and material powers of a given period.[88]

[80] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 26.

[81] "Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism," *op. cit.*, p. xxiii.

[82] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 304.

[83] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 85.

[84] *Ibid.*, II, 207.

[85] N. Lenin, "Gesammelte Werke, Bd. XIX," quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

[86] Gorky, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[87] N. Lenin, "Parteiorganisationen und die Parteiliteratur," quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

[88] Cf. *State and Revolution, op. cit.*, pp. 17 f.

Lenin finds the dialectical feature of his doctrine most fundamentally expressed in the conflict of classes, "the inference to which the whole of world history leads."[89] Thus an objective consideration of the changing relations between each class is essential, relations which are not static but in dynamic development.[90] In the period with which Lenin is especially concerned the class struggle arises between proletariat and capitalists, the explanation resting upon the Marxian theory of surplus value which Lenin explains much after the fashion of our own summary in Part Two.[91] This theory means simply that the worker donates a part of his labor-time to the employer gratis, and that from this part the profit of the employer accrues. Lenin repeats after Marx how this economic situation leads to an intensification of antagonisms;[92] and he shows too that the Hegelian logic is utilized by Marx in *Capital* to provide both a dialectical and epistemological explanation of this increasing antagonism.[93] In this entire explanation of dialectical materialism, it must be said that Lenin is often slavish in his devotion to Marx and Engels;[94] indeed he goes so far in one case as to show that Engels anticipated

[89] "Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism," *op. cit.*, p. xxv.

[90] W. I. Lenin, "Sämtliche Werke, Bd. XVIII," quoted in *Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass, op. cit.*, introduction by Adoratski, p. xiv.

[91] *Supra*, pp. 64 f.; cf. *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, pp. 31 f., and "Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism," *op. cit.*, p. xxiv.

[92] Cf. *supra*, pp. 66 ff.; cf. also *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 332 ff.

[93] If Marx left no regular logic, he did leave the logic of *Capital*, Lenin says in his "Plan der Dialektik (Logik) Hegels," *Unter dem Banner des Marxismus*, V (1931), 280 f. Also in *Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass, op. cit.*, pp. 247 ff.

[94] Cf., e.g., *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, I, 19, 41; cf. also "Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism," *op. cit.*, p. xxvi.

state monopoly capitalism,[95] a development usually regarded as post-Marxian.

Yet there are several elaborations by Lenin of the objective system portrayed by his predecessors.

(1) He argues that dialectical materialism is also fundamentally applicable to an agricultural country such as Russia;[96] and what is perhaps his most scholarly work, *Die Entwicklung des Kapitalismus in Russland,* is an effort to establish the Marxian thesis there.[97] As regards agriculture particularly, Lenin in 1901 wrote a book called "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'" in which were argued the following theses: the law of diminishing returns is not a valid explanation or justification of increasing hardship; the theory of surplus value as regards rent is applicable to agriculture; the use of machinery, which in industry results in a diminution of returns to the laborer and an increase to the capitalist, applies also to agriculture; the antagonism of city and country, while great, is not necessary; and finally the "proletarianization" of the peasantry is inevitable and is already developing rapidly.[98]

While all these points are important applications of dialectical materialism Lenin also makes several modifica-

[95] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* II, 203. Lenin himself is given credit often for developing this feature in terms of Communism, along with his study of imperialism; cf. *infra,* pp. 96 ff.

[96] Yet it has been said that even here Marx gave a somewhat similar opinion; cf. M. Hillquit, *From Marx to Lenin* (New York: Hanford, 1921), pp. 25 ff.

[97] W. I. Lenin, *Entwicklung des Kapitalismus in Russland,* sämtliche werke, Bd. III (Wien-Berlin: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1929).

[98] V. I. Lenin, "Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx,'" *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* I, 183 ff.

tions of interest: he admits that capitalism in Russia is comparatively new,[99] that the oppression of the common people comes as much from the autocratic rule of the Tsar as from ordinary capitalists,[100] and that Russia is backward as compared to other European countries.[101] Perhaps the most interesting modification, however, is that a third class stands between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, the petty bourgeois class of peasants.[102] This midway class needs consideration and Lenin urges that it be allied with the proletariat in the latter's battle against capitalism. He admits that the petty bourgeoisie may be even the largest class in numbers; and that every country, not alone Russia, is divided into three main forces; yet he insists that members of the petty bourgeoisie gravitate toward the workers or toward the bourgeoisie; they cannot maintain an independent place indefinitely, for they must either increase in wealth to survive in capitalist competition or they must lose their wealth to become semi-proletarian and finally of the proletariat proper.[103]

Thus despite variations on the Marxian theme Lenin held as early as 1897 in his fight with the Populists—a movement which insisted Russia need not and should not follow Europe's course—that Russia is rapidly growing strong capitalistically, that any interpretation of that growth in anti-dialectical terms is "reactionary."[104] In

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 48; cf. also *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 225.

[101] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, pp. 198, 37.

[102] N. Lenin, "Provisional Government," *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 56.

[103] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 68 f., 32, 147, 91; cf. also *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 62, 106.

[104] N. Lenin, "Heritage We Renounce," *Selections, op. cit.*, I, 11 f. Cf.

1917 he substantiates in a way his early statement with the conclusion that politically Russia has now caught up with other countries.[105]

(2) It is to be expected that Lenin would insist also that there can be no hope of a genuinely proletarian revolution until bourgeois productive forces have fully developed.[106] Thus Lenin speaks of the need to remove relics of the past which bind the peasantry in order that capitalism may develop more adequately.[107] Considering that such vigorous opposition is expressed in his writings *against* capitalism, one might legitimately express surprise at this assertion, but Lenin does not vacillate. In 1905, the year of the first Russian revolution, he said,

"The objective historical progress of affairs has confronted the Russian proletariat with the task of bringing about a democratic bourgeois revolution (the substance of which, for the sake of brevity, we would describe by the term 'republic'). . . . Unless this revolution is brought about first, anything like the extensive development of an independent class organization for the social revolution is inconceivable."[108]

Here then is reason for helping the bourgeois cause: it is a means to an end, in Hegelian terms the antithesis of a triad. No wonder that in Russia where capitalism exists,

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also *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 32, where Lenin points out how Russia has already evolved through the periods of simple co-operation, division of labor, and manufacture, and is now well into the period of machinery and large scale industry.

[105] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 216.

[106] V. I. Lenin, *Paris Commune* (New York: International, 1931), pp. 15, 19.

[107] "Heritage We Renounce," *op. cit.*, p. 15.

[108] N. Lenin, "Revolutionary Dictatorship," *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 76; cf. *Revolution of 1905, op. cit.*, p. 14.

but where Tsarism and serfdom have held back *complete* development of that stage, Lenin can say consistently that "The Russian proletariat demands now and immediately, not that which will undermine capitalism, but that which will clear the path for its development and accelerate it."[109] In fact Communism can even, for this reason, give the bourgeois order its blessing.[110] But Lenin does not confine this argument to the early years: in 1915 he was saying that the proletariat must fight to free bourgeois Russia from feudal Russia,[111] and he was praising Germany for recognizing that historical circumstances require concessions to the bourgeois state.[112] As late as 1918 he admitted that the revolution of March, 1917, was a bourgeois revolution, and that "We were fully aware of this, had repeated it a thousand times from 1905 onwards, and never attempted either to skip over this necessary stage of the historical process or to 'abolish' it by decrees."[113]

(3) The historical materialism of Lenin is expounded also by recognition of periods of evolution, of peaceful development during which contradictions accumulate slowly but surely toward an inevitable breaking point,[114] a phenomenon indicated by a certain unevenness of development in various countries and under different circumstances.[115] This immanent movement also leads Lenin

[109] "Party and Non-Party," *op. cit.*, p. 144; cf. p. 143.
[110] *Revolution of 1905, op. cit.*, p. 17.
[111] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 363.
[112] *Proletarian Revolution in Russia, op. cit.*, p. 364.
[113] *Proletarian Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 115; cf. also p. 136.
[114] N. Lenin, "Against the Boycott," *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 255.
[115] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 272.

to say that revolutions, for instance, "are never born ready-made; . . . they do not kindle at once. They are always preceded by a process of fermentations, crises, movements, revolts, *beginnings* of revolutions".[116] In Russia particularly one cannot expect Communism to triumph immediately or directly; the proletariat cannot be expected to bring about or succeed with a revolution single-handed: what is necessary rather is that there should first develop "favourable circumstances".[117] In fact one primary reason for a strong political party is that such would permit steady, ever-spreading development, and above all "evolution gradual, peaceful and tranquil".[118] The point, however, is not so much the degree of calm or of violence present in this accumulative process as it is that according to materialist dialectics Communism somehow evolves out of capitalism definitely and surely;[119] and scientific method consists in understanding society as a living organism[120] whose course of development proceeds objectively according to a definite system of production relationships.[121]

(4) We now come to what is frequently regarded as the greatest of Lenin's interpretations of the theory of dialectical materialism—his diagnosis of the stage of imperialism as that crucial point in the course of history where the contradictions, which have been accumulating in the

[116] *Ibid.*, p. 397.

[117] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 86 f.

[118] *Revolutionary Lessons, op. cit.*, pp. 55, 62.

[119] *State and Revolution, op. cit.*, pp. 101 f.

[120] "Was sind die 'Freunde des Volkes,' " *op. cit.*, quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

[121] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

more peaceful periods, produce an explosion.[122] His study is induced by the World War, and is meant as an elaboration of the thesis of Marx that capitalism tends toward greater and greater centralization, accumulation.[123] It may be enlightening to refer to an article in which he shows the dialectical course of history by actual dates: The First Epoch, he contends, is that of 1789-1871, which marks the rise of the bourgeoisie, its full victory, and the rapid breakdown of feudalism. The Second Epoch marks the full domination and decline of the bourgeoisie, the period where the inner forces of Communism are gathering power: its dates are 1871-1914. The Third Epoch, which begins in 1914 and extends for an uncertain time, is the epoch of "imperialist convulsions." It marks the utter expropriation of capitalism amidst the death throes of the latter.[124] Note its characteristics, as Lenin presents them in his major work on this question, his *Imperialism:*

There is a definite tendency toward monopoly as production is concentrated. Instead of the older free competition among individual employers we now find that raw materials, skilled labor, transportation, in fact all the features of modern manufacture, are brought under the control of fewer and fewer industrial magnates. There is increased socialization in productive methods, but decreased socialization in appropriation of profits and control.[125]

The development of monopoly is especially obvious in

[122] Cf. *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.,* I, 331.
[123] Cf. *supra,* pp. 65 f.
[124] *Imperialist War, op. cit.,* pp. 126 f.
[125] *Imperialism, op. cit.,* pp. 13 ff.

banking. Here big banks absorb or subordinate small ones, and there is likewise frequent connection between banks and great industries through overlapping of directorates, shares. (In fact banking and large industry have become an indissoluble whole.[126]) The supreme stage of financial imperialism, however, is that stage where the ownership of capital is separated from its application to production, where the investor lives entirely on the income he receives in dividends and similar profits.[127]

The next characteristic of the period Lenin is analyzing is the exportation of excess capital. This phenomenon occurs because of overdevelopment in certain countries which results in a scarcity of profitable investments. Hence we find the world being divided among capitalists much after the manner of monopolies. This means, of course, competition among nations whose policies are dictated by capital to control those colonies providing the most valuable raw materials and other economic values.[128]

All this leads to greater, ever greater, disturbances of equilibrium, crisis and chaos, and irregularity of growth in those countries where capitalism is most developed.[129] And then—war! There were imperialist wars even in ancient times but only of late has imperialism developed fully.[130] "Imperialism is the progressing oppression of the nations of the world by a handful of great powers; it is an epoch of wars among them for the widen-

[126] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 190.
[127] *Imperialism, op. cit.*, pp. 20, 28 f., 44 f.
[128] *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 72, 104.
[129] *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 48, 105.
[130] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, II, 81.

ing and strengthening of national oppression".[131] Indeed,

"To test the real power of a capitalist state, there is, and there can be, no other way than war. War is no contradiction to the foundations of private property—on the contrary it is a direct and inevitable development of those foundations. . . . Under capitalism, no other means for periodically re-establishing destroyed equilibrium are possible. . . ."[132]

The World War "was a consequence of the development of international Capitalism in the course of the past fifty years, of its endless connections and ramifications."[133] But this development though expressed imperialistically is fundamentally no different than that expressed between private capitalists; the whole situation resolves itself to this: "Competition among individual enterprises makes it inevitable for the entrepreneurs either to become ruined, or to ruin others".[134] And in precisely the same way "competition between individual countries places before each one of them the alternative of either remaining behind . . . or ruining and conquering other countries".[135] Imperialism is dialectically inevitable.

(5) But now that this stage is reached what rôle does the proletariat play? Lenin accepts both of the outstanding consequences for the proletariat of accumulative capitalism—increasing misery and increasing socialization. Although he honestly admits that imperialism may to a certain extent retard the growth of the revolutionary movement because of the prosperity some countries have gained

[131] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 368.
[132] *Ibid.*, p. 271.
[133] *Proletarian Revolution in Russia, op. cit.*, p. 88.
[134] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 332.
[135] *Ibid.*

through it,[136] yet in speaking of the increasing misery of workers he lists such effects as reserve armies of labor, widespread unemployment, economic crises, the labor of women and children, unnatural concentration of masses in the cities,[137] and—a phenomenon especially correlative with imperialist competition—the exploitation of cheap foreign labor in colonies.[138] These phenomena mean of course numerous privations, and therefore development of dissatisfaction on the part of workers.[139] Hunger and disease—here are two supreme evils of the supreme stage of capitalism.[140] But such miseries are only relatively more acute during this period: the capitalist era, even when it overlaps with Tsarism, is throughout a "hotbed of violence, outrage and license".[141] Indeed,

> "Thousands and tens of thousands of men and women, toiling all their lives to create wealth for others, perish from starvation and constant under-feeding, prematurely die from diseases caused by the horrible conditions . . . in which they live and overwork. He who prefers death in the open struggle against those who defend and protect this horrible system, rather than the lingering death of a crushed, broken-down and submissive hag, deserves the title of hero a hundred-fold."[142]

The wars that result through imperialist competition are, however, the supreme evil. War is criminal, terrible, for the masses; yet it is waged for the capitalists who quarrel over the division of spoils.[143]

[136] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* II, 87.
[137] *Imperialist War, op. cit.,* pp. 33, 40.
[138] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* II, 86 f.
[139] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.,* I, 333 f.
[140] *Great Initiative, op. cit.,* p. 22.
[141] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* I, 74.
[142] *Ibid.,* p. 117.
[143] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.,* I, 258.

The second way in which the proletariat is affected, socialization, Lenin suggests by the fact that value of labor is not wholly atomic but involves social necessity, and by the collective operations of modern manufacture.[144] In his discussion of imperialism Lenin has already noted how industry has become more and more closely integrated by systematic technologies, by the co-ordination of industry and banking. This affects the workers: "Large-scale capitalist economy is, by its technical nature, socialised economy, *i.e.*, it both works for millions of people and unites by its operations, directly and indirectly, hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of families."[145] What we are approaching is virtually state monopoly capitalism, which—although it is still capitalism and cannot avoid the crises characteristic of capitalism—gives the maltreated proletariat a tremendous class power.[146] But even in the old *Iskra* days Lenin anticipated an organization large enough to embrace the whole country of Russia, sufficiently tried and flexible to carry out its own work in the face of adversities or surprises.[147] That capitalist methods have throughout been largely responsible for this growing unity is suggested implicitly by Lenin often; and he speaks frankly of the "*forced syndication*" of the workers.[148]

And so we arrive at the point of maximum class opposition, the point where the proletariat becomes simultaneously aware both of its oppressed status and its own

[144] *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 34, 39 f.

[145] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 194.

[146] *Ibid.*, p. 211; cf. also *ibid.*, II, 80, 203.

[147] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, I, 115.

[148] V. I. Lenin, *Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power* (New York: International, 1932), p. 22.

power. Lenin defines classes as "great groups of people which are distinguished by their position in the historically determined system of social production through their relation to the means of production".[149] Everyone must belong to one class or another: "It is laughable really even to speak of such a duty here, for no living person can help taking sides with this or that class, if he has once understood the reciprocal relationship of the classes".[150] The essence of the Marxian doctrine is the question of classes.[151] With the development of capitalism the dialectical polarity of their opposition increases; then it is, for example, that the petty bourgeoisie mentioned above[152] waver between the two extremes, some joining the workers others the bourgeoisie.[153] The duty of science is to recognize the ultimately absolute conflict of these classes[154] until, when we arrive at imperialism with its concurrent wars, we ascertain easily the "socio-political character of the war" as determined by the class conducting the war.[155] One must not, that is to say, fail to realize that wars are conducted by governments and that the latter merely represent the interests of specific classes.[156] The criterion is above all the class in power, and which continues to

[149] N. Lenin, "Grosse Initiative," as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 142. Cf. also "Was sind die 'Freunde des Volkes,'" *op. cit.*, quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

[150] N. Lenin, "Ökonomische Inhalt der Lehre der Narodniki," as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[151] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 101.

[152] *Supra*, p. 93.

[153] Cf. "Party and Non-Party," *op. cit.*, pp. 142 f.

[154] "Was sind die 'Freunde des Volkes,'" *op. cit.*, quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

[155] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 137.

[156] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

rule: today it is, of course, the class making hundreds of millions of dollars in banking and financial operations, the "same old capitalist class."[157] But the issue lies in the opposition to such aggrandizement: "The proletarian standpoint in this matter consists of a definite *class* characterization of the war, and of an irreconcilable hostility to the imperialist war".[158] It was objectively inevitable that this war should sharpen, quicken, the class struggle between workers and capitalists, and lead to a civil war, Lenin insists.[159] The periods of calm and evolution which had preceded[160] now suddenly burst forth into storm and revolution; in fact it is wholly dialectical to suppose that changes from turmoil to calm and back again occur with remarkable rapidity.[161]

Class struggle—this is the point of society's immanent contradiction; it arises when conditions of social development are ripe for it;[162] it is inevitably the "main spring of events."[163] As civil war it arises at times spontaneously,[164] and this spontaneity is sometimes itself proof of the firmness of the roots of the movement as well of its inevitability.[165] When revolution occurs, moreover, many years of slow evolutionary accomplishment may be equalled

[157] *Ibid.*, II, 199.

[158] *Ibid.*, I, 111.

[159] *Ibid.*, p. 29. Cf. also *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 112, where Lenin speaks of the era of imperialism as the era when objective conditions "are ripe for the collapse of capitalism and masses of Socialist proletarians are already in existence". Cf. also *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 130.

[160] Cf. *supra*, pp. 95 f.

[161] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 245.

[162] *Paris Commune, op. cit.*, p. 19.

[163] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 27.

[164] N. Lenin, "Bogey of Civil War," *Labour Monthly*, VII (1925), 160.

[165] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 232.

in a brief time.[166] Referring once again to the dialectical method Lenin insists that the class struggle together with the development of productive forces constitute the basic moving forces of society.[167] Much of Lenin's popular fame arises, no doubt, from his combustible language on the subject of revolution. On founding the *Iskra* he wrote that "We strongly repudiate every attempt to weaken or tone down the revolutionary character of Social Democracy,"[168] in fact we must beware of the compromising tactics of the liberal governments who try to fool the workers by coalitions.[169] He admits that even terror as a military procedure may be both useful and essential.[170] Mild forms of struggle are sometimes valuable—strikes, for example—but before the fundamental conditions oppressing the proletariat can be removed it is absolutely essential to carry on "a revolutionary struggle against the whole existing social and political system,"[171] to break the fetters binding labor to capital.[172] This is why Lenin rejects pacifism, for while opposed to imperialist wars nevertheless he regards it "absurd" to disavow the necessity of revolutionary wars in the interests of socialism.[173] Only these latter disclose to the masses their great power.[174] In short the one way to end the horrors of war is by means of the class

[166] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* I, 158.
[167] *Imperialist War, op. cit.* p. 283.
[168] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* I, 20.
[169] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* I, 87.
[170] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* I, 110 f.
[171] *Ibid.,* p. 118.
[172] *Paris Commune, op. cit.,* p. 14.
[173] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.,* I, 85.
[174] *Revolution of 1905, op. cit.,* p. 42.

struggle, for much "has been left in the world that *must* be destroyed by fire and iron for the liberation of the working class."[175] In a time of world war, especially, the task of the Communist is "to raise the banner of revolutionary Marxism" and to "turn the period of imperialist war into the beginning of a period of civil wars."[176] Revolution must occur at that *"crucial point"* where there is an upsurge in the maturing crisis.[177] Dialectically the important issue again is the inevitability of the revolution.[178] Sentiment cannot be substituted for the prerequisite of an objectively revolutionary situation.[179] The deepest economic and political forces, not the mere existence of Bolshevism, are causing this movement.[180] It is *history* which demands of the proletariat that it serve as the vanguard in a revolutionary situation.[181] Lenin does not talk here of possibilities: "Let us bear in mind that the great mass struggle *is* approaching."[182] This is why a revolution is not made to order but grows;[183] this is why the expectation of a revolution is not an infatuation but common opinion;[184] finally, this is why despite temporary setbacks "the masses will rise again, mightier than ever", why the

[175] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 316.

[176] *Ibid.*, p. 248.

[177] *On the Eve of October, op. cit.*, p. 5.

[178] Cf. *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 138.

[179] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[180] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 32.

[181] Cf. Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 6; also *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 349; cf. also *Religion, op. cit.*, p. 48.

[182] N. Lenin, "Lessons of Moscow," *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 206, italics mine.

[183] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 300.

[184] *Proletarian Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 100.

"red dawn is approaching, *the proletarian revolution is coming.*"[185]

But what about the effect of this revolution? Can dialectical materialism tell us that? Lenin answers unhesitatingly that capitalism must collapse, that the proletariat must triumph. "Before us," he cries, "in all its strength, towers the fortress of the enemy from which a hail of shells and bullets pours down upon us".[186] Even so, economic development guarantees that the movement will grow, defeat all obstacles.[187] Such was Lenin's conviction in 1900; in 1906 he says that the collapse of the political superstructure is inevitable;[188] in 1917 he reiterates that the proletariat will win,[189] that the "final victory of the proletariat is certain";[190] and—what is of more technical importance—that before imperialism can proceed to the point where single world trusts should appear, "imperialism will inevitably explode," and as Hegel might say, "*capitalism will turn into its opposite.*"[191] Such is the conviction of Lenin throughout his writings, whether expressed in an article remote from immediate practice, or in a point of tactics after March, 1917, when Lenin is insisting that the new capitalist government of Kerensky be overthrown.[192]

(6) Following the revolution in which the proletariat is definitely victorious—an event which Lenin lived to see

[185] N. Lenin, "Revolution and Tasks," *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 170 f.
[186] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, I, 57 f.
[187] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[188] N. Lenin, "Two Tactics," *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 16.
[189] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 35.
[190] *Ibid.*, p. 327; cf. also *Paris Commune, op. cit.*, p. 20.
[191] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 403, italics mine.
[192] Cf. *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 35.

occur in Russia in November, 1917, but which dialectically will occur also throughout Europe ("objective circumstances . . . make it certain that the revolution will not be limited . . . to Russia"[193])—thoroughgoing Communism cannot be expected immediately to arise. What is necessary rather is a transition period which Lenin, as did Marx, calls the dictatorship of the proletariat, a period not invented by theorists but produced by the class war.[194]

As early as 1905 there is mention of the need of such a dictatorship, although in accordance with the feudo-capitalist conditions of that time Lenin speaks of it as combining the peasantry with the proletariat.[195] Again, in 1915—two years before the actual revolution—he advocates the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, following the overthrow of capitalism, as an essential foundation for the abolition of poverty and an institution of genuine reforms.[196] Such a dictatorship involves smashing the bourgeois state-machine, control of social production, and distribution of goods by the organized proletariat.[197] In a definite sense, however, this is but a step beyond the preceding level of state monopoly capitalism which, since it has already provided a socialized system to some extent, has itself made progress toward Communism.[198] The police, army, bureaus, moreover, must consist of the people united

[193] *Ibid.*, p. 87; cf. also *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 357, and *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 13.

[194] N. Lenin, *Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (New York: Contemporary Publ. Assn., 1920), p. 17.

[195] "Democratic Revolution," *op. cit.*, p. 102; cf. also "Provisional Government," *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[196] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 368.

[197] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 80, 108.

[198] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 211.

in the Soviets (the government of workers) who use the comparatively simple methods of accounting and control developed by capitalism.[199] The dictatorship is based upon the principle that "Force is the instrument of power."[200] In it is to be found a fundamental difference from anarchy which

"is the denial of the necessity of the State and of State power for the period of transition from the supremacy of the capitalists to the supremacy of the proletariat; whereas I, with a definiteness which excludes all possibility of misunderstanding, insist on the necessity of a State organization for this period. . . ."[201]

This is not, of course, to deny that the state is an organ of suppression no matter whether under capitalists or proletariat.[202] In fact, regardless of whom the titular leaders may be, the state is run by an enormous army of officials saturated through and through with the ideology of the régime they represent.[203] But the situation requires a state none the less, because "Victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible without a long, persistent, desperate, life and death struggle: a struggle which requires persistence, discipline, firmness, inflexibility".[204] That is to say, even though the revolution has been won, to get rid of landlords, small producers, and larger capitalists, requires lengthy and careful organization within which these enemies can be regenerated if possible as friends instead of be-

[199] *Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power, op. cit.,* p. 21; cf. also *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.,* I, 168.

[200] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.,* I, 281.

[201] *Revolutionary Lessons, op. cit.,* p. 20.

[202] *Paris Commune, op. cit.,* p. 53.

[203] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* I, 181, 166.

[204] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.,* p. 6.

ing permitted to corrupt and demoralize.[205] But this will necessarily produce a number of restrictions of liberty; if need be we "must crush them in order to free humanity from wage-slavery; their resistance must be broken by force. . . . Democracy for the vast majority" and suppression for the exploiters, this is what must occur during the transition period.[206] But by creating conditions where the bourgeoisie cannot exist,[207] and by establishing for this purpose a strong, centralized machine to dominate those bourgeoisie[208] the procedure is far simpler than in an ordinary democracy, for now only a minority suffers. It will cost far less bloodshed, Lenin feels, than has the suppression of slaves, wage-earners, serfs; and thus the total cost to humanity will be far less.[209] It will cost the race far less even though the franchise of the bourgeoisie be restricted wholly.[210]

There are three modifications of this general statement regarding the dictatorship of the proletariat which warrant mention here. First, there cannot be at this level a completely satisfactory distribution of goods among all members of society, for the retention of certain bourgeois standards is necessary and this means, particularly, that rewards or payments often will be disproportionate to needs and services rendered.[211] Second, there is need of

[205] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[206] *State and Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 91.

[207] *Soviets at Work, op. cit.*, p. 10.

[208] *Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power, op. cit.*, p. 75.

[209] *State and Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 93.

[210] Cf. *Proletarian Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 47.

[211] *State and Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 97. In this work Lenin frequently quotes Marx, but as in the case of his article on Marx (see footnote 5,

incorporating certain policies of state capitalism while in the transition period; for example, creating limited alliances and treaties with private producers, extending the authority of the state to include operation of certain industries, and paying "tribute" to foreign capital.[212] And third, a point already somewhat implied, there must be a party which leads the proletariat without at the same time itself acting as dictator.[213]

(7) At last the objective of the dialectical process of history is reached—the classless society. Says Lenin, "after the social revolution there will be no class struggle, since there will be no classes."[214] This is real Communism, whose banner flutters with the motto, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."[215] Only then, is there—politically speaking—a United States, not of America or Europe merely, but of the World, an international unification and freedom, a totally absent state, a completely victorious Communism.[216] "The State will be able to wither away completely when . . . people have become accustomed to observe the fundamental principles of social life, and their labour is so productive, that they will voluntarily work *according to their abilities*."[217]

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supra) his tone and phraseology are such as to indicate that the views therein are also emphatically his own.

[212] Cf. N. Lenin, "Meaning of the Agricultural Tax," *New Policies of Soviet Russia* (Chicago: Kerr, no date) p. 28; *Soviets at Work, op. cit.*, pp. 18 f.

[213] Cf. *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 23.

[214] "Memoirs of a Publicist," *op. cit.*, p. 330.

[215] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 154.

[216] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 271.

[217] *State and Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 99.

When the classless society will actually arrive is a question unanswerable. World history cannot, Lenin believes, be reckoned by decades. "Ten or twenty years sooner or later—this from the point of view of the world-historical scale—makes no difference; from the point of view of world-history, it is a trifle, which cannot be even approximately reckoned."[218] Indeed, though the road to peace lies straight ahead,[219] and though Communism must and will arrive at its destination,[220] to precipitate a fully developed Communism immediately would be "an abuse of, and sordid crime against, nature."[221]

But the classless society will appear, and then we shall be proceeding from formal to real equality.[222]

"When all, or be it even only the greater part of society, have learnt how to govern the State, have taken this business [of simple book-keeping and control, which are all that are essential] into their own hands, have established a control over the insignificant minority of capitalists, . . . and workers thoroughly demoralised by capitalism—from this moment the need for any government begins to vanish. The more complete the Democracy, the nearer the moment when it ceases to be necessary. . . . For when all have learnt to manage . . . socialised production, when all really do keep account and control of the . . . 'guardians of capitalist traditions,' the escape from such . . . control will inevitably become so increasingly difficult, so much the exception . . . that very soon the *necessity* of observing the simple, fundamental rules of any kind of social life will become a habit. The door will then be wide open for the transition from the first phase

[218] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.,* p. 38.

[219] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.,* II, 225.

[220] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.,* p. 31.

[221] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.,* p. 31; cf. also *Letter to American Workingmen, op. cit.,* p. 15, and *State and Revolution, op. cit.,* p. 94.

[222] *State and Revolution, op. cit.,* p. 102.

of Communist society to its second higher phase, and along with it the complete withering away of the State."[223]

When the chief cause of social wrongs is conquered, the evil of exploitation, then this cause is bound to disappear, and so also the state itself.[224]

The systematic nature of the world, portrayed in these preceding pages, is no more exactly reëmphasized than in the great characteristics of Hegel's dialectic which Lenin adopts. Not only does there occur a definite, invincible evolution punctuated with periods of violent opposition, but each pole, each social category, of the opposition is itself organically necessary to the whole. And since the whole means nothing short of the world's entire contents we can well understand why men and men's minds are themselves completely subject to it.[225] They are, as Lenin has chosen to view his world, at most but patterns of this grim material progress toward struggle and victory.[226]

[223] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[224] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[225] "Three Sources and Three Constituent Parts of Marxism," *op. cit.*, pp. xxii f.

[226] Cf. *Paris Commune, op. cit.*, p. 20.

Chapter Seven

Acquiescence in Communism

Let there be recalled the main features of the respective positions taken by Marx, Engels, and Lenin in their regard for the individual and the world when those two sides are taken by themselves.

In the case of Marx and Engels, then, we have seen that they concede the importance of individuality by their concern with self-interest—self-interest sometimes expressed in brutal greed for profit, sometimes in the realization that man has been and still wishes to be peacefully free and equal. The autonomy of individuality is also seen in their references to basic characteristics of human nature, to the important part played by great leaders, to their insistence upon the subjective factor and consciousness, and finally although more indirectly to Feuerbach and Hegel both of whom held positive views as to the individual.

Lenin too concedes that man is greatly concerned with his private interest, so much so indeed that hatred and warlike antagonisms are quite natural between individuals. Again, Lenin considers men as endowed with private rights and kindly traits. More practically he notes there are times when a personal incentive to economic accomplishment is healthful. He believes that leadership is essential to political causes. Lenin also expresses individuality in emphatic psychologic and philosophic language: reason, conscience, consciousness, theory, personality—all these terms and others are suggestive of an essential individualism.

Recapitulating the position of Marx and Engels taken from the world side—the side we have called, philosophically, dialectical materialism—it is seen that Marx considered himself to have turned the idealism of Hegel right side up: he retains the dialectical process but grounds it in the material forces of nature and economics; ideas from this point of view are but reflections of such forces; and history is an evolution of economic levels interspersed with periods of violence. Class struggles are the prime illustration of this dialectical process; they reveal the contradiction now existing between capital and labor, a contradiction developing within "the womb of society" because of the exploitation of labor by capital in order that the latter may usurp surplus value from the former. This provides increasing socialization for the workers, but it also increases their misery. Consequently the contradiction finally "bursts asunder" as labor becomes so downtrodden, and yet so organized, as to rise up in revolution. The straining polarities are thus released and—through the intermediate stages of a dictatorship and declining state—the classless society is finally born.

Lenin's doctrine of dialectical materialism shows, again, the Hegelian dialectic manifesting itself in the economic forces of society along with all other natural and material objects. With men's minds epiphenomenal copies of a unified though moving world Lenin describes the class struggle in terms of exploitation; but to the simple description itself he adds several important features. (1) Capitalism is on the whole an adequate explanation of pre-Communist Russia's social troubles; (2) a proletarian revolution is possible only after a feudalist society has passed through

the capitalist stage; (3) periods of evolution are essential to the accumulation of class contradictions; (4) the stage of imperialism is the final stage of capitalism, its symptoms being monopoly, finance, capital, exportation of capital, increasing disturbances of equilibrium, and war;[1] (5) the opposition of the proletariat increases owing to suffering and organization until it becomes a great class, rising up in bloody but necessary revolution and overwhelming its oppressor; (6) following victory a transition period of proletarian dictatorship is essential: here the bourgeoisie must be subdued by force if necessary; yet certain concessions may be made to capitalism; (7) the final stage of history, the classless society—though a synthesis not to be reckoned temporally—will arrive and when it does the oppressions of the state will disappear.[2]

These are the ways in which Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and Lenin, on the other, have developed their views on the nature of the individual and of the world. Argument is hardly needed to see that Lenin has carried on the essential features of his predecessors in all important respects. His modifications are not serious deviations from the original doctrine, and in fact his analysis of the post-Marxian period—while it concedes further development—would prove that imperialism, for example, is overwhelming evidence that Marx and Engels were correct as to the immanent functions of economic reality. In short, Lenin recognizes the profound autonomy of the individual,

[1] Cf. N. Bukharin, *ABC of Communism* (Detroit: Marxian Educational Society, 1921), p. 91.

[2] For an excellent summary of most of the essential steps in the world dialectic, cf. Lenin's statement in *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, II, 74 f.

but he also recognizes faithfully that the world is a vast interrelated system proceeding from stage to stage of history by a mechanism of cosmic logic within which man serves as a material unit. This then is Communism: it is, as we originally defined it, a synthesis of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in that it is a consistent and contemporaneous correlation of the views of all three.

When Communism is taken thus—taken, let us reiterate, as a doctrine with premises absolutely individual-sided and yet also absolutely world-sided—it becomes a doctrine with *acquiescent* implications.

A philosophy which finds the key to reality in personal autonomy, however that autonomy be defined, is a philosophy whose exponent is likely to be indifferent to the exigencies of experience conceived objectively and socially. This at least was the inference resulting from our investigation of the concept, acquiescence; and it is the point on which laissez faire doctrines seem most often to have focused. While they profess an interest in social welfare they insist that such welfare can be obtained best by disregard of it, and a concern rather with self-interest expressed competitively. Ethically this same result follows from Utilitarianism: Bentham and Mill, for instance, were eager for the greatest happiness of the greatest number but ultimately they were held bound by their premises which explained conduct in terms of atomistic pleasure motives.[3] We may note indeed that Lenin at times is explicit, much in the manner of Utilitarianism, about ends justifying means, an assertion which often reduces to this, that social

[3] Cf. Rogers, *op. cit.*, pp. 311, 321 ff.

ends are so much assumed as given that we as individuals need rather to concern ourselves wholeheartedly with means. Thus in times of crisis illegal methods are necessary;[4] the proletariat must *"take advantage"* of the government;[5] rivers of blood must if necessary flow;[6] and illiteracy even may be justified when it enables the masses to be swayed toward the cause of Communism.[7] And when Marx and Engels place extreme stress upon production[8] they are also carrying over, whether quite deliberately or not, the position of the classical ethico-economists whose concern is almost solely—since ends are mainly granted —with their means.

Now we do not suggest that a major emphasis on means is the sole cause of Communist individualism; we do suggest that this emphasis illustrates, indeed encourages, such individualism; but what is equally important is that the deeply grounded individualistic philosophy beneath Communism's ethics and economics, and which earlier chapters exposed, places in turn an emphasis on means. The point is that when Communism stresses the primacy of the individual in ways frequently close to that of laissez faire and related philosophies the inferences which follow from the latter are likely to follow too from Communism. When Communism is depicted as concerned with consequences neither wider than the means thereto nor as influencing those means, the perspective of interest remains essentially within individuality's immediate circle of temporal and

[4] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 62.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 200; cf. also *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 30.
[6] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 240.
[7] Cf. Zetkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 f.
[8] *Supra*, p. 59.

spatial experience. Society and the world at large are themselves means for fulfillment of personal wants. The individual comes to attach great importance to what he does for and with himself. There very easily arises—this is the issue—a direction of interest toward the conscious, wilful, self. And being a natural interest, moral indignation over its effects is quite absurd.

Significant it is that the lusty initiative to profit, developing from this focus inward, frequently results in the somewhat truistic criticism of Communism that the latter involves too Utopian a human nature to be compatible with such initiative. What such criticism really means is that a human nature nourished richly from its own desires for gain—a human nature obviously accepted by the authors of such criticism—can hardly hope to be so peaceful, so Rousseauian, as to justify the idealism implied. Now when Communism itself fixes upon the kind of human nature depicted by this criticism as essential, the argument is perhaps not so much truistic as it sound. But Communism also fixes upon other kinds, and the mere presence of some discordant traits in Communism's individual[9] is obviously insufficient reason to dismiss any of them. In fact, Communism is entitled, from its subjective premises alone, to supply itself with as many individualistic attributes as seem necessary to account for what the individual actually is. Communism can even conceive men—and Engels, with Lenin's approval, does just this[10]—in a kind of individualistic dialectic of human traits: a thesis of free, equal, peaceful men; an antithesis of anarchical, greedy exploiters of

[9] *Supra*, p. 37.

[10] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, pp. 171 f. Cf. *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, pp. 332 f., footnote.

the unequal; a higher synthesis of freely equal and peaceful men once more.

The conclusion to be reached from these remarks was suspected at their start. Whatever the precise qualities of the individual may be, Communism when it centers in these qualities provides an attitude of acquiescence in, through the supremacy of, an autonomous ego. Since the world is but at most assumed, a yielding to its processes may also easily occur: the Communist, for instance, from complete devotion to his natural rights may join in revolution to uphold them. But compliance is, so long as the presuppositions are carried to their logical conclusion, primarily with oneself. There is an acquiescence not dissimilar from that in Stoicism as that philosophy is interpreted as an inner retreat. One is indifferent to the world.

It is wholly obvious however that Communism also has a strong regard for that world. Can we say that when the latter side is given priority we have again an attitude of acquiescence with consequences quite as drastic as those following from an individualistic approach?

Before we examine this question further let us note how the organic philosophy of Hegel, which has been shown to serve as foundational to dialectical materialism, is itself possibly acquiescent. In the summary earlier[11] it was noted that the Hegelian system begins with the logical category, Being; moves through a succession of triads; then is objectified as Nature; and in the ultimate synthesis becomes Spirit where history and the state are manifested. The whole is interrelated in such a way that no one sphere

[11] *Supra*, pp. 50 ff.

is meaningful or real in itself, so that there is an effect of sheer movement, of eternal Becoming. But from another point of view every sphere is completely real or meaningful since it contains the whole of Being implicitly within it. "Hence everything," says Hegel, "appears brought within the compass of the Absolute Idea, which seems thus to be recognized in everything".[12] Every sphere, as it realizes itself and is simultaneously realized by the absolute end or whole, approaches teleologically that end or whole. Hegel then regards it necessary here to accept whatever stage or sphere lies immediately before one at a given time: from a Spinozistic point of view[13] the universe for Hegel must itself constitute the sphere of spheres, but yet one must acquiesce in that which is essential to the universe, in that which is divine on earth, perhaps the state. Hegel therefore asks you, Professor Rogers says, to accept the actual

"by giving up your private sense of values, and by finding your freedom and satisfaction through an *acquiescence* in the World Spirit whose life has received expression in the constituted order. . . . Progress is necessary. . . . But the responsibility for this . . . belongs not to the man himself, but to the World Spirit which lives and has its being in universal history. . . . Whatever the future may bring about, man's present duty is primarily one of *acquiescence* and of piety. . . . The criterion of truth and duty turns out to be in actual practice not merely the *status quo,* but the *status quo* as embodied in one particular political community. . . . [For Hegel, true theories and institutions] demand the subordination of the individual, and his *acquiescence* in things as they are. . . ."[14]

[12] G. W. F. Hegel, "Phenomenology of Mind," *Selections, op. cit.,* p. 12.
[13] *Supra,* p. 15.
[14] Rogers, *op. cit.,* pp. 378 ff.; italics of "acquiescence" mine.

In somewhat the same vein, Professor Dewey has said that Hegel justifies in terms of idealism certain doctrines and institutions threatened by modern science and popular government.[15]

Returning now to Communism what we note is that it adopts an acquiescence similar to that of Hegelianism. What it conceives as most valuable about Hegel is not, to be sure, his defense of the *status quo* but his dialectic. Communism interprets the dialectic as descriptive of a moving not a static reality; it sees with Royce that "Hegel's Absolute is . . . a man of war. The dust and the blood of ages . . . are upon him".[16] But the mere fact of the dynamic does not guarantee an active attitude as against the acquiescent. It is possible—so long as the relation of man to reality is sufficiently direct—to acquiesce in such a reality conceived as evolving dynamically just as well as in a reality conceived as static; and this is no more aptly proved than by reference to the system of Hegel itself. Nor does the fact that Communism is a materialistic rather than an idealistic philosophy affect this conclusion: where men are so completely joined with the processes of history as to define consciousness as the epiphenomenal reflection of those processes, we can well understand why in the early days of Russian Communism there was much dispute as to which should be selected for the correct philosophic basis, idealism or materialism;[17] and why Lenin, even after

[15] *Reconstruction in Philosophy, op. cit.*, p. 19.

[16] J. Royce, *Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1893), p. 216.

[17] Cf. Fülöp-Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 f. It is worth noting that Plekhanov, the champion of materialism in Russia, compared his position with Spinozism; cf. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, II, 349.

he had led the conflict for the latter, felt so sensitively an objectivity in Hegel.[18] We can understand also how Engels so easily expresses a kind of epiphenomenalism either way when he says, "We conceived of ideas as materialistic, as pictures of real things, instead of real things as pictures of this or that stage of the Absolute Idea."[19] Finally we can understand why, from the perspective of a dynamic objectivity, there are dissolved the conflicts in human nature earlier described:[20] since human nature is but a reflection actually of changing historical levels the kind of society extant explains why man appears at one time peaceful, at another cruel. At the same time, however, this taking for granted of human traits may quickly justify a yielding to them: if what he feels and thinks is not the individual's responsibility but based on causes stronger, wider, than himself he quickly finds his conduct as, for instance, avaricious in the profit-seeking sphere natural and right. But more exactly, *human* nature is a misnomer when it suggests something of a distinction from nature as such: in so far as dialectical materialism is a system of strictly objective though constantly surpassed syntheses the attitude of man, if such he may be called, is definitely one of compliance with the moving world. This does not mean there is necessarily direction in the course of history; the attitude is one of acquiescence in the material movement of itself.

Communism carries, however, the Hegelian dialectic another step in Hegel's own direction when it admits a more

[18] *Supra*, p. 79.
[19] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, p. 95.
[20] *Supra*, p. 37.

or less distinct teleology.[21] We say more or less, because the purposiveness of world-sided Communism does not go so far as to assert that the end of a classless society actually realizes the means. Until that end arrives it is still, strictly speaking, non-existent: it is an end in time. But yet there is a teleology present in the sense that the classless society is the end toward which all previous stages are moving; it is the ultimate effect of which they are links in the causal chain. Now the objectivity of Communism as an historical system may be postulated evidently from an inspection of the necessary stages even in past history —from, that is to say, an inspection of the serial nature of the dialectical movement toward the present—and acceptance of these stages as essential follows. This does not however prove the necessity of such order in the future; but in positing a final synthesis which presupposes a definite number of stages, there is a further incentive to the acquiescent attitude in the discovery that men must now concede, not only the certainty of *movement* in history, not only too a *retrogressive* order, but a *progressive* necessity as well.

The element of time, instead of weakening the force of this attitude by rendering an empirically temporal character to the course of historical events, may on the contrary also stimulate an acquiescence. Until a definite amount of contradiction is realized within a given sphere —a contradiction whose acuteness sharpens with varying but not arbitrary speeds—what one can do is to recognize the historical necessity of, and thus in a sense to comply with, whatever sphere of the triad is in the causal se-

[21] Cf. *supra,* pp. 52 f. for a suggestion of Hegel's teleology.

quence uppermost at a given time. One cannot crystallize even the next stage at will, much less the ultimate society: the full realization of each stage is essential to the end. And so submission to the *status quo* becomes in this sense a possibility even in Communism—submission not only to process as such, including the fury of revolutions, but to particular levels of history.

If the individual should at times feel desires and have ideas in contrast with this realm of matter, it is more than likely that while compliant with it he remains indifferent to them. Thus, whatever the technical relations of Hegelian and Communist dialectic, whether of verbal analogy largely[22] or of actual logic[23] it is clear that a definite relation exists so far as the dialectic of materialism encourages an acquiescence in the world.

There is one other way in which acquiescence penetrates the doctrine here considered. Acquiescence implies, be it recalled, both an indifference of the individual toward the world and a compliance with the world in varying, reciprocal degree.[24]

What we may first reiterate is that when Hegel speaks of the organic whole as realized in each sphere, each sphere in the whole, he means not only each sphere of history but also each person. The logical processes of the universe are identical with those of human thought. Ulti-

[22] Cf. R. Cooper, *Logical Influence of Hegel on Marx* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1925), pp. 178 ff.

[23] Cf. J. Plenge, *Marx und Hegel* (Tübingen: Verlag der H. Laupp'schen Buchhandlung, 1911); cf. also Croce, *op. cit.*, introduction by Lindsay, p. xii.

[24] *Supra*, p. 26.

mately the way reality is reached is either to concentrate upon some inner experience which the individual arbitrarily feels to be true, certain, or to see nothing short of the Absolute as true, certain. There is no machinery by which this and not that can be accepted or rejected as an object of knowledge, a haven of security.[25] What we have here then is a duplication in one way not merely of the philosophy of Spinozism in so far as it permits the individual to neglect his individuality and to turn outward for his certainties, but also of Stoicism in so far as it permits the individual to find his certainties within and thus to be indifferent to the "without." If one pursues the former tack one acquiesces by complying; if the latter, by being indifferent; yet one is also likely—because either is possible—to do both.

Now when Communism is viewed from the extreme premises of either side we seem to find two vast dialectical triads: first, the triad of merely individualistic character —primitive freedom-equality of man; capitalist anarchy-inequality; Communist freedom-equality.[26] Second, the triad of strictly objective character—simple Communism; systematized, sometimes even nationalized, capitalism; socialized Communism.[27]

But while both of these triads are accurate enough, they are still more accurately expressed when brought together. Each of the three great levels in history, in other words, may be deduced as a correlation of individual and world: the primitive level is a unity of individual producers and

[25] Cf. *supra*, p. 119 f.
[26] *Supra*, pp. 118 f.
[27] *Supra*, pp. 72, 98.

a truly communal though simple society; the capitalist level is a unity of the anarchy of competitors and the co-operations of vastly systematized industry; the level of a classless society is so perfect a classlessness as to allow unstinting expression of personal autonomy and yet so complete a sociality as to unite the individual within the objective mass. Even in our expositions of individual and world as distinct entities their unities thus were frequently implied.[28]

These extreme yet joined polarities may have their explanation, partly at least, in the historical setting within which Marx thought: it was a time when there predominated both a strong laissez faire spirit in economics and a growing respect for the scientific exactitudes of the natural and social world. When each individual thus is permitted full play of his desires or interests he easily comes to feel himself subject to conditions which no individual wanted and no one can remedy; and as he stands before these conditions he may then regard them as utterly beyond his personal control because regulated by laws rigid and eternal.[29] So, while the widespread mechanistic materialism of the nineteenth century may have itself stimulated the self-interest of the individual by way of escape and consolation, it is also possible that the spirit of aggrandizement in turn strengthened a regard for the coldly impersonal laws of natural science and for a strictly objective social organization. Coincident with this somewhat practical situation, however, is the philosophy of the time. The proximity of Communism's individual-world relationship is not greatly

[28] E.g., *supra*, pp. 42 f., 74 f.

[29] Cf. Lindsay, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 f.

different from that sought, though not satisfactorily achieved, by Utilitarian ethics, by Utopian rationalism, and even by laissez faire economics:[30] all of them wished to discover a compatability of pleasure motives, innate reason, private interests, with social harmony. Hegel, as we have seen, does discover that compatability: it is securely grounded logically as is his concrete universal.[31] He can even recognize the individual while finding the Prussian monarchy supreme; indeed is there not, as one loyal critic says, a personally vital spirit rather than a mere conservatism in the Hegelian thought?[32] Feuerbach too is capable of providing with Hegel, whether he does explicity or not, an individualistic element for the Communist creed.[33] The micro-macrocosmic relationship which Communism achieves is far older, however, than the nineteenth century: it is at least as old as Stoicism for, as has been shown, to account for the subjective in objective terms and vice versa is equally possible—and equally ancient—once the absoluteness of criteria is posited by which all else is judged.[34]

But mention of Hegel reminds us that the identification of individual and world in Communism is not quite accurately described as a series of self-sufficient levels. These levels are historically dynamic and in struggle. The paradox of dialectic is that there are not only unities but contradictions. The unity of the primitive level "brings forth

[30] *Supra,* pp. 35 f., 116.
[31] *Supra,* p. 51.
[32] *Ethics of Hegel, op. cit.,* introduction by Sterrett, p. 13.
[33] *Supra,* p. 40.
[34] *Supra,* pp. 21 ff., 124 f.

the material agencies for its own dissolution";[35] the capitalist level produces its own "grave diggers";[36] and when the contradictions stretch to the breaking point there is a sudden shifting of the spiral from one historical level to the next. But though time and strife thus give the system new vitality, a correlation of individual and world remains. The individual pole of one level joins with the antithetical social pole of a second to form a third individual-social pole synthesizing both the others. If we follow Marx's own sketch of the process, the thesis of primitive freedom-equality evolves into the antithesis of co-operative industry, and finally into Communism where freedom-equality and co-operation join.[37] It was observed above that Hegel's philosophy offers a mechanism in which any sphere, amidst its energetic interplay with other spheres, can act as criterion of those others; and here in an analogous way there is a system whereby at one moment the extreme principles of egoism embrace all objectivity, whereby at another moment the extreme laws of social matter embrace all subjectivity, and whereby at a third they embrace each other. The very dynamics of such dialectic seems motored by polarities which are mutually reflexive—indeed, with this reflexive process well established, individuality instead of being anomolous to dialectical materialism turns out to be quite indispensable. Thus by this immanent interchange Communism can provide both self and sociality with equal force: whenever

[35] *Supra*, p. 66.

[36] *Supra*, p. 70.

[37] Cf. his famous chapter, "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation," *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 834 ff.

there is needed an explanation of the one we give it through the other; and so again the conflicts in, for instance, human nature are resolved.[38]

The third interpretation of the rôle of acquiescence follows from this situation, but it follows only as a result which was implicit in our first and second. When the individual acquiesces in the autonomy of his own nature he is likely—so the first interpretation showed[39]—to be indifferent to the world. Yet curiously enough in stressing excessively himself the individual (not so much because he necessarily agrees with them as because of indifference to them) may accept the movements, the customs, the taken-for-granted ends, of the world. When he acquiesces in the world—the second interpretation showed[40]—the individual may be indifferent to himself. But yet he may be inclined (again, not so much out of regard for as from indifference toward himself) to yield to personal desires felt as powers greater than himself. The reciprocity of the acquiescent attitude is there from the beginning; so that this third and final aspect can claim but explication.

Acquiescence in the doctrine of Communism is, then, toward both poles of individual and world. Perceived as a great system Communism allows man submission to age-old desires or to contemplation of his natural rights existent since the timeless *past;* yet man may subordinate them through compliance with evolving history which after all, he thinks, determines them. Man may however comply in the *present* with necessary stages of material history,

[38] *Supra,* p. 37.
[39] *Supra,* p. 119.
[40] *Supra,* p. 124.

by reflecting them economically as they come and go; yet he may remain profoundly indifferent to them through realization that they are secondary steps toward what is still conceived within himself as a personal ideal—the *future* inevitable goal. But however the attitude is found the conclusion is that acquiescence in the world, and acquiescence in the individual—though each extreme in Communism occurs on shifting planes in time—encourage, supplement each other. Meanwhile acquiescence doubtless helps create the doctrine it reflects.

Still this attitude is not, we must remember, passive or lethargic. The Stoic achieves unity with his universe through a lively concern with his own powers. Once the revolution has begun, says Marx, we must act with great determination and on the offensive.[41] In the struggle, says Lenin, we must be impatient, pitiless, inflexible.[42] But the Spinozist achieves vigorous self-realization through unity with the universe. If we must perish, "let us perish in the struggle for our own cause, for the cause of the workers . . . this is what every class-conscious worker sees and feels."[43] "We do not need hysterical outbursts," Lenin insists. "We need the regular march of the iron battalions of the proletariat."[44] We need to join enthusiastically the march of dialectic through the world, toward victory unquestionable and absolute.[45]

[41] Quoted by Lenin in *Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power, op. cit.*, p. 43.

[42] *Dictatorship of the Proletariat, op. cit.*, p. 27; cf. also *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 26.

[43] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 213.

[44] *Soviets at Work, op. cit.*, p. 44.

[45] Cf. *Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power, op. cit.*, p. 5.

Part Three
ACTIVITY

Chapter Eight

The Individual Criticized by Marx and Engels

An active attitude, as Chapter Two regarded it, is an attitude of analysis, criticism, on the one hand; and interaction, potential synthesis, on the other. It is as negative as acquiescence is positive. Can there be a thoroughly activistic side to Communism? This is the question of the present Part.

Again the individual is considered first, not however as he is now accepted as a fundamental premise but rather as he is not.

The writings of Marx and Engels abound with moral indignation toward a philosophy of economic self-interest. Marx denounces the "merciless Vandalism" and "passions the most infamous" of exploiters;[1] Engels often talks of capitalist robbery, brutality, of trickery and fraud.[2] Marx, again, speaks of civil society, the society of individual competition, as that level where men are deprived of the rights of real human beings.[3] This moral feeling is enough, regardless of whether there is intellectual justification for it, to prove their dissatisfaction with what Marx and Engels call the "icy water of egotistical calculation," the "shameless, direct, brutal exploitation."[4]

The Marxian criticism of individualism also extends

[1] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 835.
[2] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, pp. 112, 130.
[3] K. Marx, "On the Jewish Question," *Selected Essays, op. cit.*, pp. 66 f.
[4] "Communist Manifesto," *op. cit.*, p. 33.

to the interpretation of it by theorists like Rousseau and the Utopians. Both these would recognize the autonomy of man in whom are expressed and guaranteed such goods as equality and freedom. But what are the facts? The political democracy endorsed by such theorists makes every person sovereign and supreme, but they really mean every person as unsocial and uncultivated. The

"so-called rights of man, as distinguished from the rights of the citizen, are nothing else than the rights of the . . . bourgeois society, that is of the egoistic individual, of man separated from . . . the community. . . . It is strange that a people who were just beginning to free themselves, . . . to establish a political community . . . should solemnly proclaim the justification of the egoistic individual . . . [when] egoism should have been punished as a crime."[5]

So then the difficulty with bourgeois society is that it perpetuates individualism instead of bringing men together into a real community. The Utopians, in their eagerness to solve the problems of the world, likewise turn inward to the "kingdom of reason," but this is actually the understanding of the eighteenth-century citizen evolving into the bourgeois.[6] No wonder then that the *Contrat Social* of Rousseau arose as a democratic bourgeois republic.[7] It is a short leap from the kind of philosophy which justifies laissez faire exploitation to that which talks of *a priori* reason and equality. But the fact is that such a concept as equality is anything but an eternal truth.[8]

Another principal way in which individualism is criticized has already been implied in our exposition of dialec-

[5] "On the Jewish Question," *op. cit.*, pp. 73 ff.
[6] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, pp. 52 ff.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 49 f.
[8] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 144.

tical materialism.[9] What Marx felt necessary was to turn Hegelianism right side up by making of it a materialism rather than an idealism where consciousness is prior—necessary because until that is done the chances are remote of understanding the hard facts of experience. The result of Hegel's idealism, Engels writes, "was an inversion of everything, the actual interrelations of the universe were turned completely upside-down".[10] The truth is, however, that "the consciousness of man could be shown as springing from his existence rather than his existence from his consciousness."[11] Objections of this sort to the Hegelian emphasis on "ideas" led Marx and Engels in "die Deutsche Ideologie" to say at the outset that the whole material world changed for Hegel into a world of thought: he was not content merely to register the fruits of thought; he wished also to show how they are produced.[12] According to the Hegelian system, ideas rule and even produce the real lives of men as well as their whole material world. But radicalism deprives him of this primacy of ideas.[13] The individual does not stand in some "fantastic seclusion and state of fixation" from which are drawn all the riches of truth and reality.[14]

Along with this philosophic discounting of individuality is also that of the influence of consciousness on environment. For example the fact of accident is that which often explains the so-called leadership of great men.[15] Indeed

[9] *Supra*, pp. 56 ff.
[10] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 45.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[12] "Deutsche Ideologie," *op. cit.*, p. 231.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 232.
[14] "German Ideology," *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[15] Cf. Bober, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

the masses are often more able than those who profess to be leaders.[16] "That which is willed but rarely happens."[17]

Because man recognizes himself first, not in himself, but in other men[18] the gist of the quarrel Marx and Engels hold with mere individualism may be summarized in these two provocative remarks: It is "first in society that personal freedom becomes possible."[19] "Consciousness is from the first a social product, and remains so as long as men exist."[20]

[16] "Fr. Engels an Sorge," in J. B. Becker, *Briefe und Auszüge* (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1906), p. 399.

[17] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, p. 104.

[18] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 61, footnote.

[19] "Deutsche Ideologie," *op. cit.*, p. 286.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

Chapter Nine

The Individual Criticized by Lenin

Just as in the case of Marx and Engels there is in Lenin a high note of moral indignation, first of all, toward Hobbesian egoism, self-interest, as expressed particularly in the desire for more and more gold. In his early years, especially, Lenin writes often of the wretchedness and starvation of the Russian peasantry under the rule of the Tsar,[1] and cries that "the gaze of every honest man . . . is moved to indignation by brutality and violence".[2] In analyzing the accumulation of surplus value and the concurrent growth of capital Lenin points out how crises invariably mean horrible inpoverishment of workers.[3] Coming then to the imperialist epoch where competition has reached the bitterest stage, Lenin's indignation is tremendous: he denounces "this criminal, predatory, capitalist war that has brought mankind to the brink of ruin, hunger, and destruction";[4] this slaughter of the proletariat;[5] this cruelty and barbarism;[6] these robberies, bestialities;[7] this "malicious, furious campaign of falsehood."[8] All of these evils are due fundamentally to capi-

[1] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 31.

[2] *Ibid.*, I, 89; cf. N. Lenin, "Ueber Religion," quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, pp. 234 f.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 173 f.

[4] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 212.

[5] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 62.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[8] *Revolutionary Lessons, op. cit.*, p. 44.

talism whose motivating force is, once more, the greed of man. Capitalism indeed would not be capitalism if it did not intimidate the worker, hold him in ignorance, by an immense apparatus which dupes and brutalizes[9] while "drinking the blood of the people."[10]

But Lenin is critical of the conception of human nature which finds innate endowments of such natural rights as equality and freedom. He scoffs at the bourgeois laudation of these rights, insisting that under present conditions they are wholly a delusion,[11] and he likewise mocks the bourgeoisie for their slogans of peace.[12] This is why Lenin feels that mere sentiment cannot hope to replace the need of objective facts,[13] why ideals and rights are for the most part "mere talk, at best innocent little wishes",[14] why even freedom of the press is a deception,[15] why ideals are not explicable as commonly supposed in terms of moral science,[16] why even the ideal of democracy as equality among men is for the most part a bourgeois shibboleth,[17] why such virtues as courage are not a personal matter at all.[18] Religion sometimes has an evil subjective turn,

[9] *Dictatorship of the Proletariat, op. cit.*, pp. 20 f.

[10] *Proletarian Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 77; cf. p. 33, and *supra*, pp. 41 f.

[11] *Revolutionary Lessons, op. cit.*, pp. 75 f.

[12] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 266.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[14] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 145.

[15] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 173; cf. N. Lenin, "Freedom of the Press," *Labour Monthly*, VII (1925), 35 ff.

[16] "Ökonomische Inhalt der Lehre der Narodniki," *op. cit.*, quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, pp. 146 f.

[17] N. Lenin, "Theses Presented to the First Congress of the Communist International at Moscow, 6th March 1919," quoted in R. W. Postgate, *Bolshevik Theory* (London: Richards, 1920), p. 205.

[18] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 169 f.

too; for the "God-building" of idealistic philosophers often results, instead of in deeds, in self-admiration and stupid contemplation of one's supposed ego.[19]

Still another of Lenin's quarrels with individualism is to be found in his anti-opportunism. Now opportunism is a term which he uses to describe almost every kind of position which disagrees with his own. Sometimes, for instance, he means the kind of person who sighs over ideals like those just discussed;[20] sometimes he includes under the term almost any kind of "expression of the influence of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat";[21] again he defines it as an alliance of the bourgeoisie with the workers;[22] but there is also evidence that Lenin means by opportunism, in one case at least, the tendency to force one's own ideas upon objective conditions, and thus to attempt reform of those conditions regardless of what materialistic formulae may assert. Thus he describes the difference between the opportunist and revolutionary wings of socialism as the difference between "intellectual individualism and proletarian organization."[23] This was said in 1904 in his famous "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward"; but in 1920 he says much the same when he differentiates between compromises due to objective conditions and compromises due to selfishness, cowardice, and desire.[24] Lenin's principal opportunist opponent, in the early days es-

[19] *Religion, op. cit.*, p. 51.

[20] N. Lenin, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward," *Selections, op. cit.*, I, 176.

[21] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 390.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

[23] "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward," *op. cit.*, p. 204.

[24] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 49.

pecially, was Eduard Bernstein the author of such works as *Evolutionary Socialism.*[25] Now Bernstein while not accurately described as an individualist, nevertheless is attacked by Lenin principally because he advocated "freedom of criticism," the privilege of bringing new arguments and reasonings against dialectical materialism,[26] and of providing plans in the way of what Lenin characteristically describes as "niggardly reforms",[27] eclecticism, and absence of principle.[28] It is significant that both Eastman and Masaryk regard Bernstein as a theoretician whose influence rests largely upon his emphasis of ideological and ethical motives.[29] At any rate, the opportunist who sometimes out of neutrality refuses to follow a formulized route is labelled by Lenin with "narrow egotism".[30] Lenin sometimes classifies the Mensheviks, also, as similar opportunists, as people who wish to account for all changes in a given situation;[31] and his own polemics against them in his *Menschewismus und Bolschewismus,*[32] as well as in his *Der Kampf Um die Bolschewistische Partei,*[33] some-

[25] E. Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism* (New York: Huebsch, 1909). Cf. H. W. Laidler, *History of Socialist Thought* (New York: Crowell, 1927), pp. 295 ff.

[26] Cf. *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* II, 96, and V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism," *Communist,* XII (1933); 282.

[27] *Ibid.,* p. 96.

[28] *Ibid.,* p. 109.

[29] M. Eastman, *Marx, Lenin, and the Science of Revolution* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926), p. 189. Cf. Masaryk, *op. cit.,* II, 351.

[30] *Imperialist War, op. cit.,* p. 337.

[31] N. Lenin, "Liquidating the Liquidators," *Selections, op. cit.,* II, 296.

[32] W. I. Lenin, *Menschewismus und Bolschewismus,* sämtliche werke, Bd. VI (Wien-Berlin: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1930).

[33] W. I. Lenin, *Kampf Um die Bolschewistische Partei,* sämtliche werke, Bd. V (Wien-Berlin: Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1930).

times suggest that one of his basic objections to the policies of Menshevism is the latter's tendency to permit individual ideas and criticisms of the dialectical course of history.[34]

Lenin does not fail however to find still other faults with any doctrine which would give priority to the criterion of individuality. For instance, he objects strenuously to anarchism which he finds not too different from "petit bourgeois" policies of opportunism,[35] of disintegration, and individualism.[36] The anarchist philosophy, Lenin writes, "is bourgeois philosophy. . . . Their individualist theories and their individualist ideals represent the direct opposite of socialism, . . . the domination of blind chance"[37] and a refusal to recognize even the temporary need of a state.[38] Along with his denunciation of anarchism Lenin insists that people are too iconoclastic.[39] He denounces all forms of asceticism.[40] He opposes mere dreaming as likely to detach one from the developments of real life.[41] He dislikes exaggerated ambition[42] and careerism.[43] He insists that dispositions and moods are not enough.[44] He regards intellectual skepticism as covering an absence of prin-

[34] The distinction between Menshevism and Bolshevism was not always sharp, however. Cf. Masaryk, *op. cit.*, II, 297.

[35] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, pp. 13 f.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[37] N. Lenin, "Socialism and Anarchism," *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 137.

[38] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 49.

[39] Cf. Zetkin, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 59.

[41] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 403.

[42] Cf. Gorky, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[43] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, II, 63.

[44] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 45.

ciple.[45] He pooh-poohs the notion that in literature and art there is any such thing as individual freedom,[46] for even a genius like Tolstoy but reflects the Russian life of his time.[47]

And Lenin questions the powers of great men. "The assertion that history is made by great men is from a theoretical standpoint wholly unfounded";[48] if socialism proves anything it is that individual experiences lead back to social ones.[49] Communism can no more be made by official decrees[50] than the World War could be made by an individual.[51]

There is one other criticism Lenin makes of individualism, perhaps the most interesting of all from the perspective of this study—that dealing with philosophy proper. In our exposition of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* it was pointed out how Lenin's basic objection to Machism is that it eventuates in a subjectivism; and for similar reasons he is wary even of pragmatism with its emphasis on human experience.[52] Subjective wishes cannot, he says, be a real factor in dialectical materialism;[53] indeed to use the flexibility of the dialectical method subjectively, eventuates only in eclecticism and sophis-

[45] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* I, 123.

[46] "Parteiorganisationen und die Parteiliteratur," *op. cit.,* quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.,* p. 206.

[47] *Religion, op. cit.,* p. 45.

[48] N. Lenin, "Ökonomische Inhalt der Volkstümerlei," as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.,* pp. 125 f.

[49] "Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II," quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.,* p. 138.

[50] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* I, 149.

[51] *Speeches, op. cit.,* pp. 40, 56.

[52] Cf. *supra,* pp. 81 f.

[53] N. Lenin, "Unsere Vernichter," quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.,* p. 25.

try.[54] And agnosticism, as has also been suggested, seems to Lenin—especially if that agnosticism is of Hume's variety—to be equally vicious from the standpoint of putting too much emphasis on the priority of sensation.[55] From this standpoint, then, the thing-for-us is but a part, an aspect, of the thing-in-itself; for "man himself is only a fragment of nature which reflects itself in his presentations."[56] The upshot of Lenin's discourse here is to minimize the significance of consciousness. Applied more specifically to his political interests he objects strongly to intellectual, subjective impressions and moods in judging the social movement.[57]

Let it be remembered, finally, that individualism philosophically has been associated with a certain amount of indifference. Now Lenin himself curiously enough objects to indifference as a "tacit support to the strong and to the rulers", as "political contentedness."[58] Apathy and indifference, he declares, mean that the person possessing them is "comfortably ensconced in the party of the replete."[59] All of which may suggest that Lenin is not unaware of the proximity of that attitude which results from overemphasis upon the individual and that attitude following from submission to the world.

[54] "Konzept der 'Wissenschaft der Logik' von Hegel," *op. cit.*, quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

[55] Cf. *supra*, pp. 83 f.; cf. *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, p. 45.

[56] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, p. 92.

[57] *On the Eve of October, op. cit.*, p. 38.

[58] "Party and Non-Party," *op. cit.*, p. 147.

[59] As quoted in Marcu, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

Chapter Ten

The World Criticized by Marx and Engels

When Marx was twenty-six years old he pronounced almost his final dispute with a one-sided *Weltanschauung:* "We shall not," he said then, "dogmatically anticipate the coming world, but shall begin by discovering the new world through criticism of the old one."[1]

There is one fundamental fault with doctrines which explain the world as a self-sufficient whole, and that fault lies in their neglect of the influence of human activity. Marx and Engels expend most of their objections against two such self-sufficient wholes: these are objective idealism and materialism, Hegelianism and Feuerbachianism.

It has been pointed out earlier in this study that Marx's point of departure from the Hegelian philosophy was according to Handman the subjectivity of Hegel. But it has been noted also that the objective side was not overlooked[2] and here the evidence for this observation appears. The trouble with objective idealism, Marx declares in his "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," is that it is synonymous with a paralyzing world-religion.

"Religion is the moan of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. . . . The abolition of religion, as the illusory happiness of the people, is the demand for their real happiness. . . . Religion is but the illusory sun

[1] As quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[2] *Supra*, p. 57.

which revolves around man, so long as he does not revolve around himself."[3]

Politically speaking, the religion of Hegel is the narrow-mindedness of the German *status quo*.[4] And the way out of this evil passivity is to realize one supreme truth: "Man makes religion, religion does not make man."[5] We must attack this dream history, Marx urges. We must reach the categorical imperative that man himself has to wipe out those conditions which make him a "degraded, servile, neglected, contemptible being."[6]

Or suppose we call Hegelianism a philosophy of history rather than one of religion. The same difficulty remains. Instead of a history of living, healthful human beings it becomes one of the abstract spirit of mankind beyond them. The truth is that history in itself is helpless, passive. *" 'History' does not use man as an instrument to fulfil its own purposes"*[7] as though man were a pawn on a cosmic chessboard. History is man pursuing actively his own ends.[8]

But what now about the materialism of Feuerbach? Simply this, that it—like Hegel's religion and history—neglects the importance of individual, conscious influence. In his eleven "Theses on Feuerbach" Marx begins emphatically: "The main defect of all earlier materialism

[3] "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," *op. cit.;* translated as "Criticism of Hegelian Philosophy of Right," *op. cit.*, pp. 12 f.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 26 f.

[7] "Heilige Familie," *op. cit.*, as quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 f., italics mine.

[8] *Ibid.;* cf. in *Nachlass, op. cit.*, II, 186, 192.

(Feuerbach's included) is that the object, reality, the sensible, is conceived only under the form of the object or of contemplation, not as *human sensory activity,* not as *practice,* not *subjectively.*"[9] The third thesis says that the materialist doctrine forgets circumstances must be altered by man.[10] And the last: "Philosophers have done nothing more than interpret the world in various ways; our business is to change it."[11]

Engels' attack on Feuerbach, in the book whose title honors that philosopher, eventuates in much the same kind of fault-finding. After positing a naturalism which explains religion in terms solely of human experience, all that Feuerbach then does is to provide an empty abstraction remote from the throbbing, problematic conditions of actual society.

"The same Feuerbach who on each page preaches sensation, diving into the concrete, the real, becomes thoroughly abstract as soon as he begins to talk of more than mere sensual intercourse between human beings. . . . He is realistic in form; he begins with man, but the discussion has absolutely nothing to do with the world in which this man lives, and so, instead of the man, stands an abstract man. . . . Feuerbach could not find his way out of the abstraction . . . to living reality."[12]

"Die Deutsche Ideologie" continues this attack upon a *Weltanschauung* which fails to give the play of human activity sufficient importance. Men are not fixed in a frozen universe. Only when speculation ends do we find ourselves in positive science where the practical activities of

[9] "Theses on Feuerbach," *op. cit.,* as quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.,* p. 90, italics mine.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 90 f.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 92.

[12] *Feuerbach, op. cit.,* pp. 82 f., 90.

men are expressed empirically and perceptibly in specific, concrete conditions.[13] Of course the treatises here mentioned do not confine themselves exclusively to criticizing the passivity of a flat materialism; in the case of "die Deutsche Ideologie," for example, much consideration is given to social consciousness, to humanity as organized and evolving. But even so, the underlying issue includes Marx's keen realization that Feuerbach's empty materialistic world needs active content.[14]

It should be noted also that the proximity of mere objective idealism and mere materialism is brought out profoundly by Engels. Religion he says is simply the fantastic reflection of what man sees are the external forces dominating him, be those forces natural or social.[15] This makes it easier to understand why he and Marx can criticize both Hegelianism and Feuerbachianism for the equal fault of neglecting the empirical evidence of interaction with living men.

A different suggestion of their attack upon a one-sided objectivism is brought out during the later years of Engels' life. He accuses the German socialists of making Marxism an article of faith which they have to "swallow down" as a rigid orthodoxy.[16] And he denies, as Woltman among others has pointed out, the monistic relationship between economics and life. He says:

"According to the materialistic view of history the factor which is *in last instance* decisive in history is the production and reproduc-

[13] "Deutsche Ideologie," *op. cit.*, pp. 240 f.

[14] Cf. Hook, "Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism," *op. cit.*, pp. 117 f.

[15] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 257.

[16] "Engels to Sorge," *Socialist Review*, I (1908), 32.

tion of actual life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. But when any one distorts this so as to read that the economic factor is the sole element, he converts the statement into a meaningless, abstract, absurd, phrase. The economic condition is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure—the political forms . . . , legal forms, . . . philosophical theories, the religious views—all these exert an influence on the development of the historical struggles, and in many instances determine their form."[17]

Engels, we see, thus retains the economic factor "in the last instance" but at the same time he makes it plain that all development must not be sought in economic causes, that men, through their theories and achievements of many kinds, exercise a retroactive influence on the entire social environment.

[17] As quoted in E. R. A. Seligman, *Economic Interpretation of History* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1924), pp. 142 f.

Chapter Eleven

The World Criticized by Lenin

Does Lenin analyze sharply the absolutely necessary course of history which he elsewhere appears to accept?

It has already been noted that Lenin is fully aware of the objectivity present in Hegel's idealism.[1] He does not himself interpret this particular brand of idealism as a world-religion; but he does explicitly see idealism as such in this way. It gives, he says, "nature at least the same status as God, if not altogether subordinating it to God."[2] Thus although at other times he identifies religion with subjectivism[3] he is prepared also to analyze it for objective weaknesses. The very idea of God he insists has been engendered by the ignorance and subjection of mankind beneath the forces of nature and class oppression.[4] He compares the economic with the religious as evil in the same way: economic oppression causes many kinds of political, social degradation, while religion is a kind of spiritual oppression weighing heavily on the masses.[5] No wonder that Church and State have been alligned so often historically: both serve the common purpose of violating individual conscience and political freedom; both serve the clergy and landlords in protecting their own in-

[1] *Supra*, p. 79.
[2] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, p. 193.
[3] *Supra*, pp. 138 f.
[4] *Religion, op. cit.*, p. 53.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

terests.[6] Lenin shows therefore how religion is profitable for the governing classes; it "teaches 'uncomplainingly' to bear the woes of hell on earth for the sake of an alleged celestial paradise."[7] This is his great objection, that religion tells the worker to be resigned and patient in a present world of awe-inspiring forces.[8] Lenin puts his case eloquently here:

"In modern capitalist societies the roots of religion are principally social. The roots of religion today are to be found in the social oppression of the masses, in their apparently complete helplessness in face of the blind forces of capitalism. . . . Fear of the blind forces of capitalism, blind because they cannot be foreseen by the masses of the people, forces which at every step . . . bring . . . disaster and ruin . . . and condemn them to starvation; these are the roots of modern religion which the materialist . . . must recognize."[9]

Lenin's reaction is of course that "We must combat religion. That is the ABC of all materialism".[10] The proletariat must be the intellectual leader against the old official religion.[11] It must reject religious prejudices in favor of a better life for itself on earth[12] and, wherever religion remains, the proletariat must attack the roots thereof in a united and conscious way. Books are not enough to obliterate religion from the minds of those condemned to capitalism.[13]

The most drastic quarrel Lenin stirs with exponents of

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 12 f., 56.
[7] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 83.
[8] *Religion, op. cit.*, p. 11.
[9] "Workers' Party and Religion," *op. cit.*, pp. 274 f.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 273.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 283.
[12] *Religion, op. cit.*, p. 12.
[13] "Workers' Party and Religion," *op. cit.*, p. 275.

an absolute dialectical materialism is to be found however in his attack upon the movement of "spontaneity" or Economism—the movement which in Russia was more or less identified with a reluctance to resort to political action; with a "submission to elemental forces, *i.e.*, bowing to what is 'at the present time' "; and finally with an insistence that there must be no effort made to divert the course of history from a path "determined by the interaction of material elements and material environment."[14] In his famous "What Is To Be Done?" Lenin states clearly that the Economists try to place their whole interest in a "material environment which determined the road from which it was impossible to divert the movement by any kind of ideology."[15] Economism defends straggling because it lacks ideologists and leaders with a thorough theoretical training.[16] The masses are awakening spontaneously, this is the gist of the theory Lenin repels; it is a theory of narrow outlook lacking broad, strong plans.[17] It believes that politics obediently follow economics.[18] Lenin attacks particularly a certain advocate of spontaneity, Martynov, for maintaining that popular revolutions take place by themselves;[19] and at another time he condemns the same Martynov's "orthodoxy" regarding

[14] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 108. Lenin quotes an "Economist" in this passage. This whole Economist movement especially when it emphasizes the spontaneity and "unanalyzability" of the class struggle, as did Sorel, is identified also as Syndicalism.

[15] V. I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?" *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 117, footnote; cf. p. 155.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 120; Lenin here quotes an Economist periodical.

[19] "Two Tactics," *op. cit.*, p. 15.

dialectical materialism, by asserting that "we would be pedants if we adhered rigidly to this scheme without allowing for the possibility of some variation."[20] The basic fault with spontaneity, Lenin usually asserts, is that it belittles the rôle of the conscious element[21] and therefore that it refuses strong individual leadership.[22] We can understand, then, why Gorky says he never felt in Lenin a fetishistic worship of history.[23]

It is significant that this attack upon a deductive world is expended in later years against Karl Kautsky and George Plekhanov, two of the foremost theoreticians of Marxism. Lenin uses the word "opportunistic" to describe both, in this case meaning usually their tendency to attach too much significance to the dialectical process conceived as a succession of necessary stages. Kautsky's book, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat,* maintains for example that the Russian dictatorship is contrary to necessity—that Communism must become possible through stages which include particularly that of democracy rather than all those Lenin advocates.[24] Lenin's answer is his own furious *Proletarian Revolution* in which he argues not only for a dictatorship which will lead the workers and suppress the bourgeoisie but also for a revolution beyond the bourgeois stage, the stage which he feels Kautsky is

[20] As quoted in *Selections, op. cit.,* II, 85, editor's note.

[21] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* II, 121.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 208.

[23] Gorky, *op. cit.,* p. 23.

[24] K. Kautsky, *Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (Manchester: National Labour Press, no date), cf. chaps. 3-5. Cf. also Kautsky's statement in Eastman, *op. cit.,* p. 198: "our desires and capabilities are limited by material conditions, and it shows how powerless is the strongest will which would rise superior to them."

really defending as an advocate of the *status quo*.[25] Now it is clear that both these arguments of Lenin fit into the scheme of history already described as dialectical materialism; but from the standpoint of what Lenin is here criticizing it is also clear that he is suspicious of any tendency to resort to a "general idea of 'transition'" under the sophistry of dialectics when that idea appears to be acceptance of present conditions.[26] For similar reasons Lenin quarrels with Plekhanov for maintaining that objective conditions require Russia to engage in the war against Germany, for taking refuge in a philosophy which justifies lack of action against the oppressors of a régime.[27] Indeed his criticism of extreme orthodoxy goes so far as to maintain even that early Marxism can and should be modified.[28]

There are several other ways in which Lenin criticizes a merely world-sided doctrine. For instance, he states that it is erroneous to suppose a definite plane of culture can be achieved without active creation of the groundwork for such a plane: where is it written, Lenin asks, "that such variations of the usual historical process are unreliable or impossible?"[29] Again, he is inclined to suspect

[25] *Proletarian Revolution, op. cit.;* cf. pp. 105, 108. also *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 295.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[27] Cf. the brief biography of Plekhanov, *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, pp. 459 f., and also pp. 66, 112, 333, 73 f. Cf. Stalin, *op. cit.*, pp. 15 f., for characterization of spontaneity as, according to Lenin, justifying the *status quo* and thus even the World War.

[28] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 121.

[29] N. Lenin, "Ueber unsere Revolution," as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 218; cf. N. Lenin, "Bericht über die Tätigkeit des ZK der KPR," quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

the Communist theorist who would trace all experience exclusively to an economic basis: one would be going too far to trace changes in sex relations, for example, directly and apart from a wider ideology, to the economic foundations of society.[30] In the same way he argues that instead of pure capitalism anywhere in the world there can be none; it is always mixed with other economic systems.[31] Thus he admits that in place of just two classes arrayed against each other there is the possibility of many variegated, transitory types,[32] shadings which range all the way from a ministerial bourgeois to a semi-pauper.[33] There is no Chinese wall, Lenin declares, between the working class and the other classes;[34] in fact in Russia the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat have had a good deal in common.[35]

The point is that when Lenin assumes this critical attitude toward the world he is emphatic on the issue that Communism "does not tie its hands, it does not restrict its activities to some preconceived plan or method of political struggle:"[36] revolutions therefore do not arrive according to pre-arranged plans.[37] There are no historical laws which know of no exception.[38] History cannot be expected to put in motion Communism in different coun-

[30] Cf. Zetkin, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[31] N. Lenin, "Zusammenbruch der II. Internationale," quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

[32] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 55.

[33] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 156.

[34] *Imperialism, op. cit.*, p. 91.

[35] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 68.

[36] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, I, 57.

[37] *Letter to American Workingmen, op. cit.*, p. 15.

[38] *Proletarian Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 21.

tries according to "strict graduation".[39] The World War brought about a revolution in Russia which otherwise might not have occurred for decades.[40] It is pedantic to insist that to skip the stage of state capitalism is un-dialectical.[41] And it is childish to reject compromises as likely to imply a lack of absolute determinism.[42]

Lenin, finally, is critical in the same way from a philosophic point of view. He curiously distinguishes his materialistic position, for example, from that of the objectivist who runs the risk of becoming an apologist for chains of social circumstances and for necessary historical movements.[43] Epistemologically Lenin refuses at certain times to recognize the thing-in-itself as merely a substratum of the objective world: it is wholly plausible for the thing-in-itself to change into the thing-for-us.[44] "In fact each one of us has observed innumerable times the simple and palpable transformation of the 'thing-in-itself' into the 'thing-for-us.' "[45] And one of the great reasons, if not the reason, for Lenin's objection to this thing-in-itself as utterly world-sided is that it suggests something

[39] N. Lenin, *Chief Task of Our Times* (London: Workers' Socialist Federation, no date), p. 9.

[40] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, II, 47.

[41] Cf. N. Lenin, "Second Congress of the Communist International," quoted in Hillquit, *op. cit.*, p. 115; cf. also *Proletarian Revolution, op. cit.*, pp. 114 ff.

[42] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 19.

[43] W. I. Lenin, "Über den historischen Materialismus," quoted in *Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass, op. cit.*, introduction by Adoratski, pp. xxi f.; cf. Luppol, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 ff.

[44] "Konzept der 'Wissenschaft der Logik' von Hegel," *op. cit.*, quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[45] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, p. 93.

transcendentally idealistic, religious.[46] When Lenin takes this point of view he is, whether philosophic or more practical, dissatisfied with any doctrine which places complete weight upon objectivism as such, an objectivism which tends to deny the significance of conscious men.

[46] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 163.

Chapter Twelve

The Interaction of Individual and World According to Marx and Engels

Interaction of individual and world, mind and nature, subject and object, does not mean—so Chapter Two has postulated—a dexterous logic built upon some sort of automatic mechanism of abrupt interchange. It means a series of tentative adjustments eventuating only from analysis, critical and dynamic, of both in specific situations. Neither pole of the interacting process provides at any time an absolute or permanent criterion for the other, since each pole constantly affects, modifies, the nature of the other.

The acute significance of this methodology is voiced by Marx and Engels as early as in "die Deutsche Ideologie." All writing of history, they insist there, must set out from the modification of history by the action of human beings.[1] Elsewhere Marx asks whether human beings are not at one and the same time the authors of and the actors in their own drama;[2] and in his essay "On the Jewish Question" he asserts sharply that human emancipation will be achieved only when man has both organized and recognized his own capacities as social capacities.[3]

These general remarks are however somewhat crystal-

[1] "Deutsche Ideologie," *op. cit.*, quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[2] *Poverty of Philosophy, op. cit.*, p. 125.
[3] "On the Jewish Question," *op. cit.*, p. 85.

lized. That the two thinkers could have perfected a technique of scientific adjustments between persons and things through the solution of problems, the dissolution of obstacles in those things, is perhaps an extreme hypothesis; nevertheless they do, as has before this been pointed out,[4] indicate in their writings the foundation of a thoroughgoing instrumentalism.

"The question [Marx says prophetically] whether human thought has circumstantial truth, is not a theoretical but a practical question. In practice, a man must prove the truth of his thought, that is to say its reality and power, its mundaneness. The dispute concerning the reality or unreality of thought isolated from practice is a purely scholastic problem. . . . Feuerbach, not content with abstract thinking, wants contemplation; but he does not conceive the sensible as practical sensory-human activity. . . . All social life is essentially practical. All the mysteries which drive theory into the realm of mysticism, find their rational solution in human practice and in the understanding of this practice."[5]

Engels adds to this his belief that the truth of an idea lies in its experimental results, in using it for our own purposes.[6] The correctness of sense-perceptions, too, lies in putting to our use the objects whose qualities we have perceived. If the end at which we are aiming is achieved, then both our ideas and our perceptions are sufficiently proved to be in agreement with the reality of those ob-

[4] Cf. W. E. Walling, *Larger Aspects of Socialism* (New York: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 373 ff.; R. Mondolfo, *Le Matérialisme Historique* (Paris: Giard & Brière, 1917), pp. 115 ff.; Hook, "Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism," *op. cit.*, pp. 118 f.; and K. Korsch, *Marxismus und Philosophie* (Leipzig: Herschfeld, 1923).

[5] "Theses on Feuerbach," *op. cit.*, as quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, pp. 90 ff.

[6] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, pp. 60 f.

jects involved in the aim. The "result of our action proves the conformity of our perceptions with the objective nature of the things perceived."[7] Instead of arguing about the pudding let us resort to the simple task of eating it to prove whether or not it is good, and real, pudding.[8]

Now we have suggested that indispensable to this practical problem-solving interactionism is a critical analysis of all extremes. This aspect has been developed in Chapters Eight and Ten where Marx and Engels attack both a pure individualism and again an exclusive objectivism. What those chapters could not easily reveal however was that Marx and Engels criticize each extreme, not alone for the static sufficiency of itself, but likewise for the static sufficiency of the opposite extreme which so easily becomes reflexive of each. When social affairs, in other words, are allowed to go their way as merely natural processes rather than as regulated by a conscious and voluntary control over them, such affairs come to seem often "an alien power standing over and against" the desolation of man. But from another point of view when division of labor is made atomic, when there is "a circumscribed sphere of activity" characterized by self-interest and split off from truly organic relationships, the world soon appears again as dominating, thwarting individual desires and ideas.[9] They are realizing, are these thinkers, that a solely material world may quickly lead to a futile individuality; but that a purely egoistic individual may lead as well to a rigid and impervious world.

[7] *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, op. cit.*, pp. 19 f.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] "German Ideology," *op. cit.*, p. 1.

But besides critical analysis there is the even more important though integrally involved component of interaction—functional synthesis. The supreme fallacy, on the one hand, of a doctrine which submerges individuals in the world is that it fails to realize that individuals both do and must "order the empirical world in such a way that man shall have truly human experiences in it, shall experience himself to be a human being."[10] What we need is to give men opportunity to express themselves; we must provide them with the proper social setting in which circumstances are such that each can become truly a man.[11] Though the individual may derive knowledge from the world, though the dialectic may manifest itself as laws of that world, yet he must employ both knowledge and dialectic consciously.[12]

The supreme fallacy, on the other hand, of a doctrine which submerges the world in subjective criteria is that it misses the influence of nature upon man. Instead of trying to transcend the course of history by the mere establishment of individuality we must face the fact that determinate persons are limited by determinate material conditions. Ideas and consciousness are interwoven directly with the material environment. Human beings need to recognize that, though they may be producers of their own ideas, those ideas as they are found in actual men are in turn conditioned by the evolution of definite levels of production.[13] Consciousness, like speech, arises first from

[10] "Heilige Familie," *op. cit.*, as quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Cf. *ibid.*, and *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, pp. 95 f.

[13] "Deutsche Ideologie," *op. cit.*, quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, pp. 94 f.; "German Ideology," *op. cit.*, p. 9.

social intercourse.[14] The spiritual riches of the individual depend upon his actual empirical process of development under definite conditions and in definite relationships.[15]

Here then is the real issue. There is reciprocal influence, and unless this is recognized constantly there is a lapse into one-sidedness with its attendant evils. *Both* the environment and human beings are altered.[16] Marx and Engels explicate this highly important truth when they say that in each stage of history there are productive forces which are modified by the new generation, but on the other hand which prescribe to that generation its own conditions of life. Thus "circumstances make men quite as much as men make circumstances."[17] And these circumstances as well as men are never settled, for all adjustments are temporary; knowledge is relative since it is limited by given times and given peoples.[18]

Perhaps no better way of illustrating this philosophy of interaction could be devised than to examine what Marx and Engels mean by "productive forces." Much discussion has transpired through the years on this point. It is important because according to our theorists the political and ideological superstructure reflects those forces.[19] This statement is illustrative so far as our interpretation is concerned: "productiveness is determined by various circumstances," by the average skill of workmen, by science, by the degree of its application practically, by socially or-

[14] "Deutsche Ideologie," *op. cit.*, p. 247.
[15] "German Ideology," *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 10.
[16] Cf. Lenin, *Paris Commune, op. cit.*, p. 60.
[17] "Deutsche Ideologie," *op. cit.*, as quoted in Rühle, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
[18] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 123.
[19] Cf. *supra*, pp. 58 f.

ganized production, by "the extent and capabilities of the means of production, and by physical conditions."[20] Upon the basis of such views as this it has been well argued that by productive forces Marx means three things: labor, land (including natural resources, climatic conditions), and technique (including instruments and scientific processes).[21] Certainly no one can examine *Capital* without at times feeling that economic society and man are interactive. Man "of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. . . . *By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature.*"[22] Neither he nor the outer world is permanent and inflexible, for each changes by the dynamic influence of the other. Again,

> "what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. . . . He not only *effects a change of form in the material on which he works,* but he also realizes a purpose of his own. . . . [The] process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman's will be steadily in consonance with his purpose."[23]

Stated in more economic but still highly appropriate terms the process of labor is "human action with a view to the . . . appropriation of natural substances to human requirements; it is the necessary condition for effecting exchange of matter between man and Nature".[24] The point we are especially concerned to establish is that so long as "productive forces" is a phrase which means not only external,

[20] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 47.
[21] Cf. Bober, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[22] *Capital, op. cit.*, I, 197 f., italics mine.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 198, italics mine.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 204 f.

yet plastic, conditions but likewise techniques for which thinking men are responsible, there is no longer any reason for regarding that term as fatal to scientific method as here defined.

There is one particular exemplification of this technique in Marx and Engels—their participation in political activity. Both men while devoted largely to theory were also organizers and prime-movers in the cause of Communism. The intellectual leadership, as well as the furnishing of a political objective in forming the first International, came from Marx, Rühle says.[25] The "Communist Manifesto," *Criticism of the Gotha Program,* and other documents already mentioned are ample proof of the interest they took in practical accomplishment. Thus they recognize the need of careful analysis of conditions as a basis for readjustments: before a fundamental change can hope to be made in the present social system, for example, capitalism must have reached a stage of severe exploitation; it must have provided a well organized proletariat which acts according to the respective stages of political development in various countries.[26] To propose Communist measures under conditions not thoroughly susceptible to them is absurd.[27] Marx and Engels recognize also the importance of action, and especially during the specific process of attacking a social obstacle through insurrection.[28] Finally they are sensitive to the wisdom of changing preconceived formulae in the face of unforeseen

[25] Rühle, *op. cit.,* p. 249.

[26] Cf. Chang, *op. cit.,* pp. 76 ff.

[27] Cf. "Address of the Central Authority to the Communist League," *op. cit.,* p. 366.

[28] Cf. Lenin, *Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power, op. cit.,* p. 112.

circumstances. Witness how Marx conceded the value of the Ten Hours Bill for workmen despite assertions elsewhere that all bourgeois legislation affects evilly those workmen;[29] again how in some countries like America the workers may hope to secure their ends peacefully;[30] and once more how after denouncing the insurrection of September, 1870, Marx shortly afterward in view of new conditions supported it with a cry, "What flexibility."[31]

[29] Cf. J. Spargo, *Karl Marx, His Life and Work* (New York: Huebsch, 1910), pp. 331 f. Cf. also "Address of the Central Authority to the Communist League," *op. cit.*, pp. 363 ff.

[30] Cf. Chang, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[31] As quoted in Lenin, *Paris Commune, op. cit.*, p. 21.

Chapter Thirteen

The Interaction of Individual and World According to Lenin

We must not, Lenin cautions us, "regard our knowledge as ready made and unchangeable, but must determine how from ignorance knowledge is gradually built up, and how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact."[1] This at once suggests that Lenin here rejects absolute criteria, a statement which he endorses with an insistence "on the approximate, relative character of every scientific proposition".[2]

More specifically Lenin approaches the instrumentalist view when he says that the success of practice proves whether or not human representations agree with the objective nature of things perceived.[3] In fact, "practice ought to be the first and fundamental criterion of the theory of knowledge."[4] Lenin goes even further than this, however: "human practice must enter into our full definition of a thing, both as criterion of truth, and as practical determiner of its connection with what is needful to mankind".[5] This position never permits us either to refute or to establish a presentation completely, but it also prevents knowledge from becoming absolute.[6] There is nothing, Gorky

[1] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, p. 77.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[5] As quoted in Eastman, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
[6] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.*, pp. 113 f.

quotes Lenin as saying, either sacred or holy about theories or hypotheses; "they serve us only as instruments."[7]

But these statements are still vague enough. What precisely does Lenin mean by practice? He means not only that ideas are validated and limited by what is done with them practically, but also that the objective world becomes validated and limited by our ideas.[8] He means all the things the scientist means when the latter analyzes a segment of his problematic environment; produces a plan, idea, hypothesis, on the basis of that analysis; puts the hypothesis to the test; and arrives or fails to arrive at an adjustment—an adjustment which however is recognized as tentative because subject to unforeseen conditions necessitating new readjustments. Lenin makes no systematic statement of this method, the closest being perhaps his way of distinguishing the periods of insurrection as three —the first when it is only a theoretical objective, the second when practical preparation is made, and the third when there is direct action.[9] But he also furnishes evidence —scattered though it may be—that the essential steps are all present in his philosophy.

First, he admits the need of analysis. This has already been demonstrated in Chapters Nine and Eleven where we have seen he rejects both individualism and objectivism. He criticizes an absolute subjective standard, but he refuses to place complete trust in a materialistic or im-

[7] Gorky, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[8] Cf. *Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass, op. cit.*, p. 107, where the strain is again toward this position, though not devoid of a more strictly materialistic aspect.

[9] Cf. *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 364; cf. also H. Laski, *Communism* (New York: Holt, 1927), pp. 231 f.

personal existence. When, for example, he questions a spontaneously generated history he is suggesting the need of more scrutinizing analysis—analysis which may reveal history to be affected by more complex, perhaps even more human, factors than mere spontaneity allows. At any rate, there must first of all be an explanation of origins, sources, and means.[10] If we are considering classes we must make a thorough accounting for all the relationships of every class in a given society before there can be a basis for correct tactics.[11] If we are considering war we must make a careful study of each war individually.[12] Imperialism too compels an understanding of its problematic nature before it can be met.[13] In tactical matters, again, it is necessary to be able to judge accurately the crucial point of discontent and irritation among the workers[14]—to answer the question of the possibility of a revolution at a specific time[15] by a consideration of specific conditions[16] and by the ability of adaptation.[17] Above all, we "must take account of real life, of the exact facts of reality, and not hang on to the tails of the theories of yesterday, which . . . do not come near enough to the complexities of life."[18] Science must insist upon an evaluation of the experience of all forces, groups, parties, acting within a

[10] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 183.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 219.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 399.
[14] "Two Tactics," *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[15] *Proletarian Revolution in Russia, op. cit.*, p. 358.
[16] *Proletarian Revolution, op. cit.*, p. 47.
[17] *Revolutionary Lessons, op. cit.*, p. 7.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

given country.[19] To admit a mistake frankly, to reveal its reasons, to analyze the circumstances causing it[20]—this procedure is necessary before one can go further and correct it. What the analytical approach boils down to, then, is that "We must constantly test ourselves, *studying* the chain of political events in their entirety, in their causal connection, in their results. By analysing the errors of yesterday, we learn to avoid errors today and tomorrow."[21]

But once this analysis has occurred the second operation is the provision of plans. Indeed the obstacles which arise sometimes themselves provide a lesson in understanding and skill.[22] This creation of plans requires, of course, consideration of various possibilities; thus it is that "the individual hesitates before making his choice and stamping on his will one or the other of the ideas conflicting in his mind".[23] Conscious preparation;[24] an organized plan tested in the light of ideas, experiences, observations;[25] the necessity of guidance by theory;[26] defense of the revolutionary structure "with ideological means, with the means of experience, with . . . the whole sum of these habits, morals, and ideas as tools"[27]—all this is essential. The fact is that Communism has always

[19] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 62.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[21] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 249.
[22] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 8.
[23] *Revolutionary Lessons, op. cit.*, p. 65.
[24] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 239.
[25] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, II, 14.
[26] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 110.
[27] N. Lenin, "Gesammelte Werke, Bd. XVIII," as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

seethed with plans offered now by one, now another, leader; some of these plans show far-sightedness and insight, others short-sightedness.[28]

Supposing then that such a plan is determined upon for a definite situation. In order to put it to the test, and this as the third step in scientific methodology holds certainly in social situations if it holds in the laboratory, there must be application of that plan to the situation by active operations, work. All through Lenin's books this call to action is sounded. Mere chattering accomplishes nothing.[29] Party unity cannot be achieved just by resolutions, for definite work must be done to accomplish it.[30] What is important is change:[31] the world does not need interpreting so much as it needs change by means of practical activity.[32] Moreover it would be a serious mistake to imagine that any important reform can be accomplished "by one stroke. No, it demands a tremendous amount of labor, it demands exertion, determination, and endurance".[33] We must be, for example, real internationalists in deed,[34] for the path is long and the tasks of Communism require a strenuous, constructive, and continuous effort.[35] The chief way of action is obviously revolution itself—terrific struggle, which Lenin demands with such typical phrases as "the yoke of capitalism must be shaken off, the extortioners overthrown,

[28] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 130.
[29] N. Lenin, "Party Rules," *Selections, op. cit.*, I, 161.
[30] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, I, 16.
[31] *Ibid.*, II, 108.
[32] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 23.
[33] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, II, 128.
[34] *Ibid.*, I, 152; cf. *On the Eve of October, op. cit.*, p. 16.
[35] *Chief Task of Our Times, op. cit.*, p. 13.

and their resistance crushed."[36] Lenin strikes the keynote of this step, then, when he declares that "Our theory is no dogma but an incitement to action. . . . But if we overlook this then we . . . take from it its living soul. We undermine its most important theoretical bases, . . . its connection with the definite practical duties of the epoch, which may change at every new turn".[37]

Fourth, it should be noted that Lenin regards the active application of a plan as subject to revision by another plan; that is, tentativeness, uncertainty, are essential to the procedure here discussed. He speaks, for instance, of the supreme need for maximum flexibility in all Communist tactics;[38] of the mistakes which are constantly being made by the Soviets[39] (yet "only those who do nothing make no mistakes"[40]); of the existence of peculiar situations which demand adaptation to them;[41] of the necessity of amending old Bolshevik formulae in concrete cases;[42] of reversing oneself if necessary in the advocacy of certain procedures;[43] of recognizing that Communism at different times employs different methods, always employing them under exactly defined ideological and organizational circumstances;[44] of the need of retreating, tacking, and wait-

[36] *Revolutionary Lessons, op. cit.*, p. 76.

[37] N. Lenin, "Ueber einige Besonderheiten der historischen Entwicklung des Marxismus," as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.*, p. 115. Lenin refers here to Engels. Cf. *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 133.

[38] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 83.

[39] *Letter to American Workingmen, op. cit.*, p. 13.

[40] *Religion, op. cit.*, p. 41.

[41] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 107.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 278.

[44] N. Lenin, "Guerilla Warfare," *Selections, op. cit.*, II, 225.

ing;[45] of proceeding "sometimes in zig-zags, sometimes retracing our steps, sometimes giving up the course once selected and trying various others";[46] and of the policy of sharp turns which implies both modification and change of techniques.[47] So much for the general way in which Lenin speaks of tentativeness. There are however several specific implications which are sufficiently interesting to be included. (a) The obvious reason why a tentativeness—resulting often in change of plans—is essential lies in the appearance of unexpected circumstances: "every sudden turn in history . . . unfolds . . . unexpectedly peculiar coordinations of forms of conflict".[48] There is, after all, a good deal of uncertainty about experience.[49] Matters develop concretely in a way no one can anticipate—they are more original, peculiar, mixed, more complicated because of new and living realities.[50] No wonder it is almost impossible to predict when periods of violence will yield to periods of calm.[51] "We do not know and we cannot know which road developments will take in the coming years, internationally";[52] rather we recognize that new unforeseen forms of struggle must arise as social conditions change.[53] It is wrong to repeat old formulae torn from

[45] *Chief Task of Our Times, op. cit.*, p. 9; cf. *Soviets at Work, op. cit.*, p. 43.

[46] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 51.

[47] Cf. *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 136, 43. Cf. Eastman, *op. cit.*, pp. 158 f.

[48] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, I, 27.

[49] Cf. *Revolution of 1905, op. cit.*, p. 53.

[50] *Revolutionary Lessons, op. cit.*, pp. 12 f., 15.

[51] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 245.

[52] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 250.

[53] "Guerilla Warfare," *op. cit.*, p. 213.

the conditions which gave them birth, and to use them in entirely different situations.[54] In short, we often need new plans because we find new conditions.[55] (b) Another suggestion of Lenin's tentativeness has already been made in his admission of the need for compromise,[56] for that admission itself implies new "un-formulized" conditions. Lenin mocks the popular idea that the Bolsheviks will compromise with no one: the fact is that circumstances often make such compromises necessary.[57] In a remarkable article, written in 1917 just before the revolution of October, he goes so far as to suggest that because of an exceptional situation it might be desirable to compromise with the petty-bourgeois democrats and Mensheviks; it is his hope thereby to accomplish a peaceful revolution, a proposal which admits the possibility of deviating from one of the basic principles of so-called orthodox Communism.[58] And his writings after the revolution of 1917 are full of such tactics: for example, he advocates utilization of highly paid bourgeois specialists, a measure explicity conceded to be a deflection from proletarian rule;[59] again, Lenin admits that so long as the world revolution has not arrived bourgeois capital is needed;[60] and he attacks the "left"

[54] "Against the Boycott," *op. cit.*, p. 259.

[55] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 100, 197. It is because of this that Bukharin regards Leninism as not merely a repetition of Marxism but a return enriched by the new: N. Bukharin, *Lenin as a Marxist* (London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1925), p. 24. Cf. Krupskaya, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

[56] *Supra*, p. 155.

[57] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 152.

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 152 ff.; cf. also pp. 238, 263.

[59] *Soviets at Work, op. cit.*, pp. 14 f.

[60] Cf. Hillquit, *op. cit.*, pp. 119 f.

or orthodox Communists for refusing to participate in parliaments.[61] But this is not new in Lenin's writings: in the early *Iskra* days he admitted that co-operation with mild trade-unionism might be beneficial;[62] in 1906 he stated that Communists regard parliamentarianism as a means of educating and organizing the proletariat.[63] But Lenin is careful to explain that by compromise he is not advocating a general policy.

"It is necessary [he insists] to be able to analyze the situation and the concrete facts of each compromise. . . . In politics, it is not always so easy to make distinctions. . . . But whoever took it into his head to contrive for the workers a formula which would give beforehand ready solutions of all cases, or to assert that . . . there would be no difficulties, no intricate problems to solve, would be merely a charlatan."[64]

It may be said that here Lenin utters his thesis on scientific technique as tentativeness. (c) One final implication lies however in his attitude of uncertainty as to his goal. We do not know, he says, just what will happen after a revolution.[65] In fact, Lenin once admits that instead of Communism's inevitability we are likely to find, unless we control thoroughly production and distribution, an inevitable return to capitalism.[66] Rather frequently there is suggested such an alternative possibility as to the future, for example the possible destruction of the Soviet régime by imperialism.[67]

Fifth and last, something must be said as to Lenin's

[61] *"Left" Communism,* p. 18; cf. Laski, *op. cit.,* pp. 208 ff.
[62] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* II, 191.
[63] N. Lenin, "Electoral Agreements," *Selections, op. cit.,* II, 232.
[64] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.,* pp. 19 f; cf. also p. 56.
[65] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* II, 89.
[66] *Soviets at Work, op. cit.,* p. 20.
[67] *Proletarian Revolution, op. cit.,* p. 106.

concern for the relation of individual and society in the course of attacking the situation analyzed. We do not refer to the final synthesis, the classless society, but rather to the stage of plans by which that synthesis may be reached. It is obvious that here, especially since the readjustment is prolonged and involves the whole structure of society, plans which leaders advocate must take some kind of social form—and because this is necessary Lenin insists often upon the importance of organization. In 1904, for example, he was saying that the backwardness of organization was the weak spot in the movement, for it dissipated energy.[68] "Organize," Lenin cries, ". . . organize for the determined struggle".[69] It is essential to be clear-headed on organization; there must be "a definite *plan* of organization that will enable us to work to build it up from all sides."[70] The more Communism is persecuted the more it needs organization.[71] In his attack upon spontaneity, already discussed,[72] Lenin found that the advocates of that theory believe in the mass movement as self-perpetuated; his reply is, "The fact that the masses are spontaneously entering the movement does not make the organization of this struggle *less necessary*. On the contrary, it makes it *more necessary*".[73] Anarchists, not Communists, oppose a strong organization of the masses;[74] hence when a revolution is approaching, the slogan of the hour for Communists is organiza-

[68] "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward," *op. cit.*, pp. 186 f.
[69] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, I, 56.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 112.
[71] "Party and Non-Party," *op. cit.*, p. 141.
[72] *Supra*, pp. 151 f.
[73] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 186.
[74] *Revolution of 1917, op. cit.*, II, 14.

tion;[75] and it is necessary to build that organization firmly and powerfully from the bottom up.[76] To work untiringly for discipline, organization, orderliness, efficiency, and harmonious co-operation—this is the Communist path to power.[77] And if the hypothesis of true socialism reaches the stage of proletarian dictatorship in fact, it is more important than ever to realize this truth; for such a social system is above all a co-operative system in the true sense, a co-operation where the masses really participate.[78] But if this is the meaning of organization, does the rôle of individuality still count? Yes, Lenin replies, the fact is that the more the movement grows, the more co-operation must become fused with personal initiative. Certainly individual leadership is essential to class success.[79] Organization as an essential factor in the plan to remedy evils of the present social reality—and an organization which, incidentally, Lenin continually depicts as active, vigorous—would not deny the importance of personality; but at the same time it would hope that personalities might achieve expression through the process and nature of organization itself. For this reason Lenin sometimes urges that individuality be expressed most fully in self-discipline.[80]

[75] *Ibid.*, I, 48.
[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 265 f.
[77] *Proletarian Revolution in Russia, op. cit.*, pp. 362 f.
[78] Cf. Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[79] Cf. *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 109.
[80] Cf. Zetkin, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

Chapter Fourteen

Activity in Communism

The active attitude is an attitude which reflects and is reflected in a scientifically analytical and synthetical method. Part Three thus far has been devoted to stipulating in what ways Marx, Engels, and Lenin adopt that method.

We have seen that Marx and Engels are severely critical of mere individualism for they regard avaricious egoism as, if not positively immoral, at least despicable. They attack the Rousseauian emphasis on innate rights by showing how these come to mean in bourgeois society little more than the kind of laissez faire individualism against which they are so indignant. They reject Hegelianism interpreted as a subjective idealism, and likewise any philosophy which would retreat within the recesses of consciousness rather than advance upon the facts of the world. Finally, they question the influence of conscious leadership.

Lenin's attack upon individualism also displays a strong repulsion against the brutality and greediness of profit-seekers. Again, he puts little stock in theories of human nature which stress endowments of a sense of freedom or equality, calling them bourgeois fables. A fault with individualism as such is opportunism attempting to foist private wishes, selfish desires, on objective conditions. He denounces anarchism, iconoclasm, asceticism, the illusion of cultural individualism, and belittles the powers of great men. Philosophically he opposes himself to subjectivism, to dialectic as thought-process, to agnosticism, and to the

notion that things are dependent upon perceptions. Finally, Lenin denounces personal indifference as an implicit concession to the political *status quo*.

Returning to Marx and Engels let us note how they criticize a merely objective world-view. The Hegelian philosophy, Marx argues, is a religion and a history, and whichever you emphasize, it is the moan of the oppressed, the cry of men—unaware of the truth that history is the activity of man himself—strangling in the Absolute. Feuerbach's system, though materialistic, is evil in much the same way. Engels also denies even the kind of monism where economics is the sole element in historical causation.

And Lenin, too, objects to an exaggerated world-sidedness. He particularly questions spontaneity and other brands of historical fatalism which refuse to justify the need for political leadership. He finds the same fault with Kautsky for defending bourgeois democracy as necessary according to dialectical law, and with Plekhanov for advocating support of the World War as inevitable. Religion is attacked for its negation of human efficacy, its intrigues with the "blind forces of capitalism." Other miscellaneous but no less significant criticisms against extreme dialectical materialism are these: definite planes of culture do not arise automatically; the attempt to trace all experience to economics is erroneous; there are no exactly demarcated classes arrayed against each other; no preconceived plan either brings about or guarantees revolution and ideal Communism; lastly, the thing-in-itself is always also the thing-for-us, for the thing-in-itself altogether too easily implies the transcendental.

Coming now to the ways in which Marx, Engels, and

Lenin conceive of individual and world as interactive, the former two—it has been noted—suggest an instrumentalism with their doctrine that the test of a perception or idea of an object lies in the use to which such perception or idea is put. What they mean in social terms is that as men reorganize their environment to make it a better place in which to live are they establishing the import not only of their actions but of that which is acted upon and which limits their actions. Failure to analyze and test constantly each human and natural fact results in sterility for each. A dynamic interaction is pertinently described in terms of "productive forces"—of labor and nature co-operating with one another. The conviction of Marx and Engels as to the efficacy of human action is exemplified practically in their revolutionary work.

Finally, the interaction of man and nature in Lenin's view. Not only, he says, is knowledge relative and changing, but its verification is determined by practice. Greatest evidence for his position here lies in his revolutionary technique: the need first of careful analysis; then provision of plans after consideration of various possibilities, and the concurrent recognition that these plans are tools; then active operations in testing a selected plan; finally, the constant need of tentativeness and flexibility because of the possibility of unforeseen circumstances, uncertain ends. All this implies that human activity modifies conditions within the limits of those conditions, an implication made concrete by Lenin's insistence upon co-operation of individuals inside careful organizations.

If these summaries have accomplished their purpose the evidence is clear that Lenin continues again the basic fea-

tures of the tenets held by Marx and Engels. It is true, of course, that his analyses, criticisms, of the individual and world vary now and then: for instance, his quarrel with spontaneity. But there is no reason why according to a flexible methodology such criticisms should not vary. Sufficient it is to note that he opposes strenuously—in as full-throated a way as did his predecessors—a subjectivism and likewise a self-complete world. He suggests however the corrective influence of the world upon individuals; while again his objection to a mere automatic externality is often that such is short-sighted in not admitting the power of human redirection. As a revolutionary, Lenin focuses interactionism: his whole life being devoted to a concrete cause in Russia, he was led to articulating in full the revolutionary technique which the more academic Marx and Engels in a rather, though by no means altogether, general way themselves advocated. Thus we are justified in continuing use of the term, Communism, as defining on the whole the correlated views of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

But how, upon the basis of our observations in this Part, is Communism a philosophy of activity? Such a philosophy, we must recall, has been characterized in Chapter Two as interaction of individual and world—not by an abrupt interchange where now one and now the other is absolute, but by a functional influence of one upon the other. Consciousness, that is to say, affects environment by studying its difficulties, and upon the basis of that study operates upon it, changes it manipulatively; environment affects consciousness by setting the conditions, furnishing the materials, within and upon which the latter works. Both

aspects and all readjustments, moreover, while important are only tentatively secure or true at any given time; for as they interact their significance changes.

Now Communism is active because it is analytical and synthetical in the sense suggested. It is, as we have seen, critical of both extremes—individual and world. It so greatly fears submergence in a one-sided permanency that it forever is bringing the other side to bear upon it. Yet Communism for this very reason regards each side as indispensable to the entire program. Without active, intelligent, desirous men—grouped and single—the world becomes a bulk of social ineffectiveness; without nature and society as real and important, man retires into his atomistic shell and feeds there upon his ego, his feelings, and a God made after his own image. With both working and drawing upon the other, as a scientist works upon problems set before him by his environment, the whole of reality changes from one of contemplative immobility to one of exciting and inciting operations.

These are the conclusions from the first six chapters of this Part. But by means of them Communism offers—on a broader scale—several further inferences.

In an early discussion of individualism as postulated by Marx, Engels, and Lenin there was suggested something of a paradox—a paradox of human nature as, on the one hand, naturally avaricious, cruel, hateful, in short as somewhat Hobbesian; and, on the other, as still egoistic but so unconcerned with doing his fellows injury as to appear Rousseauian, peaceful, and happily free.[1] We did not in

[1] *Supra*, pp. 36 f.

discussing these qualtities by themselves attempt a resolution of the difficulty, but in the chapter on acquiescence in Communism certain ways of doing so were proposed.[2]

The resolution occurs in a philosophy of activity, however, by recognizing that men are, without being so innately, of both sorts in tendency. To deny that their lust for profit often makes them greedy and brutal—whether taken now from the standpoint of the separate person or again from that of economic society—is to ignore the empirical evidence. But to deny that men are also willing, even anxious, to find the happiness of freedom and peace which a properly ordered society would make possible is again to be unaware of an empirical drive in human nature. What Communism is doing when it admits a kind of Hobbesian mood into its analysis is to be cognizant of how men seem to act in certain ways. But when Communism admits something of a Rousseauian-Utopian tendency it concedes the possibility through the help of new conditions of modifying those ways. What is, on the one hand, a frank admission of the moral right of man to power becomes, on the other, an indignant condemnation of his immoral conduct through use of that power.

Yet when Communism discusses the Rousseauian sort of qualities it does not regard them as ideal merely. The latter are least potentially factual: man can be, indeed historically and primitively he once may have been, quite freely equal and peaceful. But there are times when these qualities are hidden by the forceful dominance of others. Hence what was more or less factual becomes now suggestive only as to what would be factual again in radically

[2] *Supra*, pp. 118 f., 122, 128 f.

different circumstances. But in these circumstances, too, other tendencies though now perhaps subordinate are themselves potentially alive.

Communism illustrates in this interpretation the typical psychological process of conditioning a susceptible human nature. The dictatorship of the proletariat, for example, is intended largely for this process; and the length of time necessary before the workers' state, a machine intended to suppress forcibly those whose Hobbesian qualities are too dominant, can "wither away" depends on how rapidly the conditioning might succeed. This interpretation denies, obviously, a human nature static or extreme: if it were the latter, the scientific possibility of modifying such qualities as avarice would be absurdly futile. Yet a clearly interactive methodology cannot endorse, as might behaviorism, a one-way process of conditioning. Rousseauian potentialities become—though not in all, at least in certain men—theories and programs of reform. They become hypotheses which act upon the world and thus in turn condition it. In short, Communism here would regard human nature as a series of propensities which are modified by, yet also help to modify, the social world. None need be stamped out; each may be sublimated, redirected, influenced by one another; and thus even under a classless society self-interest would necessarily have some play, though now a self-interest habituated to the incitement of rewards not of golden profits but of social acclamation and personal achievement. Moreover the sharp distinctions, drawn to stress our point, between the natural man of Hobbes and that of Rousseau might become less different than their likenesses: the harsh human nature of the "Leviathan" could well be tempered

by the milder human nature of the "Discourse," but so too might the latter learn to fortify its innocence with sterner stuff.

These remarks lead to an interpretation of dialectic in Communism as a vigorous evolution of means and ends. The means are the ideas, desires, instruments by which the ends are reached; ends are the conditions of society and environment out of which means arise and toward which means, by way of adjustment, move. Retaining the Hegelian terminology one might say there is a synthesis whenever a theory, conceived from maladjustment and therefore as antithesis, manages to reorganize a given situation, the thesis. This process does not, of course, terminate when one such reorganization has occurred. Ends become means to still further ends; thus does the end of a primitive Communism become the means to a possibly higher Communism through adjustment with an intermediary end, capitalism. This is why "a completed society, a perfect state, are things which can only exist as phantasies," and why "all successive historical conditions are only places of pilgrimage in the endless evolutionary progress of human society from the lower to the higher."[3]

This conception of dialectic recognizes obviously the dynamic quality of experience. It retains intact this contemporary aspect of Hegelianism. "All classes and all countries are at the same time looked upon not statically, but dynamically," says Lenin, and "not only from the point of view of the past, but also from the point of view of the future".[4] Dialectic being the scientific evolutionary method

[3] *Feuerbach, op. cit.*, p. 42; cf. also Hegel's own words, *supra*, p. 53.
[4] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 43.

forbids an isolated or one-sided view of things, he says again.[5] Instead, that is, of regarding any sphere of reality, subjective or objective, as sufficient unto itself dialectic reveals and participates in the active production of new spheres through which the old are changed. Conflicts and oppositions are fundamental[6]—indeed so much so that revolution is itself characteristic of this dialectic. Thus Communists find that a goal may be achieved by the overthrow of that which they oppose: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains," Marx and Engels cry in an immortal line. "They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!"[7] Force is the tool whereby society progresses and dead political forms are destroyed.[8] "We must preach from the housetops," Lenin says, "that bold attack, armed offensive is necessary . . . and that the most determined fight must be carried on".[9] But at the same time revolution cannot be expected to succeed when conditions are not fairly ripe, any more than the scientist can hope to settle a problem outside the scope of his materials. Revolutions cannot be made intentionally or at the will of individuals.[10] The dialectical polarity of means crystallizes and then attacks the polarity of ends only when the equilibrium between them has in the course of empirical development reached a point of fundamental disturbance.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 299.

[6] Cf. S. Hook, "From Hegel to Marx," *Modern Quarterly*, VI (1932, Autumn), 60 ff.

[7] "Communist Manifesto," *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[8] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 213.

[9] "Lessons of Moscow," *op. cit.*, p. 203.

[10] F. Engels, *Principles of Communism* (New York: Daily Worker Publ., no date), p. 17.

Mankind "takes up only such problems as it can solve".[11]

There is still another way of stating this dialectical process to give credit to a philosophy of activity in Communism—the relations expressed by supply and demand. It has been argued that a principal fault with individualistic economics is that it pays almost exclusive attention to means, that is, to supply. Now while Communism emphasizes this aspect—in fact, there seems almost to be, as William says of Marx, every regard for producers, little for consumers[12]—this emphasis need not eventuate in so drastic a condemnation when it is seen that there is, from the present standpoint, a concern after all with ends and therefore with demand. Consumers, in other words, receive consideration in such conceptions as the interpretation of value where commodities are gauged by their social usefulness as well as merely by the labor put into them. This means that demands cannot wholly be taken for granted; they must be understood, anticipated; and as they are they influence supply, the means. There is an interaction where supply and demand affect each other; the difficulty comes from dichotomizing them.[13]

Perhaps the most pertinent way in which the dialectic is here manifested is that already hinted as fundamentally individual-social. Marx and Engels present with Lenin a doctrine of social development,[14] in which there is a major emphasis on humanity as organic, on men as really active,

[11] *Critique of Political Economy, op. cit.,* as quoted in *Essentials of Marx, op. cit.,* p. 177.

[12] M. William, *Social Interpretation of History* (Brooklyn, 1920), p. 181.

[13] Cf. Lindsay, *op. cit.,* p. 79.

[14] Cf. M. Adler, *Kant und der Marxismus* (Berlin: E. Laub'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1925).

but only so as integrally related to their community. Men can accomplish nothing singly; they require co-operation—*class* consciousness—and, too, appreciation of economic needs, physical limitations. Yet they are capable of affecting conditions and thus of evolving toward higher and higher levels of adjustment, so soon as they realize that the secret of their accomplishments lies in functional manipulation of such conditions. The sensible world, Marx and Engels declare, is the product of the activity of a series of generations which, through its industry and social relationships, modifies and extends further those relationships in accordance with the changing needs of men.[15] "Freedom, therefore, consists in mastery over ourselves and external nature founded upon knowledge of the necessities of nature, it is, therefore, necessarily a product of historical development."[16]

Let us now suggest how this philosophy of activity might be applied to Communism in terms of its basic economic doctrine, the labor theory of value. It will be recalled that our exposition considered the theory from two aspects—the individualistic, where men are pictured as exchanging commodities at just value as determined by labor-time;[17] and the social, where labor is organized integrally and where the value of commodities is determined by their social usage as well as by labor-time as such.[18] We may regard these two aspects as representing, in this implica-

[15] "Deutsche Ideologie," *op. cit.*, quoted in Hook, "Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism," *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[16] *Anti-Duehring*, op. cit., p. 148.

[17] *Supra*, pp. 34 f.

[18] *Supra*, p. 68.

tion, two steps in the entire Communist program; and the third which is last is that step where the first may have modified and become modified by the second to produce again an individualistic level of society now interwoven with the experience of social co-operation.[19]

Lenin brings out clearly the objective of Communism as an individual-social synthesis, as has already been hinted in his consideration of an organized proletariat.[20] In speaking of the Soviet organization he says concretely that he wants each person trained politically so that eventually the whole population can participate in management.[21] Again, he admits the necessity of incorporating the stage of capitalism into the ultimate synthesis when he says that real Communism can be reached only by the development of state capitalism with its organization and discipline.[22] Capitalism's knowledge is, in fact, an indispensable basis for a socialist culture.[23] In a striking passage, he says:

"If we do not clearly understand that a proletariat culture can only be built upon the basis of an exact knowledge of the culture created by the entire development of mankind and through the working over of this culture, if we do not understand this, then we cannot solve our problem. The proletariat culture is not something which suddenly, without our knowing it, appears on the surface, it is no invention of people who represent themselves as specialists. . . . This is all nonsense. The proletariat culture must be a regulated, further development of the supply of knowledge which mankind has gathered under the yoke of the capitalists, of the property owner . . ."[24]

[19] Cf. *supra,* pp. 110 ff.

[20] *Supra,* pp. 174 f.

[21] *Soviets at Work, op. cit.,* p. 39.

[22] *Chief Task of Our Times, op. cit.,* p. 12.

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 14.

[24] N. Lenin, "Gesammelte Werke, Bd. XVII," as quoted in Luppol, *op. cit.,* pp. 221 f.

Now what must be observed carefully is that a proletarian culture, a classless society, does not here emerge by some metaphysically cosmic rhythm.[25] It is a society arising, if or when it does, by interaction of the hypothesis of human freedom and equality, with a problematic society conditioning whatever influence such hypothesis has. Marx, Engels, and Lenin are saying that to achieve their objective it is necessary to conceive a situation remedial of the one confronting them; but that situation can be made actual only if it is rooted in historical experience: thus do they insist (although not necessarily asserting a literally pure economic state of nature) that value as determined by equality of labor-time is an account of what *has* happened. But there are conditions under which this equality is corrupted as in capitalism; then does it become an hypothesis of what *would* happen if the hypothesis met its test. Especially however do they insist—and this is Lenin's point above—that the hypothesis, the remedial theory, can be actualized only by an active participation in and use of the materials provided by the same social environment with which they are dissatisfied. Obviously then they do not here admit either the static autonomy of self or the existence of a solely objective environment; but they do admit the susceptiveness of man to the world's influence, and of the world to man's.

And so Communism as a great social program for the present sees itself with a problem requiring correction. This problem consists of capitalism's inequalities, inequalities which are due to anarchy in productive forces side by side with co-operative techniques, inequalities which have

[25] Cf. Croce, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

produced the evil of exploitation of labor through surplus value with all its attendant evils—drudgery, hunger, unemployment, imperialist wars. Capitalist society provides a set of conditions which we must first of all frankly face and clearly analyze. Thus Marx, Engels, and Lenin sometimes assert that the exploiting process is not immoral;[26] yet, when seen in terms of theoretical correction, capitalism deserves—because the evils of the system may possibly be rectified—the strongest epithets of criticism.[27] The problem may be met by the capacity of organized human beings to deal with it intelligently, actively; by the leadership of those who will meet that problem courageously without supposing leadership can itself be sufficient cause of historical change;[28] by the application of ideas and ideals founded upon the hypothesis that men have been and may perhaps be made again—though this time socially—equal and happily free.

The whole program, to return to the labor theory of value, is essentially one of scientific reform. The theory that men can exchange their labor-time freely and equally is used (and best regarded now, if we should retain Hegel's terms, antithesis) to analyze and then attack the sphere of society where labor-time is no longer exchanged freely and equally. In breaking down this sphere the common control of natural materials which capitalism has developed, and which is also manifested in the social usefulness of commodities, may be retained. There may be still a system of social production but, since now production regu-

[26] *Supra,* pp. 33, 42.
[27] *Supra,* pp. 133, 137 f., 67, 100.
[28] *Supra,* pp. 38, 45 f., and pp. 135 f., 142.

lated by free men, inequalities may become replaced by genuine equalities[29]—equalities which as genuine are characterized by what may often be dissimilarities in human needs and talents rewarded fairly in proportion to them both.[30]

Thus should this higher sphere be reached it is, while activity is fundamental still, a sphere subject even more to the plastic effects of man and society upon each other. Though our only hope for correction lies, speaking instrumentalistically, in such an interaction yet because of the stubbornness of capitalism—and only because it is so stubborn does a violent method of treatment become necessary—interaction is retarded much more than, ideally, it needs to be. Under a society of the future this at least might be predicted: individuals so long as they are different in capacities and needs, and free to deal with their surroundings, cannot be reduced to a deadening mass level; yet neither can they, so long as they depend upon the necessities of the world and social organization, establish merely anarchy. Full personal expression let there be, say Marx and his disciples. But let there be self-expression which, as constantly affected by natural necessities and other selves in organic sociality, atomizes individuals no more. Such is the universal import of these words of Marx:

"The realm of freedom begins in actuality where labour, determined by necessity and external purposiveness ceases. . . . There can be

[29] Cf. Lindsay, *op. cit.*, pp. 114 f.

[30] Cf. *Criticism of the Gotha Program, op. cit.*, pp. 30 f. The familiar motto, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," is misleading in the light of this work and that of Lenin, *State and Revolution* (collected works ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 221 ff: unequal abilities as well as unequal needs would receive proportionate awards.

freedom in this sphere only to the extent that men in society . . . govern rationally the material given them by nature, and bring it under their common control, instead of being governed by it as by a blind force. . . . But this is still a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins the development of human powers which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, though that can only come to flower if it is rooted in the realm of necessity."[31]

Communism can then as a dissecting-conjoining technique at once attack and absorb certain aspects of other philosophies. It can attack both idealism and materialism as such: the former taken either as a subjective, spiritual individualism, or as an objective religionism; the latter taken either as a mechanistic fatalism, or as a hedonistic egoism. Communism can through Lenin insist that the struggle is against *both* an individual-sided Menshevism or anarchism, and a world-sided "left" Communism.[32] Yet Communism can also admit consistently that subjectivism and objectivism possess together a not inconsiderable residuum of tentative truth. It can, therefore, achieve a kind of synthesis of Utilitarian atomism with Utilitarian socialism; of Feuerbachian individualism with Feuerbachian materialism; and, as scientific dialectic, of Hegelian subjectivism with Hegelian organicism.[33]

Marx, Engels, and Lenin are critics here of all extremes. They criticize extremes by, however, means so sharp as to seem likewise almost as extremes, except that as modifying and interactive such means eventuate in syntheses of functional reform. The program of Communism is an effort to

[31] *Capital, op. cit.*, III, 954 f., translation adapted from Lindsay, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[32] Cf. *"Left" Communism,* op. cit., p. 72.

[33] Cf. *supra,* pp. 40, 52 f., 54 f., 116.

realize Eucken's dictum that "All the prerogatives of man depend upon his not remaining an isolated point but being in constant association and reciprocal activity with his fellows."[34] The program of Communism has its counterpart, therefore, in what we have called the active attitude; an attitude which is dissatisfied, curious, analytical, but likewise is directive, organizational, synthetical; an attitude which reflects, yet by its own light kindles, the flaring beacon that would "light up the path of the ignorant and oppressed masses."[35]

[34] R. Eucken, *Socialism an Analysis* (London: Unwin, 1921), p. 40.
[35] "Provisional Government," *op. cit.*, p. 63.

Part Four
CONCLUSION

Chapter Fifteen

Acquiescence-Activity in Communism

The attempt to characterize Communism by means of a philosophic concept has necessitated definitions, we have seen, both of Communism and of that concept. While recognizing that the definitions adopted do not encompass all possible significances, each has been shown to be fundamental theoretically.

But when we regard Communism as a synthesis of the views of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, we need to be clear as to the way in which Lenin, particularly, unites with his two predecessors. He does not repeat parrot-like the postulates of Marx and Engels. He fails to deal widely with some points; with others, again, he expands what the limitations of their era and their major interest in theory prevented Marx and Engels from so doing. The importance of Lenin to Communism lies however not in points like these so much as in his refusal to place disproportionate stress on certain aspects of the doctrine at serious cost to other aspects. Thus in refusing, for example, to petrify their doctrine into a rigid system he freshens the flexible, tentative; but in refusing, also, to satisfy himself with an interpretation reduced to a methodology of social development he gives full credit to Communism as a cosmic structure. The controversy may go on as to the relative importance of early and late statements in Marx and Engels; but Communism, to which Lenin is integral, tends to strike something like an equilibrium. The function of Lenin as such

an equilibrator is perhaps his own most significant contribution to the doctrine of Communism.

The major issue, the rôle of acquiescence in that doctrine, is approached through an examination of three great philosophies: Stoicism, Spinozism, and instrumentalism. The first of these, with its emphasis on an inner composure, suggests an acquiescence of indifference to the world; the second, with its emphasis on the exactitudes of nature, suggests an acquiescence of compliance with the world; and the third, with its emphasis on problem-solving functions rather than on absolute criteria, suggests the negative of acquiescence: activity. But all three have certain qualities in common. Stoicism complies, by means of its own direct concern with individuality, with the rationality of the material universe; again, it is militantly concerned with social affairs. Spinozism is indifferent to the empirical world when, though by the very means of unity with what it regards that world, it reaches self-realization; again, its autonomy is seen to be expressed participatively, zestfully. Instrumentalism admits its dependence upon habit, revery, feeling, and so is temporarily independent of objectivity; again, it concedes the significance of the world's laws, customs, immediacies; and finally, it places a basic faith in the active process as such. The value of these philosophies to Communism is not that of providing the doubtless legitimate hypothesis of how far they in particular are present in the philosophy of Communism; rather they are evidence of the historical nature of the concept, asquiescence, and above all unusually illustrative of the general character of that concept. It is thus that they help to delineate acquiescence in Communism itself.

Now if as Part One defined it acquiescence be understood—despite recognition of certain active elements—as preponderantly an indifference of the individual toward the world, a compliance of him with the world, and both an indifference and compliance at once, then to the extent it characterizes Communism we may expect all three perspectives to be present. This, Part Two has argued, is the case. Communism's stress on the individual permits one to draw conclusions not unlike those of laissez faire philosophies—a major concern with private means, a submergence in the subjectively egoistic, which as attitude is not remote from the Stoic's indifference toward his world. Communism's concern with a systematic dialectical materialism reveals that man becomes identified with or at most a reflection of an Hegelian world-movement which compels—through past, present, future progress at certain tempos toward an inevitable goal—compliance with that movement. Communism this time takes somewhat the Spinozistic attitude. Finally, Communism's premises of both individual and world provide a reciprocal correspondence between them with now one, again the other, taken as criterion. Just as the concrete universal of Hegel allows interchangeably an atomistic or cosmic object of knowledge, so Communism while imbedded in its own antecedents proceeds from one to the other by reflexive dialectics—a process which indeed helps to establish the necessity not of objectivity alone but as well of subjectivity. Just as Spinozism encourages also a healthful expression of human powers, so the Communist can while strongly compliant with universal forces profess an interest in himself. But just as Stoicism allows also an active unity with the social world, so Communism's indi-

vidual can while essentially indifferent to what happens in that world simultaneously join its movements. To put the interrelationship differently, it is just as possible for the Communist to acquiesce in his own desires while under the dominion of material history as it is for him to acquiesce in material history while under the conviction that in a classless society his natural rights will once more flower.

In Part Three we have considered the negative side of acquiescence, that is, activity. The active attitude is represented—despite certain lesser though clearly evident acquiescent aspects—appropriately by instrumentalism. Communism is found to be both critical and organizational, destructive and constructive. Instead of accepting self or world as merely there it tends to analyze and provide readjustments through the operational influence of one upon the other. Each therefore is important, yet neither is for a moment self-sufficient. By means of this pliable methodology Communism dissolves in one way the apparent paradox of a cruel and kindly human nature, for these are here but tendencies conditioned by the environments of different societies while also helping to condition such societies. Dialectic now becomes an evolutionary technique of means and ends, of revolutionary oppositions and conciliations, of interplays between supply and demand, of co-operations between individuals and classes in which individuals become genuinely efficacious in so far as they work within classes. All this is well illustrated when the labor theory of value is interpreted as an hypothesis of human freedom and equality—an hypothesis itself based on experience and used through class organization against a modifiable capitalist society: by means of revolutionary practice a new

adjustment is if possible achieved where individuals would be in genuinely organic relationship with the social world. In these ways Communism exhibits an active attitude.

What has thus far been indicated in Part Two and Part Three, then, may be reduced to a kind of dualism—on the one side an acquiescence taken from different perspectives but still consistently interrelated; on the other an activity. There are now at least four possible interpretations deducible from these conclusions: first, that the two attitudes are irreconcilable; second, that the active attitude is ultimately subordinated by the acquiescent; third, that the acquiescent attitude is ultimately subordinated by the active; and fourth, that the two attitudes are somehow harmonious. We propose in the remainder of this study to deal with each of these possibilities.

a) This interpretation would insist that the active attitude and the acquiescent attitude are in Communism incompatible. There would not need to be argued that they are *always* incompatible; but there would need to be shown that this particular doctrine is so dualistic—dualistic especially in the sense that it establishes both an absolute system and a flexible methodology—that the attitudes correlative with it are on the whole dualistic likewise.

No one can easily deny, certainly, that there is a lack of systematic presentation in the literature of Communism. To this difficulty is added another that Marx, Engels, and Lenin speak frequently in so polemical, indeed bitter, a style that the resultant impression is one of extreme conviction about a thesis which yet may be but a partial one.

Neither difficulty is enough however to justify an inter-

pretation of this kind. That the subject-matter of Communism can be organized is suggested, to some extent at least, by the preceding chapters. That its theorists speak intensely is no good reason for being deceived by them. And certainly Marx, Engels, and Lenin would deny vehemently any thorough dualism of attitude. What are the other possibilities?

b) Can it be shown that the system of Communism, whether atomistic or organic, is predominant, and that the attitude of acquiescence in its positive connotation is therefore correct?

This is the conclusion, though denied by many who realize the need of accounting somehow for the active element, of most so-called orthodox Marxists. Let there be mentioned a few of the more distinguished: Kautsky, who says, "Socialism is inevitable because the class struggle and the victory of the proletariat is inevitable";[1] La Monte: socialism is not a scheme for bettering humanity; it is, on the contrary, a monistic philosophy of the cosmos;[2] Plekhanov (despite attacks by Lenin on other grounds): the principal feature of Communism is that its advocates, instead of being satisfied with its ideals, require certainty that it is a necessary socio-economic process;[3] Hilferding: Marxism in both theory and practice is devoid of value judgments; it is merely a theory of the laws by which society moves;[4] Boudin: last causes are all in the

[1] K. Kautsky, *Ethics and History* (Chicago: Kerr, no date), cf. p. 206.

[2] R. R. La Monte, *Socialism, Positive and Negative* (Chicago: Kerr, 1907), cf. p. 88.

[3] Cf. Eastman, *op. cit.*, p. 232. Cf. also G. Plekhanov, *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (New York: International, 1929), pp. 72 f., 76.

[4] R. Hilferding, "Das Finanzkapital," quoted in Hook, "Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx," *op. cit.*, p. 337.

changes in production and distribution;[5] Labriola: The economic structure determines objects of thought in the production of art, religion, science.[6] In present Soviet Russia, Timiriazev argues that matter is the exclusive category of philosophy, perception a photograph;[7] Deborin: the laws of society are its inner motives and levers;[8] Bukharin: the rôle of the individual is determined by social, economic conditions.[9]

But it is not only the exponents of such a Communism who imply their support of the acquiescent attitude. A great many critics while disapproving the system interpret it in such absolutistic terms as to presuppose that attitude for those who do approve. Russell, Spargo, Keynes, Commons, William, Simkhovitch, Böhm-Bawerk, Bober, Sée, Hearnshaw, Skelton, and others, have tried in one way or another to prove that this sweeping system, when viewed either from the individualistic or objective standpoint, does not and cannot work out as its theorists say it does.[10] To

[5] Boudin, *op. cit.*, cf. pp. 24 ff.

[6] A. Labriola, *Essays on the Materialistic Conception of History* (Chicago: Kerr, 1904), cf. p. 46.

[7] A. K. Timiriazev, "Philosophy of Science," quoted in Fülöp-Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[8] A. Deborin, "Lenin, Militant Materialist," quoted in Fülöp-Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[9] N. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism* (New York: International, 1925), p. 101. Cf. pp. 123 f.

[10] B. Russell, *Bolshevism: Practice and Theory* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920), cf. pp. 134, 139 f., one of whose principal arguments is that Bolshevism is likely to intensify the lust for personal power; J. Spargo, *Psychology of Bolshevism* (New York: Harper, 1919), cf. pp. 54, 68, 32, who argues that Lenin and his ilk are motivated by "exaggerated egoism, extreme intolerance," hero-worship, hatred; J. M. Keynes, *Laissez-Faire and Communism* (New York: New Republic, Inc., 1926), cf. p. 103, who places great stress on love of money in

these thrusts are offered counter-thrusts by Communism's defenders: they show that as a self-sufficient system its predictions as to the movements of history, its analyses of human nature as illustrated by exploitation, are to a great extent correct.[11]

A particular argument in favor of an absolutistic inter-

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analyzing the motivations of Communism; J. R. Commons, "Marx Today: Capitalism and Socialism," *Atlantic Monthly,* CXXXVI (1925), cf. p. 682, who says that Marxism is becoming obsolete because individualistic cut-throat competition is becoming obsolete; M. William, *op. cit.,* cf. p. 181, who feels that Marxism fails because concerned basically with the individual producer. On the objective side, these critics: V. G. Simkhovitch, *Marxism Versus Socialism* (New York: Holt, 1913), cf. pp. 239 f., who has shown in the fashion of Bernstein, *op. cit.,* that misery, accumulation, crises, etc., are not increasing in the Marxian fashion; E. von Böhm-Bawerk, *Karl Marx and the Close of His System* (London: Unwin, 1898), whose refutation of the Marxian theory of value rests largely on the discovery that Marx in *Capital,* Vol. III, reverses his original contention that value is determined by labor-power, reverses it by admitting that commodities do not exchange in proportion to the labor they contain but according to the price which is itself determined by competition; Bober, *op. cit.,* cf. pp. 322 ff., who shows how Marx's conception of history, which minimizes all factors except economic forces and the class struggle, is over-simplified; Henri Sée, *Economic Interpretation of History* (New York: Adelphi, 1929), cf. p. 122, whose work, like Seligman's, *op. cit.,* finds that the monistic concern for economics depreciates, despite the importance of economics, the complexity of phenomena; cf. also F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *Survey of Socialism* (London: Macmillan, 1928), p. 284, and O. D. Skelton, *Socialism A Critical Analysis* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), p. 105. These criticisms, expended for the most part against Marx, apply equally against Communism as defined. It should also be said that many of them involve, of course, much more cautious treatments than these summary statements can suggest.

[11] An example of Marx's predictions which has proved surprisingly valid is that of increasing intensification of the labor process. Cf. *Capital, op. cit.,* I, 447 ff. For other attempts to defend Marx on this and similar scores, cf. Boudin, *op. cit.*

pretation is that the active elements in Marx and Engels, at least, were expounded mainly during their earlier days —in "immature" works like "die Deutsche Ideologie." Such an argument would need to recall however that Marx's *Capital* itself contains many elements of a philosophy of activity; and that the doctrine, Communism, which involves Lenin also, emphatically brings to the foreground its active aspects. It is pertinent to note that Lenin regards Marx's views as having fully matured in 1844-45, the years in which such works as the one just mentioned were written.[12]

We may suspect, then, that both the exponents and opponents of Communism are misled when they place undue stress on an interpretation which makes of it a kind of monistic structure; that indeed when it is so regarded much of the argument back and forth as to the validity of such a Communism is exaggerated; and that consequently these interpretations are inaccurate in allowing the acquiescent attitude, which is related to them, to dominate the active.

c) Suppose however that the opposite tack is followed. Suppose it be contended that Communism is basically a methodology resembling interactionism, so that the resultant attitude is the negative of acquiescence.

Interpretations in this direction are less plentiful but not unavailable. Beginnings have been made, for example, by Beer, Bonar, and especially Boucke who feels that the Marxian economics is superior precisely because it makes ethics a part of social science.[13] In America, Max Eastman

[12] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 20.

[13] Beer, *op. cit.*, cf. p. 156; Bonar: cf. his introduction to Böhm-Bawerk, *op. cit.*, cf. p. 16; O. F. Boucke, *Limits of Socialism* (New York: Macmillan, 1920), cf. p. 43.

has gone a long way to make Lenin (although not Marx) a scientific "engineer of the revolution"[14] who practices instrumentalism in a great social laboratory; and Sidney Hook, elaborating and qualifying, he says, the activist interpretations of Max Adler, George Lukács, and Karl Korsch, has developed the hypothesis that Marx (followed to a great extent by Engels, Lenin) provides essentially a dialectical method, defined as an experimental process of social development, in which conscious human beings organized in classes make their own history by interacting with social conditions.[15]

[14] Eastman, *op. cit.*, cf. pp. 150 ff. It is curiously interesting that Trotsky, certainly one of the greatest Leninists, has referred to Eastman's thesis as a "retrograde adventure." The Marxian system, Trotsky says, "has completely passed the test of history." Cf. "On the Revolutionary Intellectuals," *Modern Monthly,* VII (1933), 85. Mr. Eastman replies that Trotsky has not read his book; cf. "Criticism by Exorcism," *Modern Monthly,* VII (1933), 213. It should also be noted that Mr. Eastman and Professor Hook claim rather violently to be in disagreement; cf. their controversies in the *Modern Quarterly,* V (1928-31), and the *Modern Monthly,* VII (1933).

[15] Cf. Hook, "Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx," *op. cit.*, pp. 357 ff. Professor Hook has published a book recently of the same title as the article, part of which is a revision of the latter (New York: John Day, 1933). The book attempts to establish more elaborately his activist interpretation, and to remove several obstacles in the way of such interpretation. Therefore it dismisses as inconsistent the copy theory of knowledge, although both Engels and Lenin often regarded that theory as accurately Marxian. It distinguishes the subject-matters of natural and social sciences, although again Engels and Lenin frequently regarded them as ultimately identified by Marx in a monistically material dialectic. In order to save Lenin as far as possible for Marx, it insists there is no trace of an epiphenomenal epistemology in Lenin's political writings, although Lenin regarded it as applicable throughout. It denies that Marx recognizes (on the one hand) the "reliability" of knowledge in advance of practice; apriorisms; personal motives as such; economics as

Though such interpretations would not necessarily uphold the purely active side, where they place major emphasis upon it they must not confuse the question of what may be the most fruitful aspects of Communism for the future with what that doctrine actually is. That its greatest values may be found in its activity is a thesis no doubt worth defending, but that Communism is explicitly this requires dismissal of the evidence that according to Marx, Engels, and Lenin the individual possesses certain natural rights and characteristics which are fundamental; the material world is moving by necessity through a definite series of stages; the contradictions which have not yet matured

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the conditioning factor of particular cultural characters; and the inevitability of Communism. But it admits that Marx recognizes (on the other hand) some knowledge antecedent to practice; presuppositions, laws, and determinate social conditions; ideals, selfishness, and irreducible values; economic production as the conditioning factor of general cultural characters; the normal acceptance of definite objectives, purposes, and ends, such as the downfall of capitalism; and a "faith in action". Aside from the question of whether such distinctions are enough to rescue altogether a systematic absolutism from Marx, they surely are not enough to deny a resultant acquiescent attitude in Marx. And all the more so are they not when Professor Hook declares that certain social and political consequences are for Marx *"not merely* a matter of economic laws inevitably working themselves out, but of the presence or absence of working-class activity" (p. 225, italics mine); and (in a kind of summary of his book) that the Marxist is an activist "steering himself by the objective development of society and his class goal." (As quoted in E. Browder, "Revisionism of Sidney Hook," *Communist,* XII [1933], 285.) But because of his decided emphasis on an instrumentalist interpretation, he throws himself open to the attack of Communist controversialists who accuse him of revisionism, of dismembering Marxism, of denying the truth of systematic Communism. Cf. "Revisionism of Sidney Hook," *op. cit.* Professor Hook's articles on Marx and Hegel in the *Modern Quarterly,* VI (1932), carry on his instrumentalist thesis in more technical fashion.

within capitalism will inevitably mature; the goal of a classless society will finally arrive; and man throughout the entire process is, with all the rest of nature, reflexive of that process.[16] The acquiescent attitude must not, therefore, be minimized.

d) The final possibility is evidently that the two attitudes with which we are primarily concerned can—without submerging either—be brought immediately together. This involves the question of whether the absolutistic and experimental aspects of Communism are genuinely compatible.

What we actually seem to have in Communism is an activity within acquiescence, an attitude expressed in analyses, tentative adjustments, interactions, but also an attitude which reveals itself as accepting certain profound presuppositions and absolute although dynamic criteria. Communism derives its hypotheses, one might say, from extreme polarities, and turns those hypotheses back into equally extreme polarities so that they are actually no longer hypotheses at all. Yet it manages to perform this feat through a technique having virtually all the characteristics of scientific methodology on a wide scale.

We have seen, for example, that the whole doctrine of Communism may be described as an immense historical triad in which labor-time relations are differently valued. Although it is not impossible to define this triad in either subjective or objective terms, probably the most accurate

[16] It is at least extraordinary that Professor Dewey, from whom Professor Hook has learned much, declares that while he is sympathetic toward the Soviet experiment he is not attracted by the absolutism beneath it: *Impressions of Soviet Russia* (New York: New Republic, Inc., 1929), cf. p. 114.

definition would regard the individualistic level (where men exchange their commodity of labor-time equally and freely) synthesizing dialectically with the level of socialized production (where men exchange their commodity of labor-time unequally and subserviently) to produce a third level where autonomous individuals once more exchange their labor-time equally within socially regulated forces of production. Now what interests us about this historical system is that each lower phase passes upward toward the ultimate synthesis according to inviolable laws—translated, to be sure, economically—of matter in motion. The time necessary to bring the goal to fruition, the interspersions of calm and violence, the precise spatial points at which shiftings occur—these things may not be positive. But the certainty with which the process as a whole achieves fruition is as unquestionable as could be any principle of nature.[17]

If however we think of Communism as a program of action, then this description no longer holds. The labor theory of value now becomes, as we have seen, an hypothesis of the possibility that man may be made relatively free and equal—an hypothesis arising in the present as a theory of opposition to a problematic environment where inequality is widespread. It is an hypothesis which may express itself in an organized effort on the part of a well directed and conscious class to force through a readjustment designed to eliminate the evils of modern capitalism. But the curious fact about this way of putting Communism is that, so long as the program is strictly experimental, no theory, fact, or objective is accepted altogether. Each aspect of

[17] Cf. *supra*, p. 128.

the program is subject to serious revisions constantly. This does not mean, let us repeat, that the hypothesis may not rest on actual experience; it does not mean that the social experimenter may not anticipate what the solution might be; and it does not mean that the difficulties in question are not factually very real. Yet the program does mean that the qualities of individuals which might be drawn out are at most plastic tendencies; the problematic environment of capitalism is subject to new analyses and new modifications as there arise unpredicted conditions; the act by which the hypothesis meets its problem is also modifiable and may succeed only if the most exacting preparations are made for it; and the solution is not only subject to great modifications likewise, but its accuracy can be determined only when or if empirical establishment takes place.[18]

Now when a central thesis such as the labor theory of value is thus brought to a common focus from different angles, we at once understand that Communism somehow intends both the systematic and activistic features of the doctrine to be emphasized at once. In dialectical terms Communism is a reflexive negation of the sphere of man's autonomy by the sphere of social law to deduce the sphere of social anarchy. But Communism is simultaneously a dialectical interplay of things and ideals; it is a social science of evolution made possible only as men interpret correctly and synthesize tentatively the emergencies of their surroundings. We see therefore a system advancing under the impetus of the energies of ego and matter—a vast spiral turning, as it does for Hegel, by the mechanics of

[18] Cf. *supra*, pp. 170 ff., 186 ff.

a cosmic logic. Yet, peering a second time, we discern now the spiral turning when it does rather by the toil of conscious men who, though limited in what they do, shape uncertainly its course by painful thought, by trial, by varying operations. This is the situation which follows from what Communism offers us.

The juxtaposition of these two fundamental aspects is nowhere more eloquently displayed than in actual statements of Marx, Engels, and Lenin themselves. Speaking of thought processes, for example, Engels argues that while thought consists in the active decomposition of objects of consciousness into their parts and in uniting them, yet thought can carry on this function only with pre-existent prototypes.[19] Marx speaks of the whole systematic program: "The working class . . . know that in order to *work out their own emancipation,* and along with it that higher form to which present *society is irresistibly tending, by its own economic agencies,* they will have to pass through long struggles".[20] But it is in Lenin that there are to be found the most striking examples. "We know the direction of the road," Lenin asserts, we know what forces will lead to Communism, "but the concrete, practical details will appear in the experience of the millions when they tackle the job."[21] While we preach the inevitability of the revolution, the humdrum work must be done also.[22] Revolutionaries must remember always to have in view the ultimate aim

[19] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.,* p. 64.

[20] *Civil War in France, op. cit.,* p. 50, italics mine.

[21] *Proletarian Revolution in Russia, op. cit.,* p. 79; cf. *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.,* I, 133.

[22] "Against the Boycott," *op. cit.,* p. 251.

so that there will be no false steps.[23] "Maintaining the continuity and unity of the movement does not by any means exclude diversity."[24] Not only ultimate but also immediate aims must define a political attitude.[25] Each crisis has certain universal and certain unique characteristics.[26] The proletariat must not lose sight of its ultimate goal for a moment; meanwhile it must continue its propaganda.[27] History is filling old formulae with new content.[28] People may waver from one side to the other, but the trend does not waver.[29] The revolutionary party must continue on the same straight road,[30] but "the march towards the single goal . . . can make use of diverse paths".[31] Unless we prepare carefully we shall not be ready for "the impending Communist organization of society after our victory."[32] Co-ordination of the strictest devotion to the principles of Communism with the ability to compromise is necessary.[33] The revolution will be successful despite zigzags and difficulties.[34]

Lenin correlates the two viewpoints in more specific ways. First, he compares his political position with alge-

[23] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, I, 157.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[25] *Ibid.*, II, 57.
[26] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 30.
[27] *Iskra Period, op. cit.*, II, 86.
[28] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 132.
[29] *Imperialist War, op. cit.*, p. 133.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 258.
[31] N. Lenin, "Balance Sheet of the Discussion," as quoted in Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
[32] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.*, p. 81.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[34] *Toward the Seizure of Power, op. cit.*, I, 79.

bra, his analogy being that while its contents change often its form remains much the same.[35] Again, "the Soviet Government may be *mathematically certain* that the process of capitalistic disintegration will continue and lighten its burdens. *But as this is a long process,* Soviet Russia cannot escape the question of seeking a *modus vivendi* with those states that are still capitalistic".[36] Second, Lenin is dexterous enough to concede, yet criticize, certain implications of the doctrine of spontaneity in history:

"It is often said: The working class *spontaneously* gravitates towards Socialism. This is perfectly true in the sense that Socialist theory defines the causes of the poverty of the working class more profoundly and more correctly than any other theory, and for that reason the workers are able to appreciate it so easily, *provided,* however, that this theory does not step aside for spontaneity and *provided* it subordinates spontaneity to itself."[37]

Third, he explains that careless people often confuse two questions, that of the selection of one of two roads, and that of the way in which the goal can be reached on the given road.[38] Needless to say, Communism already knows which road. And fourth, he unites—difficult though it may seem to others—an epistemology epiphenomenal with one pragmatic: "Our perceptions and representations are . . . images. The verification of these images, the distinction of true and false images, is given by practice."[39] The correlation of both positions sometimes, moreover, takes the

[35] *"Left" Communism, op. cit.,* p. 83.

[36] As quoted in Hillquit, *op. cit.,* p. 119, first italics mine, others Hillquit's.

[37] *Iskra Period, op. cit.,* II, 124, footnote.

[38] "Democratic Revolution," *op. cit.,* pp. 103 f.

[39] *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, op. cit.,* p. 83.

most subtle forms—to mention only that the course of dialectical history is not reckoned quite temporally,[40] and yet that specific events are in time;[41] again, that revolutions are inevitable phases of the world-process,[42] and yet that we must bring them about;[43] that the world is simultaneously a thing-in-itself[44] and a thing-for-us.[45]

That all such illustrations eventuate, in one way or another, in the conclusion that acquiescence and activity are concurrent attitudes in Communism goes without further argument. These attitudes are always fundamentally correlated with, respectively, acceptance of extreme criteria and critical experimentation. But what the illustrations also prove is that our classification of evidence into that related, on the one hand, to acquiescence, and that, on the other, to activity, is justified by the necessities of analysis but not by the manner of presentation chosen by Marx, Engels, and Lenin themselves. Each attitude

[40] *Supra,* p. 111.

[41] *Supra,* p. 97.

[42] *Supra,* pp. 70 f., 103 ff.

[43] *Supra,* pp. 151 f., 163, 169 f., 184.

[44] *Supra,* p. 143.

[45] *Supra,* pp. 86, 155. Many critics have been explicit, it is fair to say, in recognizing somehow or other this basic relationship of the two aspects. For example, Bukharin, *Lenin as a Marxist, op. cit.,* pp. 22 f., calls Marxism at once a methodology and a sum of ideas. A recent book by K. Sauerland, *Dialektische Materialismus* (Berlin: Neuer Deutscher Verlag, 1932), regards the materialist dialectic as the laws of development of things but likewise a method; cf. pp. 43, 45. Still another is H. F. Ward, *In Place of Profit* (New York: Scribner's, 1933), pp. 425 ff. As we have already pointed out, however, even those who take a definitely one-sided view often *try* to account for the other side; yet none succeeds well—including the critics now mentioned—in revealing that dynamic equilibrium of both sides which is the true Communism.

is, one might say, so profoundly realized in the presence of the other that *Part Two and Part Three of this study intersect, actually, throughout.* Communism as a dialectical subjectivity and objectivity of material history—since it involves experimental interaction between plastic human tendencies and modifiable environments everywhere—is integrally active. But Communism as a dialectical methodology—since it involves certain microcosmic and macrocosmic premises—is also integrally acquiescent. Thus does this compatibility reveal that another part of the original definition[46] of our concept applies fully here: acquiescence "is never present without aspects of activity compresent."

With this the principal objective of our study may be said to have been reached, for each part of the basic concept has been examined separately in its bearing on Communism, and each then has been brought into relation to the rest. But there yet remains something of a dénouement. What is obvious is that, while the compatibility of the acquiescent-active relation has been established, the consistency of that relation has not. We seem to have more obviously a "chemical mixture" than a "chemical compound." Nor has it been shown whether there is possibly some good reason why the two attitudes *must* join together in Communism—whether one is, in other words, necessarily inseparable from the other. We propose, without extending too far beyond possibilities, to examine this question now.

There is no denying that as the demonstration stands the Communist's attitude may be paradoxical. What Com-

[46] *Supra*, p. 26.

munism seems to have done is, for instance, to have recognized so acutely the awful reality of capitalism and the great need for a new individualism as to have entangled itself in the extremities of both. Yet it struggles to disentangle itself; and thus while it seems to be asking us to believe certain axioms and premises, it asks simultaneously that we question them. The influence of Hegel manifests itself here with especial clarity: his problem was also largely to account for universal certainties along with the dubious explorations of experience. Hegel met the problem by showing that each sphere of experience is fluctuating, questionable, only in its urge to be completely understood and real in terms of the whole with which any part is metaphysically synonymous. Marx, Engels, and Lenin, one might argue, have done in the last sense the same thing: thus they declare epistemologically that while practical analysis of experience is useful to the discovery of truth yet truth is ultimately measured by an antecedent pattern of what they are analyzing. The difficulty comes however from their going farther than did Hegel. They also introduce a genuinely experimental method which emphatically denies that the subjective is verifiable in terms of the objective or vice versa. They recognize the importance of both, but they insist that each but tentatively interacts with the other. That a solution to their problem might be found by revising their epistemological technique is here beside the point. In broader terms Engels himself declares: "Man is . . . confronted by a contradiction, on the one hand he is obliged to study the interconnections of the world-system exhaustively, and, on the other hand, he is unable to accomplish the task fully either as re-

gards himself or as regards the system of nature."[47] How can one know for sure that there is a world-system if one cannot establish that surety?

But resolution of the paradox, if resolved it can be, does not rest with the intricacies of knowledge merely. Fortunately our concern with attitudes allows the possibility that a psychological and ethical consistency, at least, can be discovered. This possibility may be approached through Bertrand Russell's description of a purely scientific society the downfall of which, he believes, might follow from strict reliance upon hypotheses. Induction characterizing the scientific pursuit, though provable easily enough, nowhere carries conviction with it; and while Russell does not regard this a dangerous situation so long as scientists are unaware of their insecurity, the moment they are made aware they may either turn to a static orthodoxy of beliefs to offset that insecurity or lose their zest for discovery which is insured by belief in achievement. "When Egyptian priests discovered the periodicity of eclipses, they did so because superstition had led them to record such phenomena with scrupulous care. A false belief may be an essential ingredient in discovery".[48] The substance of Russell's speculation is then that an attitude resting wholly upon what has been called in physics operational concepts may be unsatisfactory unless it possesses also the ingredients of an absolutism, even though such ingredients be false.

Russell is talking of a society in which each individual

[47] *Anti-Duehring, op. cit.*, p. 58.

[48] B. Russell, "Science," *Whither Mankind,* ed. Beard (New York: Longmans, Green, 1928), p. 80.

is supposedly concerned with science. We need not argue that as society actually is constructed most individuals are concerned with fulfilling needs and wants which, while involving trials and errors typical of scientific search, are sought after and hoped for by a complex variety of faiths, wishes, schemes. Since they are so complex, understandings of them psychologically are not likely to be uniform, and surely not where Communism is concerned. Still let us consider the rather plausible theory that the typical workman is motivated by chronic inhibitions toward a compensatory conception in the success of which he devotedly believes. The economic struggle for existence is cruel in the hardships it exerts; and even when the workman is not deprived of fulfilled needs there may develop a sense of injustice through realization that his standard of living, his culture, his freedom are increasingly unequal in comparison with his employer's. This may lead in turn to awareness of exploitation, a violent dissatisfaction with the capitalist, and a corresponding intensity of such inhibitions as what De Man calls the instinct of autovaluation.[49] Also proportional to his dissatisfaction and inhibitions may be, however, the worker's compensations; and so if there is any psychological validity in this view we can begin to understand why the doctrine of Communism inspires its followers, not merely with the scientific tenability of its analyses, but with a burning enthusiasm for the revolution and the classless society to follow. In fact, it could perhaps be demonstrated that there is rather a

[49] H. De Man, *Psychology of Socialism* (New York: Holt, no date), p. 53. For further important points in his diagnosis, cf. pp. 63, 362, 190, 353.

close correlation between the sharpness of the Communist's inhibitions and his categorical certainties. To return to Russell, if belief in achievement is important to the scientist working dispassionately in his laboratory then surely it would seem to be essential to the Communist motivated as he may be by dissatisfactions, inhibitions, compensations. It would seem to be essential that the wholly active attitude, while by no means vitiated, might need support of an attitude of acquiescence in firmer ground than even probabilities.

We have been talking of the individual. While he is important certainly, Communism is after all from many points of view a great movement of the masses. Now the masses, however they be classed, possess characteristics which the most elementary social psychology distinguishes from those of single members. Collective conduct is on the average less intelligent, more sentimental, indeed passionate, less pliable yet more fickle, more brutal and less moral. In fact, so different from the individual has been portrayed the mass that sometimes the argument is made that the kind of methodology practised by the individual experimenter holds very little, if at all, under the supposititious logics of that mass.[50] Marx, Engels, and Lenin are not in agreement with this position. They hold strongly to the view that, as illustrated by the efficacy of wise leadership and by conscious organizaton, certain definite analogies exist between laboratory and social achievement. But at the same time they apparently realize that there may be vital need for bolstering activity with solid sym-

[50] Cf. C. E. Ayres, review of *Quest for Certainty, International Journal of Ethics,* XL (1929), 430 f.

bols, unquestioned dogmas, in which not merely individuals can find compensatory solace but in which even more importantly the proletarian class can, with loyalty and fervor, acquiesce. Yet it must not be forgotten that this need is not alone induced by limitations in the proletarian nature: the society upon which that class would throw itself is a society dominated by another class whose own ethico-psychological limitations—including greed and power, pride and bigotry—may compel the kind of coercive opposition which Communism favors.[51]

At the same time, supplementation of the active by the acquiescent attitude need not eventuate in greater importance for the latter. It has been argued, following the illustration of Bertrand Russell, that once we have the active attitude something more may well be needed. Yet, should we start with acquiescence, there could probably be shown that it in turn requires work, precaution, plans, to stir the Communist toward carrying through his premises. Both attitudes would then be necessary psychologically to one another.

Must we rest satisfied with this? Consistency, we like to feel, means something more: it means a logical as well as psychological agreement of some kind. Yet Russell has said clearly that, while the scientist may need beliefs beyond hypotheses to spur him on, such beliefs may be false. We have suggested too that, though the system of Communism is not necessarily fallacious when tested by scientific method or vice versa, yet it is not clear how

[51] Cf. R. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner's, 1932), pp. xii ff., pp. 161, 16. Cf. also Professor Niebuhr's essay, "Religion of Communism," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXLVII (1931), 462 ff.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin in, for example, epistemological terms show how one is strictly consistent with the other.

If solution to this question might be reached, it is perhaps most hopeful in the direction—not of method or system—but again of attitude. At the outset of this study it was postulated that attitudes both are reflective of and are reflected by philosophies.[52] Now if we insist throughout exclusively on the former of these alternatives, then the logical consistency of acquiescence and activity depends upon establishment of a like consistency in the Communist doctrine. But if we realize too that attitudes have themselves influenced the formation of that doctrine, then it is possible to approach the question of logical consistency to some extent through them.

This leads us back to a subject-matter close to this study. The nature of acquiescence was revealed, we recall, through examination of three great philosophies: Stoicism, Spinozism, instrumentalism. Both the former philosophies involve the active attitude: witness the Stoic's aggressive even militant participation in social experience; witness again the Spinozist's high regard for lusty self-realization; witness these qualities despite their reflexive metaphysics, their acquiescent moods. But instrumentalism, while primarily active, is itself also acquiescent—acquiescent when its exponent yields to his feelings, ego, rational processes, habits; again when he yields to natural laws, practical absolutes, the immediate experience in which he would escape from the trials of a difficult world. Yet it is not merely these personal or immediate things in which the instrumentalist can acquiesce: there is a real sense too

[52] *Supra*, pp. 25 f.

of acquiescence in the busy interactions of the modern world—as real a sense, indeed, as when the Stoic or Spinozist zestfully acts in selfhood or with universe.

These philosophies are recalled once more because while in formal structure inconsistencies may exist in them (as earlier remarked of instrumentalism[53]) yet when we examine attitudes beneath them the acquiescent-active relation seems vital to any full description. What we know of these attitudes is derived, to be sure, from the philosophies themselves. But what we also know is that the attitudes reflecting them are impregnated with implications so rich that such attitudes themselves often seem parental of the explicit compositions which mould them as philosophies. Thus there is a way, in turn, in which the inquisitions even of epistemology cannot disrupt their formal structures: in broad, deep attitudes, and not alone in technicalities of the philosophic trade, should those structures now be fairly judged.

It is by analogy with historical authority that the possibility occurs of logical consistency in the acquiescent-active relation of Communism. For Communism is in that relation not unlike the philosophies just met. An observer removed to a wider perspective than the doctrine internally allows sees that the Communist is interactive in an absolute, yet acquiescent in an interactive, world; he sees therefore that the dialectical spiral of matter-ego blends from this perspective, after all, with the operating functions of environment-man;[54] but he sees that this is so as much in spite of as because of system and method as such.

[53] *Supra*, p. 24.
[54] *Supra*, pp. 208 f.

If Stoicism, Spinozism, and instrumentalism are then in attitude, at least, consistent logically there is evidence for a similar consistency (granting of course that the psychological may still be involved) in Communism too. It is not too much to say indeed that if logical consistency has *any* truth for the attitudes of these philosophies, or for any others which involve the acquiescent-active relation, then it has truth also here. If instrumentalism, for example, has such truth, then so has Communism; but then Communism has truth too if it has for a spokesman on behalf of one of all time's great philosophies of life: work out your own salvation, cries St. Paul, for it is God that worketh in you.

The peculiarity of Communism as compared with most philosophies however is that it stresses the acquiescent and active with what seems almost an exactly equal weight. There has never been a doctrine probably where this is so fully the case—a speculation which recalls its juxtaposition between two greatly different periods, that of Hegel and that of Darwin. But just because both attitudes are present, strongly and at once, there will doubtless always be those who will refuse to concede a genuine correlation as wholly possible. These will then argue for one or another of the alternative interpretations suggested at the beginning of this chapter: first, that Communism is basically dualistic in attitude; or second, that it is subordinated to acquiescence; or third, that it is subordinated to activity. This study does not pretend to question too sharply the plausibility of these alternatives because each of them, when other aspects are momentarily dormant, will seem (as sometimes does a single sphere of dialectic) the only one; yet each of them must involve, more or less

despite themselves, aspects of the rest. When all are weighed together, then do we see that the system called Communism, which reflects and is reflected in the acquiescent mood of indifference and compliance, has itself been made possible by a scientific program which reflects and is reflected in the active spirit; but such program meanwhile is deeply imbedded in absolute premises and promises which delimit, direct, in fact originate that program. As Communism thus appropriates *simultaneously* both the positive and negative features of our principal concept—and this is the fourth alternative—the dualism produced by the evidence of Part Two and Part Three accordingly dissolves. Such dualism dissolves, moreover, by what may be for the acquiescent-active attitude a psychological and logical consistency.

And the devotee of Communism, to whom such an attitude can be ascribed, becomes at once creator and worshiper of a magnificent human order.

APPENDIX

A DIAGRAM TO SUGGEST THE RÔLE OF ACQUIESCENCE IN COMMUNISM



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